



Daily Report

East Europe

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29 June 1993

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Hungary, Slovakia Accept Hague Jurisdiction

*LD2806193593 Budapest MTI in English 1906 GMT
28 Jun 93*

[Text] Brussels, June 28 (MTI)—The joint Hungarian-Slovak statement accepting the jurisdiction of the international court of justice on the Gabcikovo dispute took effect on Monday, when the two countries' representatives exchanged related documents.

In the statement, the sides apply to The Hague-based International Court of Justice accepting its jurisdiction on debated issues related to the hydropower plant built on the Danube at Gabcikovo, on the Slovak side.

Hungarian foreign ministry legal department head Gyorgy Szenasi and Slovak counterpart Ivo Hlaracek exchanged documents ratified by both parliaments, in front of Hungary's ambassador to brussels Gyorgy Grasztoi and EC Commission East European affairs director Daniel Guggenbuhl.

Before the trial starts, like any international agreement the submission must be filed with the UN, and Hungarian and Slovak ambassadors to The Hague will have to jointly submit necessary documents to the court, probably this or next week at the latest, Szenasi told MTI.

After submitting the documents, the two countries will have ten months to prepare and submit written evidence. This stage is to be followed by a further seven-month period, when the sides will examine the other's documents and prepare their own responses. The trial will start after this seventeen-month preparation.

Romania, Bulgaria, WEU Agree on Danube Inspections

*AU2806101993 Sofia BTA in English 1856 GMT
27 Jun 93*

[Text] Vidin, June 27 (BTA)—Representatives of Bulgaria, Romania, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Sanctions Assistance Mission had a working meeting in Calafat (Romania) that lasted over four hours, Mr. Vasil Vasilev, deputy chief of the customs in Vidin, told BTA.

The WEU military representatives coordinated with the Bulgarian and the Romanian sides the details of their participation in the inspection and control of vessels sailing along the Danube. Three variants were considered and they will serve as the basis of an intergovernmental agreement on controlling navigation along the Danube to be signed by Bulgaria, Romania and the WEU representatives.

It was specified that until the agreement is signed, all vessels sailing downstream will be inspected at Calafat by a team comprising representatives of Romania, the Sanctions Assistance Mission and the WEU using two Italian patrol boats.

Upstream going vessels will be inspected at Vidin upon arrival of the patrol boats which will be accordingly notified in advance.

A document signed by the three sides will confirm the inspection and will be sent to the next point which the vessel is expected to reach. The Romanian vessels operating inland services will be inspected by the Bulgarian side which should inform the Romanian side about the results to enable it to exercise control over the respective delivery to its consignee in Romania. Such vessels are not required to obtain license from the United Nations. Cruisers are not required to obtain license either. The responsible Romanian and Bulgarian may inspect cruisers in their own judgment.

Ethnic Croats in Serbia Demand Rights

*93BA1107D Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
28 May 93 p 65*

[Article by Andrija Petrovic: "We Are Demanding the Same Rights"]

[Text] Croatia and the Croatian people are still at war, but even now as victors they are deciding their own destiny, although many areas of Croatia are still not free, and in some regions war is still being waged. Hundreds of Croats have been left in the occupied area, and hundreds of thousands are outside their parent state. About 800,000 Croats have been left to live in the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while about 219,000 of them have remained in Serbia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo. Now we hear everyday about the sufferings of those people, and we wonder how to help them.

Croats on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina have formed their own ethnic community of Herceg-Bosnia and they have some kind of prospects for survival in the future. The situation is the most difficult in Serbia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo. There, the Croats have been forced to deny their Croatian name, and if they want to continue to live in their homes, then they must shoot at Croats.

The Serbian authorities in Vojvodina make no mention of Croats, but of Bunjevci as a separate ethnic group. The Croatian name is not mentioned even in the constitution. The Serbian authorities are intentionally forgetting that the Bunjevci are Croats who settled several centuries ago in Vojvodina. They forget that those Croats once had their Croatian name, their Croatian language, and Croatian cultural and artistic societies, but those same Serbian authorities are not forgetting to speak about the Croats as a genocidal people, at the same time doing nothing to prevent the Croats being driven out of Vojvodina every day.

In the last year, about 14,000 Croats have been displaced or forcibly resettled from there, and militant Serbs have moved into their homes with one and only one task—to continue to contribute to the fastest possible displacement of Croats from Vojvodina.

Not Even a Croatian Name

Unfortunately, the number of Croats in Vojvodina is declining unceasingly. There are just about 50,000 of them left and about 12,000 "Bunjevci." But only 10 years ago, according to church sources, there were about 150,000 Croats living in Vojvodina, that is, the same number as lived there in 1931.

If this policy of ethnic cleansing of Vojvodina continues, in five years it will be difficult to speak of any significant group of Croats in Vojvodina at all.

In Belgrade and environs, there are about 100,000 Croats living. But the Serbian authorities persistently deny that figure, speaking only about Catholic Serbs, because in Saint Antun Parish in Novi Belgrade alone there are about 100,000 Catholics. Only here and there does one come upon a Croat, but then only if he serves the Serbian expansionist authorities in realizing their political goals.

Even here in Croatia very little is known about the Croats in the vicinity of Nis and Leskovac. We know that they lived there earlier, but few people know how they are living today. They were long ago left without Croatian cultural institutions.

But it is in Kosovo that it is most difficult for Croats in the Republic of Serbia. Aside from a portion of the population in the Catholic parish of Janjevo, in the other two parishes (Letnica and Vrnavokolo) the Croats are living through very difficult days. Large families without any sort of monthly income, eight or nine children to a room, with no money, food reserves, or drugs, with no prospects whatsoever, with cultural and educational institutions shut down, the everyday life of Kosovo Croats is truly pitiable.

The Latin script has been prohibited by law in Kosovo, Croatian books cannot be obtained, and so the Croatian language and Croatian history are unknown, and the Croatian homeland is too far away to be spoken of. The Croats there have thus even lost their native Croatian language, and what they use is a strange mixture of Macedonian, Albanian, Serbian, and Turkish.

Aside from the Catholic churches with Croatian graves and tricolors on walls painted with frescoes, there is no other sign indicating the fact that Croats formerly lived here and are still living here.

Because of the very difficult economic conditions, but also uncertain political conditions, many Croatian settlements in Kosovo have simply disappeared (the settlement of Novo Brdo, with 10,000 Catholic Croats, has not existed for a long time now, and others are threatened with a similar fate).

The Croats in Kosovo have been subjected to complete and forced assimilation and the ethnic cleansing policy of Serbian expansionism. Croatian villages in Kosovo are patrolled by Serbian police and military armed to the

teeth, and any complaint is punished unmercifully by Serbian expansionism, which blows up the "rebel's" house, drives him away, and frequently murders him.

It is said that between 15,000 and 18,000 Croats are still living in Kosovo today. The rest have been driven out or have left with no hope of return. The Serbs have taken everything from them, they were left nothing but their mere lives. There is no end in sight for Croatian sufferings in Kosovo.

Flight or Resettlement

The Croatian Government looks on all those troubles and sufferings of the Croats in Serbia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo without doing virtually anything (except adopting laws on dual citizenship for all members of the Croatian people and certain individual cases of aid to the diaspora in Serbia). At the same time, the Serbs in Croatia are being offered cultural and political autonomy and all other rights as an ethnic minority. Thus, most frequently left to themselves, the Croats in the Republic of Serbia have no choice but to remain and serve the Serbian tyrants or to set off into uncertainty. If we want to help them, we have to offer them some place to go, they have to understand our ultimate intentions. Many have an urgent need for temporary housing. For that matter, DANAS wrote extensively in its last issue about the problem of resettlement.

As an independent and sovereign state, Croatia must finally do something more for the Croats in Serbia. If it doesn't, Serbia will continue the ethnic cleansing and displacement of Croats from their century-old homes without consideration. The loss of that segment of the Croatian people would be a true national disaster for Croatia. Perhaps in fact the peaceful political resettlement of Croats from Serbia to Croatia would be one of the best solutions if their status cannot be corrected.

The move is up to the Croatian Government. We will see what it does, but we are of the opinion that the Croatian Government must not forget the promises that it will be equally concerned for all Croats, wherever they might live, but particularly for those on the territory of Serbia.

The Croatian Supreme Command presumably is not forgetting that 50 years ago 150,000 Croats lived in Vojvodina, that southern parts of Serbia and Kosovo were settled by Croats in the early Middle Ages, that that is Red Croatia, that a Croatian culture was created in those areas.

Let us then do something urgently for those Croats, because tomorrow it will be too late. The first step has already been taken, and that is to guarantee all political and cultural rights to all ethnic minorities in Croatia, the Serbian minority in particular. Thus, we are seeking that same right for Croats in the Republic of Serbia.

Because once the ethnic consciousness of a people is lost there, it never gets it back again.

Berisha Letter to UN Protests Greek Expulsions

AU2906094693 Tirana ATA in English 0818 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Tirana, June 29 (ATA)—On June 28, the president of the Republic of Albania sent a letter to the UN secretary-general, Butrus Butrus-Ghali, to the chairman of the Security Council, James Hojnock [name as received] to the High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, the secretary general of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumiere, the president of the Commission of the European Community, Jacques Delors through which he explains the circumstances of the expulsion of the Greek citizen Stamos and informed of the massive purging operation for the Albanian refugees. Follow the text of the letter:

"Your Excellency,

"The purpose of this letter is to notify you of an action that the Greek authorities launched on June 26, 1993. The Greek police started the massive expulsion operation of the Albanian refugees living and working in Greece for some time, helping themselves and their families back home. They have also contributed to the wealth of Greece which has been acknowledged by the Greek Government. Until now, 4000 people have been indiscriminately seized, maltreated, literally beaten, their documents torn-up, and finally driven to Albania without leaving them the possibility to take their saved money and personal belongings. A great many of them had been provided with regular visas and residence permits by the Greek authorities.

"The excuse for such an action on the part of the Greek authorities was the expulsion by the Albanian authorities of the Greek priest, Costa Stamos [as received], whose activity clearly transcended the religious scope. In the course of such activity, together with other political and religious Greek circles, he has expressed openly territorial claims, has engaged in the distribution of maps, leaflets and brochures which present or demand the hellenization and annexation of the southern Albania from Greece. Such activity and claims have found their support in the Greek broadcastings from Corfu and Ioannina. The aim of such policy is to undermine the good will and cooperation between the two countries, the peace and stability, which our region badly needs nowadays. It is a clear expression of intolerance and short-sightedness, which fuels hatred and animosity in the Balkans.

"In addition to this, I would like to point out that the above-mentioned Greek citizen is only a self-proclaimed archimandrite, since this function is denied to him by the statute of the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church. It's worth mentioning here that a year ago, the patriarch of Constantinople, in open violation of this statute and without prior consultations with the religious and official authorities of the country, nominated four priests in Albania, namely, the archbishop and three archimandrites. After some discussion, an agreement

was reached with the archbishop that his tenure would be temporary, whereas the nomination of the other three archimandrites was cancelled.

"The Greek authorities which surprisingly enough have insisted on this, have received the same answer. Considering this activity as encroachment upon the constitutional law and detrimental to the integrity of the country and the bilateral relations with Greece, the Albanian authorities took the decisions to expel him from the country. Such decision was made known to the Greek authorities through the Greek General Consulate in Gjirokastra, which accepted it. But the incident during the carrying out of the decision is mainly due to the incorrect attitude of the officials of the Greek General Consulate and the religious authorities in that city.

"I'm afraid that this instance with the Greek citizen was only the pretext of a chain of revengeful acts of a policy, which could lead to the further destabilization of the situation in the Balkans.

"In the framework of the observation of the human rights, one of the main concerns of the Albanian government has been the human rights of the Greek minority. This minority is recognized as such [words indistinct] it enjoys freedom of movement, may get schooling in mother tongue and practice its own religion in the Greek language. Eventually, there [word indistinct] many priests from Greece who carry out freely the religious services in all the orthodox cult institutions. All these rights are realized in practice [words indistinct] evidenced by various foreign official delegations.

"In this context, the massive expulsion of the Albanians from Greece, especially of those many with regular visas and residence permits issued by the Greek authorities, their arrest and maltreatment constitute a grave violation of the human rights upheld by the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights, the convention of 1952 [as received] and the protocols of 1967 related to refugees, the CSCE Copenhagen document on human dimension, the Charter of Paris of a New Europe [as received], the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, etc.

"Finally, I would like to point out once again that Greece and the Greek people have given a great help to Albania in this difficult period it is going through. Therefore, we have expressed our gratitude to them. But certainly, it is inconceivable to accept the conditioning of such help by the violation of the sovereignty of the country. The recent development damage the cooperation and the good bilateral relations, for the progress of which me and Prime Minister Mr. Mitsotakis are seriously engaged.

"Mr. Secretary-General,

"Expressing once again my determination to work with commitment for the development of the relations and friendship with Greece and the Greek people, I appeal

for the intervention of your authority and of the organization you represent, in order to put an end to this situation as soon as possible.

"Thanking you in advance for your help, please Your Excellency, accept the assurances of my highest consideration."

President Berisha Gives News Conference

AU2506200293 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1410 GMT 23 Jun 93

[News conference by President Sali Berisha in Tirana on 23 June—recorded]

[Text] [Berisha] Let us start the conversation. I am open to any question.

[Cerciz Loloci, ALTERNATIVA] The first question is: Can you tell us something about your debate with the Serbian foreign minister in Switzerland? The second is: How do you assess the fact that the social democratic group left the parliament? Thank you.

[Berisha] Any other questions?

[Unidentified reporter] The warning of increased bread prices was misinterpreted by the opposition and presented as a bogey for the people. How is the truth about this problem?

The second question is: Though the working group presented the draft constitution in time, this brought an irresponsible boycott in the parliamentary ranks of the Socialist Party [PSSH] and the Social Democratic Party [PSD]. How do you assess this position?

[Berisha] Regarding the debate in Crans Montana, I can say that it was a discussion on the Balkan crisis, and every participant at this conference expressed his own views on the real causes of the crisis. The minister of the so-called Yugoslav Federation [words indistinct] presented or, as to say, read a report in which he accused the whole international community of being responsible for the crisis and, in one way or another, revealed every action carried out by the Serbian chauvinistic circles and their responsibility for this crisis. He tried to present the Albanians of Kosovo as people who enjoy full rights and freedoms.

Of course, as you have already heard, my answer was what you listened to in the program. I told him that your discussion resembles a self-accusation against the international community, which is typical of the dictatorships that generally say that we are right and all the others are wrong. In my discussion there, I stressed that the real cause is the decision to create a Greater Serbia. The actions undertaken by Greater Serbia are the cause of the war and the conflict. The war has started neither as a religious nor as an inter-ethnic war. It has started as a war and aggression to create Greater Serbia. It is internationally known that in this Serbian tragical process we

imply the ethnic [word indistinct] of all other non-Serbian communities. Thus, later, this war obtained some (inter-?contextual) and inter-ethnic colors.

Regarding the rights of Albanians in Kosovo, I pointed out that their constitution was abolished by tanks. The schools are closed, the enterprises, too. In fact, Kosovo is living under a full occupation. If Albania is trying, and will defend the rights of Albanians wherever they are, this derives not from its aims to change the borders by force but from its right on the basis of international agreements and acts on this question. The truth is as undeniable as it is proved. There is a nation today that, in all the places where it is situated, is fighting and struggling for a democratic space and a democratic society. This is the Albanian nation. [words indistinct] and it is very true that, in this very turbulent period, it is playing a very important role in stabilizing and maintaining peace in the Balkans. I think that this is a [word indistinct] policy of the Albanians. I think that we should stick to this policy, because any deviation from the course of aggression and a Balkan war should be one of the first duties of all the democratic forces in the Balkan peninsula.

The minister accused Albania of having tendencies to encourage the secessionism of Montenegro, which is very absurd, because we are not at a moment to encourage Montenegro's secession, but we will differentiate it. Even before, we have stated so many times that Montenegro deserves to be differentiated. That is why it would have been better to place an embargo on the border with (word indistinct) as Montenegro has kept several differentiated attitudes. It has voted for Carrington's platform, it has voted for the Vance-Owen plan, it has accepted the installation of monitors on the border with Bosnia, and voted against Cosic's illegal dismissal. That is, there were a series of decisions. It is something else that this republic, with its vote, cannot determine the dreadful developments that occur in the former Yugoslavia. The truth is that, at least publicly, they maintain a stand different from that of the Belgrade leadership.

This problem took this course while we were discussing the embargo, as we are, practically, the country that respects the embargo more and better than all others. Besides the very great economic damage that this embargo has done, and is doing, to Albania, I think that the embargo and the shadow of war are two factors that have damaged Albania more than any other country in the region, besides Bosnia. Besides the great economic damage, the embargo has also a moral aspect. We [words indistinct] in the north-eastern part, we have Albanians of Kosovo, while in the northern part we have the Montenegrins. Practically, the two peoples, who may not deserve the embargo at all because they are not decisive in the Greater Serbian policy, are directly suffering these consequences.

He also discussed another problem of [words indistinct] some two or three years ago from Shkoder. I told him that they have left like many other Albanians. They are

welcomed to return to their homes. They will enjoy citizenship and all the rights belonging to them in conformity with Albanian law and minority rights. We have not evicted them. They left of their own accord, like many Albanians [words indistinct] for economic reasons.

[Reporter] How do you assess the fact that the social democratic group abandoned the parliament?

[Berisha] I consider this act to be hasty. I want to say here that I have considered and consider the work of the social democratic group in the parliament to be an undisputable positive contribution in the work of the Albanian parliament to improve legislation and approve the appropriate legislation. However, it seems to me that the departure from the parliament for the fact that the working group sent the draft constitution to the Constitution Commission on 14 June, but which should have also been sent on 8 June or 1 June, seems to me to be a hasty action. I think, and I am convinced, that the social democratic group will reconsider its decision, because it is absolutely unacceptable to abandon the Albanian parliament for the fact that the commission handed over the Constitution on 14 June and not on 16 June.

I want to clarify something. Gentlemen, here we are concerned with a procedure. The Commission for the Constitution charged a working group to compile the Constitution. This working group was made up of our most distinguished law specialists. It was the same group that compiled the human rights charter, which in fact is one of the most advanced that exists in European legislation today. That working group worked on the Constitution and I think it completed the draft by 13 September, excuse me, 13 June. On 14 June, in the quality of the Constitution Commission chairman, Premier Meksi sent it to all commission members in an envelope and with a letter enclosed. He sent a copy to me, and another one to Mr. Arbënor. To respect the deputies, Mr. Arbënor photocopied it and gave a copy to them. Also, the discussions of the Constitution Commission have not finished yet. It is true that the deputies did not get it from the commission, but the deputies did not receive it for discussion. They could study it or make remarks. It was not handed over on the day when the parliament would open the discussion on the Constitution. No. It was very clear because this was sent to the Constitution Commission and all political forces are represented in this commission. Every of these forces in the Constitution Commission has the right to make remarks that it considers necessary about the presented draft. It has also another great right—to present, if it wants, its own project. Whoever wishes, let him compile and [words indistinct]. What is important is that the country has the best and the most appropriate constitution. Instead of working in this direction, the group left the parliament.

I think that the pretext cannot be more unimportant when undertaking such a great and important step. I express my regret, because the social democratic group has undoubtedly played, and I am convinced it will play,

a constructive role in the assembly proceedings. This group cannot approve or approach the goals of several elements who, at the very beginning, for the sake of preserving or winning a position, have committed themselves to block democracy, to block its promotion, and cause crisis. These are a group of people who dream of great overthrows, they see dreams of great social downfalls and think that democracy will repeat the strong scenes and the powerful movements that the Albanian people fermented against the dictatorship. This is to see dreams with open eyes. They started to hold elections on 23 March. They continued. The EC interrupted its aid to Albania, though the EC had donated \$100 million, besides other things. The government plunged the state into a debt of \$800 million, which they had created all by themselves. The government could not survive this winter. It entered winter and completed a year in power. However, the government will not be able to get out of the winter.

When the IMF was drawing conclusions, they asked for the overthrow of the government. I think that this is the greatest absurdity demanded by this group of people. They are not another opposition, they do not represent the opposition. I can say it here openly that they do not represent the opposition. No. This group of people showed themselves when we discussed human rights. It is unprecedented in the history of Europe. Twice, people have raised a voice against Helsinki. Once, Enver Hoxha raised his voice against it. He called the CSCE conference the conference of insecurity, and so on and so forth, finding all sorts of definitions. The second time was several months ago, when some people in the Albanian parliament raised these principles again. This is unprecedented. I can say that this was an extremely irresponsible action, because, first, I want to tell you that, before presenting them, we got the full consensus of the three parliamentary groups. What happened later? The order of the party, the order of the party, it cannot be explained otherwise.

[Berisha] The second was that it was clearly revealed that several individuals are not interested in the constitution and the legislation. They are only interested in blocking it. Where was this manifested? Who hindered any of these groups from saying that this chapter on human rights was, in fact, of a European standard? Honorable deputies of the majority, we, as a parliamentary group have this proposal—that this be the first chapter of the constitution of Albania. After eight days, thinking that we will not behave [words indistinct] from Paris or Brussels, where we were on business, the parliament continued to be blocked for eight days. The tendency was clear—block the parliament and leave Albania without a human rights charter. This is the position maintained by these elements today. I can regretfully say that they do not aim [words indistinct] to achieve the constitution, but to block the parliament and leave the country without a constitution.

Let us discuss this suspension. The truth is that I can responsibly say that the parliament is not blocked. The

parliament is successfully continuing its work and is adopting very important laws, such as the Law on the Five-Day Week. I am really sorry that Albanian social democracy, which is undoubtedly the initiator of a social program for Albania, was absent in the parliament yesterday. Thus, the parliament will continue its work because it has the majority, and this majority, according to not only Albanian law but all the laws of the world, is a full representative to continue work until the next mandate defined by constitutional law.

Second, viewed from another angle, what does it mean to abandon the parliament? To abandon parliament is a self-condemning act. The self-condemnations in politics are absurdities—they are self-diminutives. A democratic state cannot accept a self-condemnation, as practically in [words indistinct] the people here and the international public prefer the one who fights and tries but not the one who deviates and leaves. Why have the others voted for you, to leave the parliament? Then, let us suppose that this does not meet the interests of one party electorate. Sir, do not forget that, by constitution, you do not only represent that electorate. In the zone where you are elected, you represent the whole electorate. Thus, there are several actions, especially the self-condemnation, that are a form of self blockage. You are blocking yourself, not the institutions of democracy. They cannot be blocked with acts that lead toward reduction and diminution. Anyway, I call on them to come back to the parliament and continue their work. At the same time, I call on the majority that is continuing to work in the parliament to feel more the responsibility it has at this period so that the laws be as complete as possible and better suit the interests of the Albanian electorate.

Let us go further. What does this blockage constitute for the constitution? Does it pose a tragic problem? It does not at present a tragic problem at all, gentlemen. Why?

First, I want to stress that even some of the most developed countries in the world today operate with constitutional laws, and we have a constitutional law that covers approximately 90-95 percent of a constitution's content. The difference between a constitution and a constitutional law does not lie in the strength, since the strength is identical, but in the content it covers. The constitution covers the whole matter, whereas constitutional law has a deficiency of 5-10 percent, depending on the case. First, the truth is that even the most developed democracies in the world today are based on constitutional laws. Second, there are other countries that have no constitution at all and are among the most democratic ones. Third, there are some former communist countries with a developed democracy that still have a constitution of the 1950's. Thus, to create psychological pressure on the people over the lack of the constitution means to simply politicize an absurdity, a problem that does not need to be politicized but solved. Thus, in this respect, Albanian democracy is not and will not be hindered on its road of development or the road of integration toward Europe, even with the present legislation [words indistinct] with the Civil and Penal Code are most imperative

that Albania equals its legislation with that of other developed European countries. That is why this is a completely absurd attempt. It has no meaning at all.

Second, a problem is raised on the way of approving the Constitution. There are several ways to approve the constitution. One way is through parliament and another is by referendum, which seems the best choice at first sight. The third is by a constitutional assembly.

[Berisha] Why did the working group decide on a constitutional assembly? Because if we consider our constitutional laws, some are issued with a parliament of 250 deputies, others with 140 deputies. To tell you the truth, it may be too much that 140 people decide on the constitution. Why? The same people, with their votes, have elected people who enjoy the votes of four deputies, such as the mayor of a municipality. Is it not logical that this person be mandated and come and vote for the constitution? Very logical. This is the practice of most democratic countries in Europe. There is no other goal here besides the aim to expand the base of the approval of this fundamental document.

As a conclusion, I think that the establishment of a dialogue between the political forces and future meetings of the Constitutional Commission, in which everyone will have the right to present remarks about the draft constitution and even its own draft, are the way that will help in the process toward compiling the final draft and approving the new constitution of Albania.

Concerning the increase in the price of bread, I want to say that in the process of Albania's integration into Europe at the economic level, a fundamental condition is not the decrease but the increase of prices, because in case [words indistinct] we would imagine that we would go toward economic integration and cooperation by declining prices, this would facilitate that the goods come from above, and not create them themselves. In case we would accept to go with an increase in prices, this means finding or using those stimuli that the whole world has used to increase production. The most typical case in this direction is the price of bread.

Why are we increasing the price of bread? We are increasing the price simply to increase wheat production, because the Albanian peasant must have a developed material interest—this can no longer be done through moral encouragement—to sow large areas with as much wheat as possible. Practically in this process, the state that once took 30-40 billion leks from the peasant is obliged today to invest no less than 3 billion leks only for the bread. Three billion [leks] is a lot money to invest to compensate the peasant. Nevertheless, we are doing this because this is the most honest and fair way to increase wheat production. Where does this money go? This money goes to the peasant, first to increase its welfare. Second, there is a very great [word indistinct].

We are not a poor country by nature. However, we cannot accept the others to work for us, that we leave the land barren and the French, Italian, or German farmer

sow the lands for us. No. We will sow and produce the maximum of what we could buy by increasing the farmer's interest for the land to the maximum. In fact, this is a very fair policy. The amount of compensation is greater than in any other time and it will be as such. We have considered slowing down somewhere so that we can detach ourselves from the emergency aid and with dignity, as it suits us, be enrolled in a middle-term economic cooperation with other countries. If we stay on alms, emergency, I do not think this is fair. They have helped us extremely too much. We should have an unlimited gratitude toward all those who helped us. Today the time has come to exploit all our opportunities. The greatest help that Europe can give us, the greatest help that the world can give us is, in my opinion, to make us capable to exploit the great opportunities that Albania represents. That is why I am convinced that the increase of the bread price will be properly understood.

Lastly, there exists another reason. It is in our interest that the Albanian peasant wants to sow wheat. Why? Not because wheat is the most profitable culture. No. The most profitable ones are vegetables and several other cultures, but they need certain market lines. As long as these market lines are not guaranteed, let us earn with the wheat and, gradually with their creation, the farmer will later pass toward substituting the wheat culture with other cultures, which he can profit from more. The profit is undoubtedly the basic law of the society we are building. Finally, by passing into the world wheat price, we give the private owner the opportunity to enter into trade, import wheat, and sell bread, thus completely doing away with our dependence. I think that this is the real road, by means of which Albania will break away from the corn legend, since the corn legend has always been tied to the Albanian people. Even when we declared that we have ensured the bread, the truth was that we had ensured only the corn. The corn legend continued. Thus, in this way and at this amount, despite the fact that the state will lose a large amount of money by investing, Albania will detach itself from the corn legend and this is a measure to be greeted.

[Reporter] A little earlier, you spoke about the consequences of the embargo toward Albania, regarding the northern and north-eastern areas of Albania that were more affected, thus creating a contrast with other areas. All economic activity is suspended in these regions. How do you see the prospects for these areas?

A second question: Our diplomacy and the majority of Western diplomacies, including that of the United States, have expressed themselves in favor of a military intervention in Yugoslavia against the Serbian forces in Bosnia. Meanwhile, the main opposition party in Albania has signed a statement [a joint statement compiled by the PSSh of Albania and PASOK of Greece] against this platform. How do you assess this statement with the consequences for the international public?

[Berisha] It is true that Shkoder and other north-eastern areas are those that are suffering the consequences of the

embargo most. We have discussed this problem with the UN secretary general and we are discussing it with the EC. We will try to take measures to overcome the very serious consequences that the embargo is creating, particularly in Shkoder and several of the northeastern cities. This is necessary because the closure of border has, in fact, created, and is creating, great economic difficulties.

Concerning the statement, I can say that I have read it. I can assert that it was a typical document of the Party of Labor of Albania. There, clearly and in an evident way, the party colors are placed above national interests. I want to stress, and I am convinced, that this does not at all represent the position of the Albanian socialists. No. I am convinced that the overwhelming majority of the Albanian socialists cannot accept ignoring the Albanian factor in the Balkans as it is ignored in the joint statement of these two parties. I am convinced that the majority of Albanian socialists will not ignore the Cam factor. The existence of this factor is not even ignored by the present Greek Government. I am convinced that the overwhelming majority of the Albanian socialists, and Albanians wherever they are, despite their political convictions, cannot ignore the fact of the ethnic distribution of the Albanian nation and their effort for freedom and human and national rights. I think that this document may be classified among the numerous statements that the Party of Labor of Albania has issued in the past in conformity with its ideological interests.

[Reporter] Mr. President, you explained the problem of the constitutional assembly. I would like you, if possible, to explain to us whether it is in the president's precedence to appoint by decree the constitutional assembly or whether the parliament should appoint it, because the present constitutional law contains an article which, among the president's prerogatives, allows the president to issue only decrees of an individual character. I express myself so, because the report on your meeting with Council of Europe representatives stated that this will be decided by a presidential decree.

The second question: On 18 June, an activity of the Socialist Party was prohibited in the city of Shkoder. What is your assessment of this event, and is the present state able to guarantee the legitimate activity of the legal parties in Albania?

The third question has to do with the round table on local government problems [word indistinct] typical, which was organized three months ago. After the round table organized by the parties, what has been done, so far, in this direction to normalize the work of local government?

[Berisha] Concerning the constitutional assembly, I can say that, by constitution, the president has the right to issue individual and normative decrees, and there is no limitation as far as these decrees are concerned. I have noticed that PSSh exponents have called many of my initiatives unconstitutional. The presentation, on my

part, of the Human Rights and Freedoms Charter was called such. I am not surprised by this tendency to limit the legal power of the presidential institution, but I can say with full responsibility that this is done only for political reasons and has deeply political aims. Nevertheless, I can say that I will continue to assign my prerogatives rigorously without violating the constitution. I can assure you of one thing—my individual decrees, as you say, should all pass and be approved in the Albanian Parliament. Thus, it is up to the parliament to accept it or not, while my initiative has no limitations. It cannot have limitations.

Regarding the second question, of whether an activity has been held and whether the state can secure it or not, I think that the state has generally protected all waves of meetings organized, from Peshkopi up to the north of Albania, and will protect them in the future, too. I can assure you of this, that the state will protect them in the future, too.

However, regarding Shkoder [words indistinct] tell the gentlemen of your group that participated at the meeting. I have two remarks about them. My first remark is—I think that when Mr. Shaqir, as People's Assembly deputy chairman, and Mr. Dokle go in the cities, as they are important personalities, they should be accompanied by local power authorities. We should understand this. There is no distinction in this. They represent local government, they are local government officials. I, and every state personality, should address the existing state authorities, wherever we go and will go. So should they.

Second, I have told them and I am saying it here, too. To tell the truth, Shkoder does not like socialist ideas. This is the reality. Then, why do you go to Shkoder? Shkoder has shown that it does not want socialist ideas. And it is right. To be realistic, Shkoder has suffered from socialism more than any other city in Europe. Because of socialism, hundreds of Shkoder sons suffered and were lost in the prisons of Albania. Socialism left Shkoder the most undeveloped city of Albania. We are witness to all this. Socialism reduced Shkoder to that situation, everything done there was done to diminish. Shkoder has remained the castle of democracy and Albanian democratic thinking. Shkoder had the great merit not to embrace socialist ideas. Why did you go there to propagate socialist ideas? Thus, I do not think that there were two positions, I can assure you that the same policy that we are guaranteeing in Tirana applies in Shkoder, too. The same rules are also for Shkoder. We will guarantee them everywhere we will go. However, the political forces are obliged to calculate reality. Ignoring reality is not normal. We should consider one reality. This is the reality if you go there.

Regarding local government, Mr. Jupe, I want to clarify that it is true that the round table, which has functioned and will function for other problems as well, as I never intend to abandon dialogue, crystallized several problems that are still today not completed, but are on the

way to being completed. I will explain to you and to all others why these problems are left. One of our most competent lawyers was engaged in compiling these laws. He became seriously ill. However, Premier Meksi managed to replace him. Beside this, we have asked that all these laws be harmonized with the European Charter on Local Autonomy. I have held several meetings with various specialists, including Council of Europe specialists. I have asked them, if possible, to help us compile local government laws in full conformity with the standards of the European Charter on Local Autonomy. As they get diverse information and various forces give their own opinions, one of them asked me and said—Mr. President, are you ready to grant them the prerogatives pertaining to them? I am unquestionably ready, and have the greatest pleasure in doing this.

I can say that one of the main directions of work is decentralization. I will give accounts of decentralization until the end, as decentralization is the multiplication of the people's energies in building a society. Decentralization is the participation of people in building it. Thus, these laws that are processed or are on the way to being processed will pass on to parliament. I cannot deny that there was a delay, but, on the other hand, I can say that there were objective reasons for this delay.

[Reporter] Mr. President, the reduction of the monthly increase of inflation is a success that shows some sign of the economy recovering from the stagnation into which it has fallen. It is known that inflation is one aspect of the stagnant situation, while the other aspect is unemployment, which in fact has been greatly aggravated. Is there optimism among government circles over reducing unemployment and regenerating employment and, if this optimism exists, what means and goals is it based on?

[Berisha] Your question is very appropriate. Regarding unemployment, I want to stress, at the very beginning, that there is an extreme exaggeration of unemployment in Albania. It is undoubtedly the grandest factor. I do not want to ignore or deny this. However, there is a great exaggeration of this factor, and this is done for political reasons. It is not good. If you cast an eye on the last year, Mr. Stefani, what do the data show? They show that the private sector created about 107,000, or more than 100,000, positions. Out of them, 20,000 or 30,000 may have been created from the privatization of state units, while the other vacancies are all a product of the free initiative of the citizen [word indistinct]. I think that this is a very great achievement.

Why do I consider this to be a very great achievement? I consider it such because I believe that it would have been impossible to employ 100,000 people during a short period of time without building dozens of combines. Second, if we consider the present economic state and the level of income, I can say that the majority of those employed in the private sector earn more than the highest-level officials of the Albanian state. That is, this is a great opportunity for their families. We are thinking of working in this direction. We are determined to

encourage free initiative and the private sector. Thus, we will not concentrate more on great works, but on small and middle-size enterprises, because we see that the great experience of this year is very satisfactory and encouraging in this direction. We intend to direct the disposable funds and the aid we will receive mainly to these sectors, so as to create working places through small and middle-size enterprises. This will be our policy, as there is no doubt that the privatization package that the government announced should have a beneficial influence in this direction. This package includes a number of 500 or more enterprises and will revitalize these enterprises, some with reductions of working places, but in many other places by increasing the number of workers, though there are difficulties. This is precisely the reason we are stating everywhere that we need investments from financial international institutions and investors, because unemployment is really a very complicated problem, a great problem.

[Reporter Bedri Myftari] Several party journalists are openly making communist propaganda at a time when communist, racist, and so on, (?propaganda) is prohibited. There are also many reporters who slander and denigrate citizens and special persons. Today, for example, the newspaper KOHA JONE published an article stating that thousands of planes, thousands of cannons, hundreds of dozens of ships are being sent toward Tropoje, Shengjin, Kukes, Pogradec. Are there measures taken for these people or not? If these are true, this is good, as we are informed about many things. If they lie, let us do as Bosnia that has [words indistinct].

[Berisha] I think that the press continues to deal with excess polemics and to publish unconfirmed news. Concerning the latest news, it has nothing to do with reality. There is a great discussion about the Law on Press. In front of you, I have expressed my point of view. Again, I stick to that viewpoint, but I see that parliament has a greater will or determination to compile a law on the press. Perhaps the Law on Press will impose a greater regulation in the information published in present newspapers. Anyway, I invite, and insist, that the present press, which should and must be a powerful factor in developing and promoting democracy, conform to reality and the facts, considering that democracy is based on the truth. Democracy can only be based on the truth. Everything that is false cannot serve democracy.

[Ndrek Gjini, ATA] I want to address a question to you in your role as the chairman of the Highest Council of Justice. When will Albanian justice take the courage to look itself in the eye?

[Berisha] I would say that Albanian justice is working. Albanian justice has, undoubtedly, shortcomings and great difficulties. However, it, undoubtedly, has had defects and is functioning. It is in the process of its reconstruction, [word indistinct] in the process of being enriched with news concepts and I am not pessimistic. I am convinced that it will gradually perform its very important function in the law-governed state.

What are the principles of understanding that Albania's cooperation with other countries is based on? These are well-known principles, such as respect for the values and universal principles on which a democratic society is built, and the recognition of human and national rights and freedoms of Albanians wherever they are. I think that we are a people free of prejudices. We develop a policy of peace and stability in the Balkans. Thus, we would not expel anyone from cooperation if he shows the good will to fully respect the national rights and freedoms of Albanians wherever they are. It would be, however, a great absurdity to think that we can jump over them. It is true that Albanians are experiencing a complete conquest in Kosovo and an apartheid unprecedented in Europe. Thus, to express goodwill under these conditions sounds more a hypocritical call than a realistic one. It is very clear and easy to respect the rights of Albanians and this would be a powerful factor of cooperation with all countries where Albanians are living.

The next problem regards executioners. We have expressed our opinion on this. We have held and will hold several lawsuits related to concrete crimes. There can and will be no massive lawsuits. This is a clear definition of the program of the party that won the 22 March elections.

Regarding the death penalty, I can say that it has been abolished in the overwhelming majority of European countries. Today, Europe does not practice the death penalty. This is the reality, if we proceed from two factors: First, the state does not find it very moral to kill a citizen for a crime he committed at a time when the state can keep him imprisoned for life and make him harmless for society. Second, the studies in criminalistics have finally proved that keeping the death penalty has no direct influence on reducing crime. Albania does not [words indistinct], based on the principle that serious crime is more unusual for them. Albania may not have it even for men. If we put forward the paradox that we have banned it for women and still retain it for men, perhaps the question arises whether we will add it for women, too, so as to symmetrize, because I agree there should be no asymmetry. There is no need for such an asymmetry. This is an asymmetrical solution. I would say it is better to symmetrize it by banning it. Anyway, this is a problem that requires discussion, a public inquiry, and many opinions, because such decisions should find compatibility. There should be a consensus on them.

[Reporter] Mr. President, you yourself and many other politicians, from among those who, presently, have state functions, have expressed [words indistinct] for this category. Meanwhile, there are voices that many present functionaries have been informers of the State Security. What do you think really hinders this political action? Thank you.

[Berisha] In all my [word indistinct], the files will be opened. I am convinced that the files will be opened. Personally, I remain, and will remain, loyal to the

principle that the files be opened only for the politicians. There are diverse opinions. Someone says to open them for all. I do not think this is reasonable. This means to make their anatomy, to make their [word indistinct]. Let us open the files for politicians. Regarding those who have collaborated, let them leave for a certain period of time, as is done by some other countries. I, myself, have no doubt, because the files will be opened. I guarantee that they will be opened with the maximum of transparency, as this is necessary. It is a process that should, in no way, be avoidable by politicians.

[Reporter] There is a presidential decree on the verification of the sources of properties that has been mentioned many times, even in news conferences. The most eccentric owners and businessmen have appeared in Albania. Generally speaking, I mean the communists, former communists who left political power and took over economic power. Why have the respective institutions done nothing to apply this decree?

The second question: The meeting of the five foreign ministers of the United States, England, France, Spain, and Russia, and especially the exclusion from this meeting of Germany and Italy, seems to significantly diminish the minimal Vance-Owen plan. What will be your opinion on this problem?

[Berisha] Regarding the decree, it is true that the decree exists. I have repeatedly presented this to the government and, as far as I am informed, the State Control Commission has prepared the procedure of verifying the properties. The commission will soon start to declare, define, and clarify the means of gathering the properties.

Regarding the plan of the five, I think that it is true that it aroused a discussion regarding the validity of the Vance-Owen plan. However, I do not think that the absence of two other big states was decisive in invalidating the Vance-Owen plan. The Vance-Owen plan was invalidated by Serbian aggression, the continuation of fighting, and the sluggishness of the international community to impose the decisions taken by the Security Council. In this respect, I can say that it is more necessary to undertake a decision to control the implementation of the decisions taken so far. Do you have other questions? Then, good bye.

Socialists Respond to Berisha Statements

AU2806080393 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 25 Jun 93 pp 1, 4

["Observer" article: "The Socialist Party's Stand on the National Cause Is Clear and Candid—Reply to President Berisha"]

[Text] On 17 June, ZERI I POPULLIT published a joint declaration of the Socialist Party [PSSH] and PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement]. The following day, the paper published an editorial article considering this declaration to be a new page in relations between the PSSH and PASOK.

Immediately afterward, the Democratic Party [PD] press and some other papers, without any evidence or logic, began attacking the PSSH for "betraying" national interests. We will not make the effort to reply to these newspapers because we have stated matters frankly.

However, President Berisha's statement at his news conference the day before yesterday [23 Jun] made an impression on us. Mr. Berisha spoke like a jealous communist, like a PD activist, and not like the country's president, as he tried to create the impression that he has been a "consistent defender" of the national cause.

"It is evident," Berisha said, "that party colors obscured national interests" (i.e. in the PSSH-PASOK declaration).

We have no reason to dwell item by item on the president's statement with its spiteful attacks on the PSSH, because the stands of the PSSH and PASOK are quite clear in their joint declaration, and also because Mr. Berisha, for good or ill, is highly contradictory himself, not only in what he says one day and what he says the next, but even within a single phrase or during a news conference.

We wish merely to tell the president that his statement was utterly irresponsible and tendentious, because the PSSH has always maintained an extremely clear and unequivocal policy on the national cause. It has publicly stated this. Not only this, but the PSSH has been highly committed to starting work realistically in the service of the national cause. It has maintained a firm line on the options for the solution of the national question. It has consistently been imbued with a European spirit and its realistic in Europe. This too has been public knowledge.

It is the party that you represent, Mr. President, that has speculated with party colors. Remember your initial statements claiming that, when the PD won, the artificial fence between Albania and Kosovo would fall, just as the Berlin Wall fell! Remember, too, the persistent inconsistencies of your own and your party's continually changing political formulations. Remember your attempts to obstruct, or at least to discount and to fail to attend as a party, the roundtable of political parties of Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia held at Tetovo II and in Tirana!

The PSSH was the first, and perhaps the sole, political force to come out against the "Program of Joint Action" of the United States, Russia, France, Britain, and Spain, which denied Kosovo the right to independence.

We published our stand in ZERI I POPULLIT of 30 May. There, we do not only not ignore the Albanian factor, but openly state that "nobody has the right to decide and issue statements on the political rights of the Albanian people in Kosovo. The PSSH cannot agree with the denial of the right to self-determination for the Albanian people in Kosovo." We have stated, Mr. President, that there can be no solution of the conflicts in the

Balkans without the Albanian factor. Can this clear stand be what you called ignoring the Albanian factor?

I think, Mr. President, that it is also very clear when we state that "the PSSh is concerned for a fair solution of the national question and it will, as always, fight with dedication and responsibility for the country's destiny, not allowing any postponement or delay in the solution of the Albanian national question." We have also said that, in order to solve the problems properly and fairly, "it is time for Albania's foreign policy to be made in Albania, by and for the Albanians." He have also shown these utterly clear stands in the statement of the PSSh Presidium published in ZERI I POPULLIT of 30 May 1993.

Looking reality in the eye, we have the right to ask you, Mr. President, what attitude our state maintains toward the 22 May meeting of the five powers that deny Kosovo's right to self-determination. The Foreign Ministry statement published on this occasion by RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE and carried by the television openly leaves it to be understood that our state agrees with this decision! This becomes even more convincing if we turn to the question put to you at the news conference, about the meeting of the five powers in the United States on 22 May. You did not speak out at all, Mr. President, and this means that you either agree with these five powers that the independence of Kosovo should not be recognized, or that you do not have the courage to speak frankly.

This was not the way you spoke two years ago, Mr. President! We spoke in the same way; we emphasized that the principle of the immutability of borders through violence does not, in any way, conflict with the principle of the right to self-determination of the Albanian people in Kosovo. You are therefore inconsistent on the national question and its solution.

Mr. President, the joint declaration of the PSSh and PASOK also includes a realistic assessment of the situation in the Balkans, the need for a peaceful solution to

conflicts and for togetherness and understanding among the peoples of the region, and for the guarantee of human and minority rights as laid down in the CSCE Paris Charter, the UN Declaration on Human Rights; in other words, it is in a European spirit. It clearly states that "They (i.e. the PSSh and PASOK) powerfully support and will devote all their efforts to encouraging cooperation, dialogue, and mutual understanding among the peoples of the Balkans and Europe, in the conviction that interdependence and peaceful togetherness represent a contemporary context for a guarantee of national independence and of national identity."

I would remind you, Mr. President, that you too spoke in this language during your last visit to the minority villages round Gjirokaster. Why then do you attach various labels to our standpoints? Why do you say one thing and do another? Why does it seem to you that we are talking wrongly, even when we say the same thing as you do, simply because it is we who are saying it? Should a president who represents the unity of the people hold such attitudes? However, whether you wish it or not, the people understand very well every word that you say and everything that you do. Even the purpose of your news conference was clearly evident: to attack the PSSh. We regret that in these attacks you trespassed beyond even rudimentary pluralist and democratic logic, suggesting to us that we should not go anywhere where, according to you, socialist ideas are not well received. Thus you have proclaimed yourself the Zeus of ideas!

We consider the joint declaration of the PSSh and PASOK to be a very important and realistic political act. It is a clear sign of the maturity of the PSSh and its fair, clear, and realistic standpoints on both domestic and international problems, and especially on the situation in the Balkans. It demonstrates the rising authority of the PSSh not only in Albania, but in the ranks of Socialist and Social-Democrat parties in Europe, such as PASOK, a party with prestige, solid experience, and increasing authority and support in Greece. Nobody needs to be jealous over not succeeding in achieving relations with sister parties to the point of being able to issue such a joint political declaration.

Edvin Sugarev Decides To End Hunger Strike

AU2806150793 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 0400 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Last night, shortly before midnight, Member of Parliament Edvin Sugarev announced over the Khorizont National Radio Network that he has decided to end his hunger strike.

In his declaration he stated that he was not in doubt over the moral justification of his strike and he appealed to all those who are on hunger strike either in his support or in supporting his opponent, President Zhelev, to follow his example.

The concern about the state of health of the individuals on hunger strike prompted the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] Coordinating Council to call an extraordinary meeting last night.

A declaration appealing to Mr. Sugarev to give up his hunger strike was issued after the meeting.

You voluntarily began your hunger strike because you did not see any other means of resisting lies and the incipient [word indistinct], without hoping that you would obtain the wholehearted support of others. However, we are fighting and you are not alone in your struggle, you are obliged to be at our side, the declaration reads.

SDS To Continue Campaign

AU2606060393 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 25 June 93

[Text] During the last hour, BTA has supplied us with the text of a official declaration adopted today by the National Coordinating Council of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces].

According to the declaration, the prime minister, scared by the national protest actions, has attempted to throw dust in the face of the nation—and here I quote—by shamelessly repeating the familiar lies of the communist press about a small group of protesters, about demonstrations with paid participants, and about a handful of activist leaders from the SDS National Coordinating Council and parliamentary group.

The SDS warns that it will not submit to provocations or ultimatums, but will continue to defend democratic principles and civil liberties in a peaceful, but unequivocal and uncompromising manner.

SDS May Resume Parliament Work

AU2806171993 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] It is possible that the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] Parliamentary Group may decide to pursue its normal work at the National Assembly as a result of Edvin Sugarev ending his hunger strike.

This is what Stefan Savov, chairman of the SDS Parliamentary Group, declared after the extraordinary meeting of the SDS Coordinating Council held late last night.

He described the fact that all political forces are convinced of the need to hold early parliamentary elections as the most important result of Edvin Sugarev's strike.

Mr. Filip Dimitrov, in turn, pointed out that even before the SDS meeting, Edvin Sugarev had declared that in view of the danger to which the other individuals who are on hunger strike are exposing their lives, he might change his view on his own strike.

The appeal of the SDS Coordinating Council was unanimously accepted, Mr. Savov explained.

The SDS leaders also reported that the meeting discussed the forthcoming actions of the coalition.

Berov Asks SDS To Move Protest Camp

AU2606061593 Sofia BTA in English 1953 GMT 24 Jun 93

[Text] Sofia, June 24 (BTA)—In a statement for BTA, Bulgarian National Television and Bulgarian National Radio, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov asked the organizers of the tent camp, pitched next to the Office of the President, to break it up or move at a reasonable distance away from the building within ten days. The camp was pitched in support of the now 17-day-long hunger strike of Edvin Sugarev MP of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), pressing for the president's resignation. "Nobody's resignation can be brought about in a democratic state with such street pressure," the prime minister commented.

"The government does not want unnecessary conflicts, but there are limits to its tolerance," Prof. Berov said in connection with the continued tent camp protest. He said that cabinet wants to preserve the social peace and that the police would give no cause for clashes. "But anybody who calls for civil disobedience will be uncompromisingly punished as an organizer of riots," Mr. Berov added.

The prime minister also said what he thought about the rallies organized by the National Coordinating Council (NCC), the top political leadership of the SDS. He considers that television coverage leaves the impression that they are very big, but only 16,000-19,000 people took part in the rally staged in Sofia on June 17. Last week's participants were even fewer, despite a lot of secret money spent to hire them.

Prof. Berov is asking Mr. Sugarev to normalize his eating and political behaviour, even if he is going to continue to criticize the president, government and parliament.

"I am not an enemy of the SDS sympathizers. I am opposed to the misguided policy of the handful of present leaders and activists of the NCC and SDS

faction. I am prepared to extend a hand to the SDS to work together in the name of Bulgaria's interests," the prime minister said.

Mr. Berov went on to say that the government was unswervingly continuing to implement its programme. About 60-70 percent of the land will be returned to its owners by the end of the year, he said.

The privatization of state-owned and municipal-owned enterprises is stalling since the available capital is channelled into trade, tourism and gambling. The only way out is mass privatization with deferred payment bills. The project envisages the privatization of some 700 units with total assets of about 150,000 million leva and could be implemented by the start of 1994, the prime minister said.

Berov Answers Mayors' Attacks

AU2806124993 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 21 Jun 93 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Prime Minister Lyuben Berov by Diana Varnikova; place and date not given: "I Offer My Hand to Anyone Who Works for the National Interests"]

[Excerpts] [Varnikova] Professor Berov, the attacks against your budget continue. Mayors from the Association of Democratic Municipalities are deliberately provoking an escalation of the tension, expressing their dissatisfaction with the funds allocated, yet at the same time voting for them at municipal council meetings.

[Berov] These are a handful of people who are trying to destabilize the situation in the country and block the work of the Presidency, government, and parliament, but lately they have increasingly been losing influence. The poll questionnaires that they have been sending out prove this. I believe that their behavior is a temporary phenomenon, and I hope that it will soon die down. Regarding the budget, it is easy to expect everything from it, even that you can use it to build yourself a bathroom at home. However, the mayors of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] want decentralization of the state, and naturally more rights and autonomy for the municipalities. The state grants them certain subsidies on the basis of certain objective criteria. Within this financial framework, they can arrange things as they like. They have certain tax revenues that they can use, and they have state subsidies, why then do they want to revise the way the budget act is drawn up?

[Varnikova] Dr. Trenchev is angry because you did not consult him on the changes in your cabinet.

[Berov] I try not to be the slave of anyone, neither of Dr. Trenchev—to whom I send my respects—nor of any parliamentary group. If a person is a captive of someone, he cannot do his work independently. I try to establish what the objective truth is, where the national interests lie, and so forth. I offer my hand in friendship to anyone who supports the interests of the state, no matter who he

or she is. I lead a government that has declared its opposition to confrontation in society and is working for Bulgaria.... In this respect, I have managed to retain a balance, at least until now. [passage omitted]

[Varnikova] Is mass privatization really the only alternative for our country? You are the author of a project of this nature.

[Berov] At the moment, yes. It is not the only alternative, but it should be one in a new form. You see, the privatization auctions declared so far have produced no noticeable effect, and most of the people who show up at them are foreigners. It is fine that foreign citizens want to invest in Bulgaria, but the fact is that the new capital created so far is not being directed into privatization. Some people are counting on finding easier and long-lasting ways to enrich themselves. In this situation, if we really want to privatize state property and hand it over to people who will manage it better in the future than the state bureaucrats have done so far, we will have to change over to some form of mass privatization, of the kind that I have proposed.

Zhelev Addresses Seminar of Liberal Parties

AU2606185493 Sofia BTA in English 1502 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Text] Sofia, June 26 (BTA)—A two-day seminar which opened here today will be discussing the role of liberal parties in the post-communist period. It is organized by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. The participants will exchange views on the prospects of liberal parties in central and Eastern Europe. This is the first in a series of seminars to be held every six months in order to promote contacts among liberals in that part of the continent, Mr. Arno Vekbeker, the foundation's programme director for southeastern Europe, said.

The seminar is attended by representatives of the liberal parties of Albania, Germany, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia, Montenegro and the Czech Republic. The Bulgarian delegation includes representatives of the Radical Democratic Party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the Bulgarian Liberals Party, the New Union for Democracy, the Alternative Social Liberal Party, the Green Party, and advisors and experts of the government, the Presidency and the parliamentary groups.

The major topics of discussion will be the meaning of the concept "liberal ideology" in each of the participating countries, the place of the liberal parties in social and political life, their followers, their possible allies, their financing, and their chances in the present and the future.

Opening the forum, Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev, who is an individual member of the Liberal International, pointed out the need of liberal rule as a political alternative in Eastern Europe. The main danger in the

post-communist countries consists in the emerging anti-parliamentarianism, the allegations that parliamentary democracy cannot resolve the problems of society and the attempts of the radicalized street to replace the vote of the electorate, Dr. Zhelev said in his speech on the subject of "Liberalism Versus Post-Communism." That is why it is very important that the liberal alternative offered proves the efficiency of democracy, Dr. Zhelev stressed. In his view, one of the principal things to do is to strengthen the democratic institutions and to observe the rules of democracy unconditionally. Eastern Europe needs strong democratic governments which will rediscover private property and market economy, because the establishment of a society of owners is the sole guarantee for consolidation of the new democracies, Dr. Zhelev said. Now the liberal parties are called upon to let the silent majority be heard and prevent the street from drowning the election vote, he said.

Today, when Eastern Europe is torn between nostalgia for communism and fascist-like political extremism, keeping measure acquires particular importance, the Bulgarian president said. This will make it possible for us to understand the other without departing from our views and to find decisions consolidating democracy, Dr. Zhelev said. It seems that we have achieved the major aims of the transition listed by an American political scientist at the beginning of changes: not to allow those who possess weapons to kill us and not to allow those who control the means of production to starve us to death, he said. There is a third and not less fatal danger: The so-called democratic leaders must not be allowed to kill the faith in democracy, President Zhelyu Zhelev said in conclusion.

Berov Views Anti-Government Demonstrations

AU2706170593 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 21 Jun 93 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Prime Minister Lyuben Berov by reporter Nevena Petrova in Velingrad on 19 June: "I Aim Carefully and Shoot Straight"]

[Text] [Petrova] Professor Berov, as soon as you completed your heavy week's work you fled from Sofia with your wife. Has this anything to do with the loud demonstration held in front of your house?

[Berov] No, not at all. The report that about 100 people were shouting outside the windows of my home on 19 June does not correspond to the truth.

[Petrova] In Sofia people are fasting, overeating, and holding rallies, while here at the recreation center it is quiet and comfortable. Despite this, you appear to be a little tense. What thoughts are disturbing your rest days?

[Berov] You are aware that the government's main task is to get on with its job. The worst thing at the moment is that some people are bent on provoking some kind of strife and blocking the work of the presidency, the government, and parliament. Unfortunately, a handful

of screaming people means more than a thousand quiet people. This bunch of loudmouths are seeking a channel to exert influence, so they are making tent camps and holding frequent rallies and unseemly demonstrations to provoke something, so that they can then say that the government is dictatorial and uses force.

[Petrova] However, at the moment you have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. How long will this last?

[Berov] Life has always consisted of a combination of different people with varying standards, values, and possibilities. The government is indeed waiting and seeking the optimum solution between tolerance, avoiding provocation, and the requirement to preserve public order.

[Petrova] Does this mean that you hope that the protesters in the camp (who always choose the summer to hold their protests) will give up of their own volition?

[Berov] Yes, this is the first thing. We will then see who is on the side of the law and then have recourse to the law. It was the same in the case of Ivo Indzhev [dismissed director of BTA]. In the beginning I tried to avoid a confrontation, not to make a circus, but this fellow obstinately remained in his office, slept there, and even went to the bathroom there. We decided to let him alone to continue this crazy behavior; we waited as long as we could, and then brought him out in a lawful way. We will do the same with the protesters in the tent camp.

[Petrova] Do you agree with Dr. Zhelev's assertion that the camp protesters have got the wrong address and should be protesting outside 134 Rakovski Street [headquarters of Union of Democratic Forces, SDS]?

[Berov] Yes, it is more logical and better for them to protest there.

[Petrova] Why?

[Berov] Because, whether you believe it or not, these tents will soon be directed against the handful of people who are organizing the protest. I will tell you something else. These tents have not been pitched by independent individuals. Half of them are empty, and a further fourth are occupied by people who have been professionally recruited, which is against the law. They are people who can be manipulated in any way. However, if tomorrow they start thinking for themselves, they will then choose the right place to go to.

[Petrova] What is your opinion of the politicians who are vilifying you? Outside the SDS, the most forceful ones seem to be Mrs. Mozer [leader of Bulgarian National Agrarian Union]. Stefan Savov is also giving you two-finger signs.

[Berov] My attitude is perfectly calm. Mozer does not know what she wants. Her behavior is quite contradictory, and the worst thing is that there is no logic in her demands. The amendment to the Land Act (which she has now taken up) affects no more than 30,000 people.

You must agree that it is impossible to satisfy absolutely everyone by a single decision. As for Stefan Savov... he fell down to get a penalty decision, but could not do it convincingly, so the referee called a foul.

[Petrova] Prof. Berov, do you not feel that your hands are tied? Many SDS mayors are carrying out instructions from 134 Rakovski Street to boycott the local executive authorities, are they not?

[Berov] This is true. The SDS mayors are even trying to dictate which newspapers should be sold and which not. What is more, they are even attempting to use strongarm methods, such as using aircraft to deliver DEMOKRATSIYA. These methods are quite transparent. Other mayors say one moment that they want decentralization, and the next moment tell local citizens that their problems stem from the budget and the state. If they are so keen on decentralization, they should manage by themselves. However, these people are losing influence. All the opinion polls indicate this.

[Petrova] Prof. Berov, there are powerful groups in the country that are skilled in martial arts and handle firearms well; they hide behind the name of racketeers, but are being directed by a handful of wealthy people. At a certain moment when the signal is given, they can also be used for certain political purposes. Have you received any specific reports about them, and do you fear any strife of this kind?

[Berov] Yes, I know about them. However, it is difficult for me to tell you publicly who is organizing and financing them. It is quite possible for the underworld to be organized in such a way that it may attempt even to command the state. However, these things will not happen while I am in control.

[Petrova] How did you take the report in DEMOKRATSIYA that showed your first wife in a wretched social position? It was even illustrated with a photograph of a woman with a little goat.

[Berov] The aim was to make me a laughing stock, but it did not come off. I divorced my first wife 32 years ago, so there was no sound reason for this report. A man cannot see the truth from outside. The article in this newspaper is as true as the other things that DEMOKRATSIYA writes about. First, this is a woman whose father owned 200 decares of land that she will inherit under the land restitution procedure that is expected to be completed by the end of 1993 or beginning of 1994, so that one cannot talk about poverty. The assertion in the newspaper article that this woman has descended to the status of a Gypsy is a mistake on the part of the reporter. A mistake that pays very well, however. Another matter for discussion is the dignity that is every person's. (smiles)

[Petrova] I see that even this cannot disturb your equilibrium. I know that your zodiac sign is Libra. What is the secret source from which you draw strength?

[Berov] The fact that I aim carefully and shoot straight.

Berov Receives CE Secretary General Lalumiere

AU2606062393 Sofia BTA in English 1931 GMT 25 Jun 93

[Text] Sofia, June 25 (BTA)—Prime Minister Lyuben Berov today met with Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council of Europe [CE], the Council of Ministers' Press Office said. Mrs. Lalumiere was familiarized with the programme of the cabinet headed by Mr. Berov. He stressed the government was firmly resolved to carry on uncompromisingly with the reform aimed to replace the system, build a democratic society and a market economy.

Prof. Berov expressed his regret that unnecessary confrontation impedes Bulgaria's economic development and political normalization.

The cabinet's press office quotes Mrs. Lalumiere as saying that Bulgaria's positive image is intact. The West European leaders attribute special importance to President Zhelev's role as a guarantor of democratic processes and the replacement of the system, Mrs. Lalumiere said. She said it was a pleasant surprise to her that the cabinet took calmly all none too pleasant developments: daily demonstrations, unceasing demands for resignations, and so on, the government press office said.

Mrs. Lalumiere said the evolution of the Union of Democratic Forces could have been foreseen long before because similar developments were observed in other countries after the collapse of communism. According to her, anti-communist coalitions were too broad and were held together by anti-communism alone. "Some people feel much better in opposition, having seen how hard it is to be in power. The important thing is that in Europe Bulgaria projects the image of a factor of Balkan stability. You have normal relations with Turkey and Greece, you do not intervene in the developments in the former Yugoslavia, you enforce the sanctions, you established normal relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Council of Europe commends you on your firm resolve to pursue this political course," Mrs. Lalumiere said, according to the press office. The press release says at the end of the meeting Mrs. Lalumiere stated Bulgaria is not a problem country.

Assembly Leaders Meet Lalumiere

AU2606061993 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1300 GMT 25 Jun 93

[Text] We have already reported that Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council of Europe, held separate meetings earlier today with the leaderships of the four parliamentary groups. She discussed the political situation and heard their views on solutions to the situation that has developed.

In the Boyana Residence in Sofia, Mrs. Lalumiere discussed the same issues with Vice President Blaga Dimitrova and with SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] leader Filip Dimitrov. Mr. Dimitrov announced to journalists that he handed over to the secretary general of the Council of Europe a detailed written exposition of the SDS stance on the circumstances connected with the work of the executive during the last six months—he was probably referring to the information reported in the DEMOKRATSIYA newspaper. Mrs. Lalumiere stated that she was very concerned over the events in Bulgaria and hoped that Bulgaria would find a solution.

According to Nikolay Kamov of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], during their meeting with Mrs. Lalumiere, she expressed the view to the Socialists and their parliamentary allies that she will be disappointed if events lead to the resignation of President Zhelev, who in her view is a guarantor of the democratic processes in Bulgaria.

The eminent guest thanked us for the information that we gave her and asked questions in an attempt to elucidate the full picture concerning the events in Bulgaria, which is experiencing a very difficult period, declared Stefan Savov, leader of the SDS parliamentary group, following their meeting with Mrs. Lalumiere.

At Mrs. Lalumiere's meeting with the leaders of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS], Yunal Lyutfi said that he pointed out to her that the government is working well at the moment and that the state institutions as a whole are stable. The DPS representatives expressed the view to her that, instead of analyzing the mistakes of their leadership, the SDS had adopted the policy of increasing political tension in the country by making calls with the aim of destabilizing the state institutions.

Following the meeting of the New Alliance for Democracy [NSD] parliamentary group with Mrs. Lalumiere, National Assembly Deputy Gospodin Atanasov said that the NSD is an expression of disagreement with the policies of certain people in the SDS leadership, who believe that only they are right. When asked whether the NSD would find its place in the future elections, the NSD leaders answered in the affirmative.

The above is a summary of the information provided by our reporter Khristo Khristov.

Lalumiere Sums Up Visit

AU2906060993 Sofia BTA in English 1857 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Daniela Pirgova report]

[Text] Strasbourg, June 28 (BTA) - In an interview for BTA following her visit to Bulgaria on June 24 and 25, Mrs. Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the

Council of Europe, stressed the need for a sensible and effective political dialogue at a national and international level.

"I was relieved to learn that Mr. Edvin Sugarev has called off his hunger strike," Mrs. Lalumiere said. "First of all, because his actions were dangerous to his health. On the other hand, from a political point of view, it is very important for an M.P. to express his ideas and criticism in parliament, rather than outside it, with such a desperate act," she said.

During her brief visit, Mrs. Lalumiere noted both positive and negative aspects of the situation in the country. The former include the dynamism and animation of public life, and the emergence of young but responsible people, open to Europe and the world. A special place on the positive side is devoted to the personality of the Bulgarian president. "Mr. Zhelyu Zhelev continues to epitomize democratic Bulgaria and is a real trump card for the country, as far as the international community is concerned," Mrs. Lalumiere says.

Increased political tension is cited as the main negative aspect of the political situation. Tension and systematic confrontation could paralyze the country and delay the reforms. The problem at the present moment is the confrontation inside the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), which is going through a hard time, Mrs. Lalumiere believes. The need to work for a new Bulgaria should unite politicians, no matter how great their ideological differences might be.

"During its presidency of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1994, Bulgaria will have a real chance of putting the problems, needs and expectations of the Central and Eastern European countries on the agenda, of pursuing a political dialogue between the member countries towards mutual recognition and tolerance - a responsibility which Bulgaria must have the strength and ambition to undertake," Mrs. Lalumiere concludes.

Parties Support Zhelev Against SDS Campaign

AU2606060293 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 22 Jun 93 p 2

[Report by Mira Belcheva from Sofia on 21 June]

[Text] Today, after long debates on future actions, the participants in a conference of 24 parties and organizations issued a communique urging the president, government, parliament, and the judiciary to unequivocally fulfill their duties and exercise their delegated powers in actively defending constitutional order. As one of the participants in the meeting, Stefan Nikolov of the New Bulgaria Party, explained, apart from preparing petitions and making appeals, they will also undertake mass actions, but these will not mirror the street manners of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]. Those attending the second session of the conference, which was closed to

journalists, included representatives of the ASP [Alternative Social Liberal Party], BPL [Bulgarian Liberals Party], BSDP [Bulgarian Social Democratic Party], BDTs [Bulgarian Democratic Center], ASO [Alternative Socialist Association], Aleksandur Stamboliyski BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], DGI [Civic Initiative Movement], DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement], Green Party, KNSB [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria], Podkrepa Labor Confederation, Constitutional Forum, and the Center for New Policy. Working groups will continue work on coordinating and finalizing the details of the campaign, which is prompted by the latest actions of the SDS.

The report presented to the conference today identified two methods, described as the oppositional and formal approaches, to repel extremism and defend the government institutions. The more forceful version recommends rallies and all kinds of mass demonstrations of a representative nature. The milder version advises the 24 political forces to put the stress on self-defense of the lawfully elected institutions. The meeting of the parliamentary and extraparlimentary parties adopted a combination of the two approaches. The text of a draft resolution that still has to be voted on proposes bringing the terrorism practiced by the SDS headquarters into public discredit, thus gaining election campaign dividends for the participant parties.

Boyko Proychev of Podkrepa declared that some of the conference participants were trying to turn it into the precursor of a political coalition. Osman Oktay of the DPS denied that the forum was a pro-presidential alliance and stressed that its aim was to warn the Bulgarian and world public of the seriousness of the present situation.

Meantime, a petition organized by the BSDP attracted 3,000 signatures in support of the president. In Kurdzhali, the DPS also started a petition. Boris Kolev, from the Council for Cooperation of the group of 12 centrist parties, said that there were no plans to hold a national rally of the forces supporting the president in Sofia precisely on 26 June. However, such an event may form the culmination of a series of active initiatives started in the provinces. The possibility of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] participating was apparently not discounted, but the BSDP spoke strongly against partnership with the Socialists. Today, rumors that a BSP expert was in one of the working groups of the group of 24 were denied.

Parliamentary Delegation Holds Talks in U.S.

AU2906132693 Sofia BTA in English 1154 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Sofia, June 29 (BTA)—The nine-day U.S. visit of a Bulgarian parliamentary delegation, headed by Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly Snezhana Botusharova, is ending today. The last talks will be held today at

the Free Trade Unions Institute. Journalist Elena Urumova reported this morning in a despatch for the Khorizont Programme of national radio. Later the Bulgarian MP's will visit the VOA [Voice of America]. Summing up her impressions, Mrs. Botusharova said she was amazed by the interest shown in the delegation in Washington. "Frankly speaking, this interest, as well as the willingness of almost all people we met during these nine days to help the country, exceeded all my expectations," she said.

During the final days of their visit, the delegation consisting of Mrs. Botusharova, who is also representing the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), Arif Mustakli from the Movement of Rights and Freedoms (the party of the ethnic Turks), and Krasimir Naydenov of the New Union for Democracy, had a series of talks at the American Bar Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which incorporates small and medium-sized enterprises in the United States, the Business Training Forum, and the Novekon Company.

Mrs. Kay Largon, U.S. Chamber of Commerce programme director for Eastern and central Europe, believes that a very good business climate exists in Bulgaria and that neither the unhelpable [as received] obstacles facing the democratic processes in Bulgaria nor the problems of tax legislation and customs were a reason to discourage American business circles. Novekon President Richard Rahn and Executive Director Ronald Utt were more critical in their assessment of the current state of the Bulgarian economy. They told the Bulgarian MP's that the economic reforms and the flow of Western investment to Bulgaria were hampered mainly for two reasons: the unsettled foreign debt and the slow privatization.

At the Business Training Forum, the Bulgarian delegation discussed the forum's possibilities to assist the Bulgarian Parliament. Mrs. Botusharova believes expert assistance in legislation, parliamentary procedures and budget debates, relations between parliament and the executive, on the one hand, and MP's and their constituencies, on the other, are the likely areas of cooperation.

Government Adopts Bill on Organized Crime

AU2806164593 Sofia BTA in English 1431 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Sofia, June 28 (BTA)—The government today approved two bills: a Central Service for Organized Crime Control Bill and an Interior Ministry Troops National Service Bill. The idea of these bills is to codify the activities of these services and to regulate their structure, rights and obligations and their powers. Interior Minister Viktor Mikhaylov told reporters at the government press office.

The Central Service for Organized Crime Control will gather information on crime and will direct and exercise crime control. Under the bill, the service would have regional units only in parts of the country where this is

necessary, but they will be subordinated to the headquarters and will be incorporated into it.

The bills set definite requirements to employees in the two services and to the members of the National Police Force.

The growing crime is an ever more important concern for the public and the political forces. President Zhelev delivered a special speech to parliament a month ago, calling on the M.P.'s to pass as soon as possible the requisite laws and appealing for legislation that would vest strong powers in the police.

Documents on Communist Privileges Declassified

AU2506101593 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1607 GMT 24 Jun 93

[Text] Sofia, June 24 (BTA)—The government adopted a National Comprehensive Programme for the development of sports in Bulgaria today.

The cabinet amended the rules for the organization, conduct, and control of air traffic over the territory of Bulgaria. In the future, construction, blasting, hail suppression, and other such activities will only be admissible within the limits of the air routes after clearing it with the Ministries of Defense and Transport.

The cabinet members were familiarized with a memorandum by the chairman of the Committee of Geology and Mineral Resources and will move to parliament to enact legislation granting an oil and gas exploration and extraction license for licensing block six, Preslav, to the Balkan Gas and Oil Company.

The Council of Ministers approved an agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the Governments of Bulgaria and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The government today declassified a confidential Council of Ministers' decree of 1968, allowing the families of top-ranking communist party leaders to inherit dwellings, apartment furniture, and any other movable and immovable properties that have been gratuitously allocated to them. The declassification was prompted by litigation over a residential unit in Sofia, the government press office specified.

National Assembly Ratifies EFTA Agreement

AU2506135293 Sofia BTA in English 1922 GMT 24 Jun 93

[Text] Sofia, June 24 (BTA)—Parliament today ratified the Free Trade Agreement between Bulgaria and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

The agreement applies to industrial goods, fish and fish products and processed farm goods. The National Assembly Economic Committee believes that Bulgaria should make the most of the five-year period in which imports from the EFTA countries will be still subject to

restrictions in order to take action to help the growth of production and accelerate structural adjustment, create a competitive market environment and encourage Bulgarian production and export.

The agreement will help integrate Bulgaria into the European economic and political structures, according to the MP's who took the floor in the debate.

Passes Tax Administration Act

AU2506171693 Sofia BTA in English 1811 GMT 24 Jun 93

[Text] Sofia, June 24 (BTA)—The National Assembly today passed on second reading the Tax Administration Act. It had to be adopted because the effective legal framework does not provide a standard regulation and the legal standards on this subject matter are scattered in numerous statutes and acts of subordinate legislation.

The act seeks to build a single centralized tax administration as a separate structural component of the Ministry of Finance. It regulates the status of tax officials and guarantees their protection. Taxpayers' rights are also protected by the law.

Under the Tax Administration Act, the tax authorities will combine the functions of investigating authorities and will gather evidence of offences. The tax administration will also be obliged to exercise control by inspections or audits.

Reports of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Denied

AU2706094893 Sofia BTA in English 2008 GMT 25 Jun 93

["Today"—BTA lead]

[Excerpt] Sofia, June 25 (BTA)—[Passage omitted] The mayors of eight towns of the Lovech region (central Bulgaria) have joined the protest of Edvin Sugarev, MP of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), who has been on hunger strike for 18 days now, demanding early parliamentary elections and the president's resignation. The mayors issued a declaration protesting the 1993 budget, the amendments to the Land Act passed by parliament and the amendments to the Local Taxes and Charges Act approved by the cabinet.

Torrential rains and hailstorms in central and northern Bulgaria damaged power lines and the crops and caused road accidents and floods, the Civil Defence said. There are no victims.

The Central Department of the National Veterinary Service today denied reports in the press on foot-and-mouth disease registered in sheep exported to Syria. According to the Central Department, the focus of infection in Simeonovgrad (southeastern Bulgaria) has been eliminated, as was confirmed by a tripartite expert commission of the European Community, the International Office of Epizootics and the Food and Agriculture

Organization. Restrictions will be lifted gradually. Daily checkups across the country show there are no new cases of foot-and-mouth disease in Bulgaria, says the report, quoted by Khorizont Programme of National Radio.

The parties and organizations supporting the democratically elected institutions held a meeting today to discuss the form and the motto of a nationwide rally in support of the Office of the President, scheduled for June 29.

The SDS believes Khacho Boyadzhiev, director general of National Television, should resign after allowing commandoes to occupy the television building yesterday. Nadezhda Mikhaylova, head of the SDS Press Office, told a briefing today. She also said there were no marked changes in Edvin Sugarev's state of health.

Decrease in Danube Region Air Pollution Noted

AU2506135193 Sofia BTA in English 1916 GMT 24 Jun 93

[Text] Ruse, June 24 (BTA)—The condition of the environment in the area of Ruse and Giurgiu is gradually improving, and people breathe cleaner air, the Bulgarian-Romanian Coordinating Commission found when it met here today.

Judging by air tests conducted by the two environmental protection inspectorates, pollution was low in April and May.

The commission heard experts of the two cities report on the epidemiological and epizootic situation in the two municipalities. For the time being, the situation does not give cause for worry but still, it was decided that the commission should address a declaration to the regional leaderships and the Bulgarian and Romanian Ministries of Transport and Health on a normalization of the traffic along the bridge over the River Danube so as to prevent infection among humans and animals.

As suggested by the Bulgarians, the two parts of the commission undertook to work out a single draft of a joint long-term programme for restructuring and ecologization of industrial enterprises in the two municipalities until the year 2000. The draft is to be ready within one month.

The two co-chairmen of the Bulgarian-Romanian commission signed a plan for joint work on the protection of the water of the River Danube from oil spills or other chemical pollution.

At the next meeting of the commission, the civil defence organizations in Ruse and Giurgiu will present a plan for joint action in the event of industrial accidents and natural disasters.

Republic Understands U.S. Attack on Iraq

LD2806122393 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] The Czech Foreign Ministry received with understanding the news of the U.S. guided missile strike on the headquarters of the Iraqi Special Service in Baghdad over the weekend since, as the ministry recalled, Iraq continued to disregard binding UN resolutions. Although the ministry described the attack as an act in line with the UN Charter, at the same time it expressed the hope that the attack would not lead to new escalation of tension and to more civilian victims.

Embassy Building in Baghdad Damaged

AU2906103593 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 28 Jun 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Explosion Smashed the Windows of Czech Embassy"]

[Text] Baghdad, Prague— Missiles that missed their target during the [U.S.] air strike on Baghdad hit objects in the vicinity of the Czech Embassy and damaged the embassy building itself. This was confirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague yesterday.

According to an official of the ministry's diplomatic service, the pressure wave "smashed almost all the windows." The official added that all our citizens in Iraq were safe and doing well.

The Venezuelan Embassy was also damaged during the strike. No one from its staff was injured.

Havel Expresses Absolute Understanding

LD2806212293 Prague CTK in English 1540 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Lany, Central Bohemia, June 28 (CTK)—Czech President Vaclav Havel today expressed his absolute understanding of Saturday's attack on Baghdad by the USA.

Havel told Czech and foreign journalists that he was very sorry, however, that civilians had been among the victims of the attack.

I completely understand the United States' attack, because I have always believed that evil should be confronted and should be responded to firmly, in order to prevent it from spreading wider and deeper, the president said.

Party Reaction To Attack

LD2806210893 Prague CTK in English 2045 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Prague, June 28 (CTK)—The Czech Democratic Alliance (ODA) can see the reasoning behind the U.S. attack yesterday on the headquarters of the Iraqi intelligence and considers it fully justified, ODA spokesman

Jan Rejzek told CTK. He said that ever since its foundation, the ODA had supported the worldwide forces of freedom and democracy, at the same time rejecting any Husayn-style form of state terrorism including assassination plots.

The U.S. attack was a blatant act of aggression, said Miroslav Grebenicek, the newly-elected chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia.

The strike cannot be justified under the Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations on the right to self-defence, he said, adding that the strike violated basic human rights by harming totally innocent people.

The attack was a capricious act for which Washington is responsible, Grebenicek said.

The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) argues that any regime resorting to violence may be dissuaded from doing so only by strident and effective action against it.

We deplore any form of dictatorship in whatever country and believe it to be the duty of the international community and in its own interest to decrease the number and importance of such dictatorships, the CSSD statement said.

Pavel Hirs, chairman of the National Social Liberal Party (LSNS) said that the USA were only doing their duty as the leading world power.

We deplore state terrorism in any circumstances, he said, pointing out the world powers' inability to check in time the expansionism of Hitler's Germany.

The Christian Democratic Party's (KDS) spokesman said that the Iraqi people shoulder responsibility for their criminal leadership.

It will always be open to question whether a society like that should be left to its own designs, or whether they should be interfered with.

State-initiated assassination schemes are becoming commonplace. This trend has to be firmly opposed, the KDS spokesman said.

Commentary Analyzes Air Strike

AU2906113693 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 28 Jun 93 p 9

[Petr Pravda commentary: "The U.S. Air Strike Was Not Just in Reaction to Iraq's Plans To Assassinate Bush"]

[Text] The 23 U.S. Tomahawk missiles struck the Iraqi special service headquarters in Baghdad so completely without warning that it was not only the Iraqis who were taken by surprise. Although the majority of West European governments have expressed their agreement with the U.S. course of action, the question arises whether the first such intervention to which President Bill Clinton has given the go-ahead is merely a continuation of the

settling of accounts—started by George Bush—between the United States and Saddam Husayn.

It is certainly possible to accept that the assassination attempt planned by the Iraqi secret service against former President Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April is a quite sufficient pretext for the strike. However, it is hard to believe that this was the only and most important reason.

Incidentally, Washington is not insisting on this. It contends that the Iraqi secret service is responsible for suppressing political opponents, foreign espionage, and terrorist offenses abroad. It has also waged a campaign of intimidation in Kuwait, has indulged in terror against the Kurds in northern Iraq, and—first and foremost—has prevented UN personnel from inspecting Iraqi missile sites.

To summarize, this secret service—like every such very effective service—is, in essence, the backbone of the Iraqi regime's ruling apparatus.

The U.S. cruise missiles launched at the center of Baghdad were, therefore, a strike against one of the most sensitive of Saddam's facilities.

Clearly, however, not even this explains the whole background to the bombardment. It is important to look at the global political situation within which the operation took place.

America and Europe are on the threshold of a new surge in international terrorism. Certain parties in the Balkan conflict are threatening aggression against innocent people. The whole of Western Europe, so to speak, has been engulfed recently by violence from Kurdish extremists. America is grappling with terrorism perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists from the Middle East. It is no coincidence that one of the harshest negative reactions to the U.S. strike came from Iraq's traditional rival, Iran.

The bombardment of Baghdad should not only be perceived as a matter for the United States and Iraq, it should also be perceived as a swift strike by the world's first power against international terrorism.

In recent months, however, the world's first power has remained a little too attached to its position. Washington wavered for a long time over its final stance on the Balkan crisis and, ultimately, its initiatives came to nothing. Even the operation in Somalia has not turned out so illustriously as it began.

So far, Bill Clinton, the tenth post-war U.S. President, has not enjoyed much success on either the domestic or the foreign scenes. It was high time for him to overcome his hallmark of indecision and prove that he is a man of action—to show that the United States, led by a strong individual, although unwilling to intervene in Yugoslavia, will strike anywhere else anytime should circumstances deem it necessary.

Klaus Receiving Treatment for Illness

LD2806162993 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Because of his acute neurological illness, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus is in the care of doctors at the neurological clinic of the Faculty Hospital in Prague's Na Vinohradech district. Government spokeswoman Klara Pospisioval clarified the information by saying that the prime minister is not hospitalized. He is merely being cared for by doctors at home. At present, it is not clear whether he will be able to go to his office in the next few days.

Klaus: No Need To Hurry With Sudeten Germans

LD2606224493 Prague CTK in English 1944 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Text] Litomysl, east Bohemia, June 26—Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus said today that statements made by some German politicians at the May Sudeten German Days had led him to decide not to give the green light to dialogue with Sudeten Germans at any level at present.

Addressing an ODS public meeting here, Klaus said that in his letter to Bavarian Minister-President Edmund Stoiber, he made it clear how hurt we are by his and others' speeches at the Sudeten German congress.

Klaus said that earlier he had received a message from the Bavarian head of state, as if nothing had happened. As if there had been no Sudeten German Days and as if he, the Bavarian minister-president, had not made the comments reported by our media, Klaus said.

He said in such a situation there is no need to hurry the start of any talks with Sudeten Germans, at any level.

At the Sudeten German Days in Nurmberg on May 30 Stoiber said that former Czechoslovak President Edvard Benes's 1945 decrees, under which Sudeten Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War II and their property was confiscated by the Czechoslovak state, should be annulled.

Havel: Delay Could Help

LD2806212793 Prague CTK in English 1750 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Lany, June 28 (CTK)—Czech President Vaclav Havel would understand if the talks with the Sudeten Germans were to be somewhat delayed, he told journalists today.

The course of the Sudeten German days did not prove to be a great help in the dialog (with the czechs - ed.). Rather, it may have caused the dialog to be postponed for some time or slowed down, he said, reacting to Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus's statement June 26, in which he said that there was no need to rush the dialog between the Czech coalition and Sudeten German representatives now being prepared.

Speaking at a rally in Litomysl, East Bohemia, Klaus said that speeches from some German politicians during May Sudeten German days made him decide not to give the green light for talks with Sudeten Germans on whatever level for the time being.

Klaus Holds News Conference on Poland Visit

LD2606155293 Prague CTK in English 1122 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Text] Prague, June 26 (CTK)—Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus assessed his two-day official visit to Poland as very useful at a press conference upon his return to Prague last night.

I believe it is high time to orient our visits to the other part of the earth, he said, adding that with his Polish trip he had started visiting countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

Klaus said he considered it most important that during his talks with Polish Premier Hanna Suchocka and President Lech Walesa, their stands on the two countries' relations to Europe and the European Community were clarified. Klaus said that Polish officials have promised to intervene to prevent Hungary's attempt aimed at blocking Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe. Klaus said he would consider such breach of contentment between the Visegrad group countries—the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland—to be a serious crack.

Czech Transport Minister Jan Strasky, who accompanied Klaus on his visit to Poland, told journalists that it was agreed during talks with Polish Minister of Transport and Maritime Economy Zbigniew Jaworski that four new border crossings on the Czech-Polish border should be established as soon as possible. Strasky said that eight border crossings had been considered by the two countries' experts but that Poland was less willing to establish them than had been expected. Poland was not prepared to give concrete answers concerning individual border crossings, Strasky said.

Klaus said that the Czech Government should discuss an agreement on small border contacts with Poland within a few weeks. It is expected that the document could be signed by the two countries' representatives in late summer, Klaus said.

Regarding a former agreement to cover Poland's 1990 trade deficit with the Czech Republic with supplies of Polish coal, Klaus said that the problem runs into difficulties due to a surplus of Czech coal. For this reason he asked Polish officials to extend the deadline, previously set for 1995, for the repayment of the deficit with coal supplies. Klaus said he also asked his Polish partners to offer the Czech Republic other commodities to repay trade deficit.

Defense Minister Meets With NATO Chief

LD2806195993 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1800 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Field Marshall Sir Richard Vincent, commander in chief of NATO Military Council's Defense Staff, arrived in Prague for a working visit today. He held a joint news conference with Defense Minister Antonin Baudys, which followed their meeting. Miroslav Konvalina reports:

The meeting between Field Marshall Sir Richard Vincent and Czech Minister of Defense Antonin Baudys is a continuation of the dialogue between NATO and the Czech Republic. Antonin Baudys emphasized the Czech interest in the concept of collective European security. He rejected the idea of a localized [dilci] security bloc in Europe.

Sir Vincent highlighted the progress made since his last visit two years ago. He recalled that the Warsaw Pact still existed at that time. Conversely, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC], a vehicle for military and political consultations between 38 European countries, had not then been conceived.

Sir Vincent went on to highlight the NACC seminar, beginning this week in Prague, on new forms of peace keeping. It will be attended by dozens of European generals.

As a response to the U.S. strike in Baghdad, Minister Baudys said he was somewhat surprised. If, however, the United States had made the decision it must obviously have had a good reason.

The Czech minister and the NATO field marshal jointly denounced international terrorism, which can undermine the foundations of democracy.

European Investment Bank Awards Loan

LD2806193193 Prague CTK in English 1912 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Luxembourg, June 28 (CTK)—The European Investment Bank [EIB] today awarded a loan of 65 million ECU (74 million USD) to the Czech Republic for the modernisation of the Czech telecommunications network, the AFP news agency reported today.

The 15-year loan is intended to help finance the modernisation and extension of the Czech network in 1993-95.

Overall costs for the project are estimated at 700 million ECU (798 million USD), an EIB spokesman said. Both the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank are expected to provide further financial assistance. Czech telecommunications companies and export credits should also participate in the financing, the bank stated.

The modernisation envisages a new numerical network which would create 500,000 new lines in the Czech Republic.

Army's Reequipping Would Cost \$20-50 Billion

LD2806212093 Prague CTK in English 2048 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Prague, June 28 (CTK)—The re-equipment of the Czech Army to make it compatible with those of NATO member countries without losing its current efficiency would cost 20-50 billion USD, Director General of the Czech R.D.P. [expansion unknown] group Jan Vlcek said today.

It would be most convenient to "westernise" the present equipment, Vlcek told a press conference following the talks on cooperation between the R.D.P. group and the French Sofma company, which specialises in the promotion and sales of French ground and naval arms and military technology.

The R.D.P. was established on June 11 by 12 Czech companies which produce military equipment among other things. Its main goal is to coordinate the development and production of modern military equipment in the Czech Republic. It wants to cooperate closely with the Czech Army without being completely dependent on its orders. It also intends to support the Czech Army's switch to NATO standards, which would help the Czech Army reach foreign markets. The R.D.P. wants its exports policy to be in line with the Czech Government's foreign policy.

The Sofma company, which was established 50 years ago and which incorporates significant French armaments firms, is authorised by the state to contract exclusive exports of French ground and naval armaments. It is to assist in the gradual modernisation of light weapons and T-72 tanks produced by the Czech armaments makers.

Unemployment Rate Falls to 2.6 Percent in May

AU2806125493 Prague CTK in English 1937 GMT 25 Jun 93

[Text] Prague June 25 (CTK)—The number of job seekers registered by labour offices reached 136,000 by the end of May with the unemployment rate amounting to 2.6 percent, reveals a report by the Czech Statistical Office (CSU) presented to CTK today.

The number of job seekers decreased by 22,000 since the beginning of the year. Vacancies increased by 2,500 compared to the end of April, the report says.

The largest unemployment rate was recorded in northern Moravia and northern Bohemia with 4.4 and 3.1 percent respectively. Unemployment in Prague is virtually nil (0.3 percent).

Veterinarians Deny Swine Fever Reports

AU2806141793 Prague CTK in English 1219 GMT 24 Jun 93

[Text] Prague/Klatovy, West Bohemia, June 24 (CTK)—There have so far been no cases of swine fever reported in the Czech Republic, Dr. Josef Holejsovsky, director of the State Veterinarian Institute in Jihlava, confirmed today.

Czech Ministry of Agriculture Press Spokeswoman Marcela Dvorakova told CTK that a laboratory check-up of organs of a pig suspected of swine fever showed no such infection. The pig was slaughtered in Domorazy in the Klatovy district of West Bohemia, after the local veterinary surgeon discovered symptoms of the disease.

Samples of the animal's tissues were sent for analysis to a specialized laboratory in Jihlava, South Moravia, and the body was liquidated. District veterinary authorities in Klatovy declared extraordinary measures to prevent a possible spreading of the infection.

Swine fever is a viral infection whose symptoms are high temperature, breathing difficulties, and lassitude. It cannot be treated. Infected animals must be incinerated.

Kovac Says U.S. Attack on Iraq 'Justified'

LD2906084493 Prague CTK in English 0823 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Bratislava, June 29 (CTK)—Slovak President Michal Kovac considers the U.S. attack on Baghdad at the weekend justified, he told CTK before departure for an official visit to Ukraine today. He stressed he regretted the civilian victims of the missile attack, but still he approves of the operation. The attack on the headquarters of the Iraqi intelligence service was carried out in reaction to an alleged plot by the Iraqi Government against former U.S. President George Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April. At least six civilians were killed in the attack.

Foreign Ministry Comments on Attack

LD2906114593 Prague CTK in English 1100 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Bratislava, June 29 (CTK)—The Slovak Republic expressed understanding regarding the USA's actions in Sunday's attack on the Iraqi secret service headquarters in retaliation for a planned assassination of George Bush, according to the official position of the Slovak Foreign Ministry today. The statement continues that terrorism is worsening, causing destabilisation, and steps must therefore be taken to prevent its spread. The ministry expressed sadness that civilians died in the attack.

The ministry believes that the current conflict will be solved peacefully and that all sides will comply with UN Security Council resolutions, thereby helping defuse the tension in the Persian Gulf area, said the statement.

Commentary Assesses Attack

AU2906115093 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Jun 93 p 12

[Leopold Moravcik commentary]

[Text] Once again the United States decided to use force in the world's policy where it simply was not necessary. Just when Bosnia is literally crying for an intervention in the name of humanity, the American President prefers to settle old accounts with Iraq. The discovery that Iraq had prepared for former President Bush's assassination during his visit to Kuwait in April was a good enough reason for a mass missile attack on Baghdad. It must be said though that this "finding" was not a discovery of an independent court. American intelligence services simply put their information together and the United States decided to take action.

Through its action, the United States has shown once again that a solution to the world's topical problems is not its concern but asserting its own interests is. Otherwise, the United States would have vigorously pushed for settling the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the rights of the Palestinian nation on occupied territories, or democracy and social progress in numerous countries

of Central America and the Caribbean region, where small Saddams are tramping on human dignity everyday.

The reason that the United States pays no attention to the evident violation of basic principles of the law and justice are its efforts to transform the existing bipolar world in accordance with its own image. Whomever yields to this will be forgiven of his own sins. Whomever resists must deal with the long reach of American justice. For instance, against state-sponsored terrorism—the attempt to assassinate a former politician—another form of state terrorism is used: a missile attack on the center of a capital, which will require many innocent victims.

Any premeditated death is a crime, whether it is in the name of Allah or the interest of "self-defense," which is how the United States is justifying its raid on Baghdad. Those who decided to use 23 controlled missiles in this attack must have counted and known beforehand about the victims among the innocent civilian population.

There is yet another dimension to the American attack. Let us, for example, take any American magazine of any given year and we will find enough proof about numerous successful or planned assassinations of inconvenient politicians all over the world by the CIA. If the countries involved had used the same form of revenge after the assassination or after its disclosure, the United States would have been in ruins for a long time.

Meciar Receives Russian Deputy Prime Minister

LD2806194093 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Excerpts] A Russian Federation delegation led by Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Ivanovich Labov, is on a two-day working visit to Slovakia. Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar met him this morning. Our correspondent Agata Stankova attended their news conference at the government office. [passage omitted]

[Stankova] Speaking at a news conference following talks between officials of the two governments, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar said:

[Begin Meciar recording] [Passage omitted] This visit by the Russian delegation concerns above all the results which will be implemented at the level of government bodies, ministries, joint commissions, banks. Cooperation agreements in these spheres have been signed. We made efforts to transfer this cooperation also to the spheres of nongovernment organizations, above all to the Russian-Slovak and Slovak-Russian Fund, in which exporters and importers, as well as those interested in trade and cooperation between the two states in science and humanities would be organized.

Taking into account the volume of foreign trade which might be involved, as well as the fact that we import the majority of power machinery from Russia, taking into account that a considerable share of production capacity

which is not being used in our country at present used to be orientated at the Russian market—then it is obvious that this visit might become an important impulse for reviving our mutual economic relations. [end recording]

[Stankova] [Passage omitted] Oleg Ivanovich Lobov also spoke at the news conference:

[Begin Lobov recording in Russian fading to Slovak translation] Russia welcomes the formation of the new Slovak state and its policy aimed at preserving good relations with its neighbors and also stability.

During our talks we outlined the fundamental directions of such a development, above all in the spheres of oil production, the oil industry, gas production, the wood processing industry, agriculture, the engineering industry, light industry, and the conversion of arms industry enterprises. [end recording]

[Stankova] Oleg Lobov went on to say that the two countries exchanged their experiences from the privatization sphere and on the mechanism for the transformation into a market economy.

Later the Russian delegation met Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik. The delegation ends its visit to Slovakia tomorrow.

Kovac Meets With Labov

LD2806132293 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1300 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Slovak President Michal Kovac received in Bratislava Castle today Russian Vice Prime Minister Oleg Labov, who is in Slovakia on a working visit. He informed his guest about the internal political situation in our republic and touched also on the process of its admission into the Council of Europe in connection with Hungary questioning Slovakia's ethnic policy and wanting to prevent it from gaining admission into this European grouping. Michal Kovac said that the Slovak Government's policy towards ethnic minorities is of an European standard. He described as very positive the fact that manifestations of nationalism do not exist in Slovakia.

Meciar on Possible Arms Purchase

LD2806213693 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 2000 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Excerpt] According to Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar, Slovakia might in theory recover what is owed by Russia by buying military equipment and arms from the Russian Federation. However, it will do so only if the Hungarian Republic continues to arm itself. This was stated by the Slovak prime minister at a press conference following his meeting with Russian First Deputy Premier Oleg Labov.

Prime Minister Meciar pointed out that Russia's debts to Slovakia amount to \$1.5 billion. According to him, however, the Russian side has not acknowledged this sum. [passage omitted]

Meciar on Ties With Romania, Hungary

LD2706091793 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica
Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Regular weekly interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by correspondent Robert Valiant in the studio—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Valiant] During your visit to Romania an agreement was concluded between Slovakia and Romania on payments and trade. Could you tell us about this agreement more in detail? One of the solutions to Romania's debts is said to be a capitalization of liabilities.

[Meciar] Romania has certain debts in relation to Czechoslovakia and a certain part of those debts is owed to Slovakia. It is clear that if we just wait for a settlement in dollars this would not take place because the volume of production in Romania has fallen by 50 percent in comparison with their situation before the revolution. The situation there is considerably more complicated than in our country.

On the other hand, we are interested in a settlement of their debts—including the capitalization method. This means an opportunity for us to gain a share in those properties that are interesting for us. [passage omitted]

The other important issue concerns payments in the future. Two principles apply here. The first is that payments will be made in dollars. The second is that, in the case this system does not prove suitable, the two parties can agree on a different method. [passage omitted]

A solution should be found to start gradually increasing the volume of exchange of goods between us.

Neither should we forget that Romania used to be very important for us in the spheres of the machine industry, chemical industry, and in the use of the Danube. Making use of the Danube was our shared interest. We must continue to discuss these issues and study opportunities for renewing our cooperation in these spheres—and if this proves impossible then to leave it and look for other ways.

Our talks with both entrepreneurs and government members have showed that their interest in cooperation with us is extraordinary.

[Valiant] The issue of minorities' rights is very popular at present, especially due to Slovakia's effort to get into the Council of Europe. Did you meet representatives of Slovak minority in Romania? What are their rights in Romania?

[Meciar] First of all, they did not complain about their lot. Their interests and opinions differ according to the region from which they come. [passage omitted]

The talks with them did not result in any feeling of injustice being committed. They refuse to turn problems into political issues the way the Hungarian minority does. Slovaks take a joint course of action when minority rights are involved. When these relations and issues are being turned into political issues, the Slovak minority distances itself from the matter.

[Valiant] There is a large Hungarian minority both in Slovakia and in Romania. Are there any differences in their minority rights? Has this been mentioned during your talks?

[Meciar] Well, of course, we had to deal also with the issue of the Hungarian minority because this is a common problem and it is of an exceptional importance.

The rights [of minorities] are guaranteed by the law. It is very interesting to see that simultaneously, at the same time, representatives of the Hungarian political movements are putting forward the same demands to all surrounding states, including Romania.

We must analyze then whether the issue at stake is an issue of rights or whether it is an organized campaign. I hold the opinion that more likely the latter is involved.

Next, we have to investigate the minorities' situation with respect to the extent of minorities' rights guaranteed in our country to see by whom one or the other state is attacked. We must investigate the level at which the rights of our minorities in Hungary are being guaranteed. The Slovak minority in Hungary is becoming gradually assimilated. The Slovak minority in Romania does not face this threat. On the contrary, they spoke as pure Slovak as that spoken around Zvolen [Central Slovakia]. There are over 20,000 Slovaks in Romania.

We must start thinking about why we are not able to tell our truth to the world and why the untruths being told about are taken as facts that need to be dealt with.

Eventually, this requires a totally new approach: We should not merely hold off the permanent pressure against us but we should tell the truth about the other side as well. We will, obviously, have to do so.

[Valiant] Mr. Prime Minister, no doubt that despite being very busy during your visit to Romania you closely followed events in our country. One of them was a rather important session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. Among the most important points on its agenda was an adoption of a resolution on our admission to the Council of Europe. [passage omitted]

[Meciar] The resolution adopted by the National Council has to respect the situation that has emerged. However, it is also necessary for foreign countries to respect the fact that the National Council of the Slovak Republic is a sovereign body that carries out its own will,

and thus does not make decisions under pressure from anybody. It will implement its sovereign will in tackling the issue of the minorities' rights in a way that corresponds not only to standards in Europe but that is above the standard as far as European conditions are concerned.

[Valiant] I am sure that in this context you can give us your view on the situation, which has been created by a change in the effort to achieve speedy deliberations about a bill on the use of first names and surnames in our mother tongue.

[Meciar] The bill was initiated by the government. Before my departure to Romania I presented the government's plea to the National Council to discuss the bill, regardless of what has been taking place, as some time ago we had promised to discuss this bill. We had been unable to guarantee the result but the government had guaranteed that it would be put forward. [passage omitted]

When the Hungarian deputies are rejecting something, they should consider what they are rejecting. Boundless liberalization that exists in the sphere of first names is not common in the world. In substance one can give any name to anybody. There are no restrictions to speak about.

If they reject even this we have to ask ourselves a question: Do they really wish to achieve a redress as far as surnames are concerned? Do they wish to achieve a redress as far as first names are concerned? What are their aims? Do they feel responsible for what happens in our country, for the development of Slovak-Hungarian relations? Do they serve their electorate and the citizens of this Republic? Or have they been carried away by the chimera of the nonexistent boundless liberalization, which is simply just anarchy?

[Valiant] How do you assess the process of approving Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe?

[Meciar] Slovakia will become a member of the Council of Europe. There is no doubt about it at all. The question is when.

The maximum that the Hungarian Republic can do is to delay the admission till September or November—although not longer.

If there is a legal clause giving a chance to veto the admission and Hungary uses it, then inevitably the question will arise of what the decision of the council of ministers will be like. It is not clear yet whether Hungary will use the right of veto, but so far it is threatening to do so. However, all countries say that they disagree with the approach of the Hungarian side. In fact, by its approach Hungarian politics gives testimony about itself and not about us. Objective bodies were here and assessed the situation. They know it, they have analyzed the status quo. We will learn the results within a few days.

Preparations by the protocol in the seat of the council of Europe are under way as if we were to be admitted.

Ministry Accepts Talks With Czechs on Border

AU2506131593 Prague CTK in English 1545 GMT 23 Jun 93

[Text] Prague, June 23 (CTK)—Slovak Interior Minister Jozef Tuchyna gave his approval to an agenda for talks and accepted draft agreements on Czech-Slovak border regulations worked out by his Czech counterpart Jan Ruml, a spokeswoman for the Czech Interior Ministry told CTK today.

Ruml wrote Tuchyna a letter June 21 with draft agreements on border crossing regulations, railway and road transport border checks aimed at easing cross-border traffic, and measures intended to stem the flow of people from third countries into the Czech Republic. He also envisaged the creation of specialist commissions to iron out the details.

Tuchyna stated talks could start immediately after Slovak representatives have gone through the drafts.

Crime Rate Increases by 38.1 Percent

AU2806133793 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 24 Jun 93 p 2

[TA SR report: "A Rising Crime Rate"]

[Text] Bratislava—Some 52,351 crimes were committed in the Slovak Republic during the first five months of 1993. Compared to the same period last year, this represents an increase of 38.1 percent. Of this number, 18,588 cases have been cleared up so far. Interior Minister Jozef Tuchyna made this statement yesterday at a press briefing held in Bratislava.

The largest increase was recorded in property-related crime, more than 40,000 cases, which means a rise of 43.3 percent. Jozef Tuchyna said that the predictions for this year, which reckoned with fewer crimes, have not been substantiated. He cited insufficient resources and inadequate legislation as the reasons for this. A culprit may be arrested and released several times before the police definitely charge him.

Tuchyna also said that only 803 police officers, instead of 4,000, will be accepted into the force before the end of 1993. The police car pool will be expanded by 694 Volkswagen and Renault cars.

Editorial on U.S. Attack on Iraq

AU2906080993 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 28 Jun 93 p 7

[Editorial by Katalin Karcagi: "A Bad Lesson"]

[Text] The United States has again proved that it cannot be treated with contempt. At dawn on 27 June, the United States carried out an air attack against Iraq's Intelligence Service Headquarters in Baghdad. Retaliation is always a late action, an expression of anger and, to a certain extent, of helplessness. According to the official justification, Washington wanted to get even with Saddam Husayn for the planned Iraqi attack on former U.S. President George Bush during his visit in Kuwait at the beginning of April.

However, the former president is alive and healthy, but we cannot say the same thing about the civilian victims of this attack. The White House was careful to stress that they took great care to cause as little damage to the civilian population as possible, and this is why they did not time the launching of the Tomahawks for Friday, the Muslims' traditional day of prayer.

However, from their experience gained in Iraq, the Pentagon strategists must have been aware of the fact that cruise missiles hardly hit their targets with maximum accuracy and, therefore, damage to surrounding houses is inevitable.

At the time of the Gulf War, the United States was at war with Iraq and, according to the prevailing ideology, halting the dictator with the help of allies did not only serve the restoration of calm in the region. The allies succeeded in convincing a large part of the world public opinion that teaching the aggressor a lesson and destroying his dangerous weaponry was not a selfish big power interest. As is well known, the United States—which led this war coalition—interrupted this job and, therefore, it received a lot of criticism. It seems that the United States has not felt any urge to finish the job ever since, because anti-Iraqi actions have only taken place under the auspices of the UN when aircraft of the Iraqi airforce violated the designated no-fly zone.

Why, then, did the administration in Washington want to teach Saddam Husayn a lesson now? One can hardly believe that the investigation of the Iraqi plan to blow up Bush took three months to conclude, from April until now. It also seems unimaginable that President Clinton only wanted to make a noble gesture toward his predecessor.

The President must have predicted that, this time, the air strike against Baghdad would not be met with unanimous approval; the French have already expressed their slight disapproval. With this delayed step that can easily demonstrate firmness and U.S. power superiority, the President probably wanted to improve his domestic image. He wanted to prove to those who were disappointed with him that he is nevertheless a dynamic

president, one who defends U.S. interests by all means. Or, perhaps, he wanted to give some tasks to the soldiers forced into inaction?

The U.S. ambassador at the United Nations recently used the strange expression "confident multilateralism" to describe U.S. foreign policy: The latest action is indeed in harmony with the concept of occasional individual actions. However, it is less in harmony with the often mentioned order of values of our new world. There are numerous planned terrorist actions affecting the life of hundreds of thousands in Bosnia. However, the Clinton administration did not find it worthwhile carrying out a similar air strike to end the bloodshed there.

Republic To Abstain in CE Vote on Slovakia

LD2906082593 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0800 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] The Hungarian delegation will abstain from voting on the issue of Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe [CE] at the latter's parliamentary session beginning in Strasbourg today. Csaba Tabajdi, a member of the delegation, said that Slovakia had not met a single condition needed for its admission to the council. Tabajdi said that the Hungarian delegation was under intensive international pressure even though it repeatedly said that it did not wish to prevent Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe, merely that Slovakia should fulfil entry conditions.

Should Hungary abstain, the parliamentary session is likely to recommend Slovakia's admission. A simple majority is all that is required.

Antall Comments on Slovak Relations

LD2806210293 Budapest MTI in English 2027 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Budapest, June 28 (MTI)—Hungary does not seek to mar relations with Slovakia. It must, however, insist on certain basic principles. The Slovak Parliament will have to adopt certain norms of the European legal system as laws. There are promises concerning minority rights but there are no guarantees on Slovakia's part, said Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall in an interview broadcast live on Hungarian television Monday night.

In the interview, among other things, he touched upon Hungary's position on Slovakia's membership in the Council of Europe.

He gave no details of the telephone conversation he had with Slovak President Michal Kovac Monday afternoon: they had agreed to keep it confidential. But Kovac, the caller, was more pleasant in style and political approach than other (Slovak) politicians.

Antall firmly stated Hungary supports the Czech Republic's admission to the Council of Europe. He said Slovakia and Romania both had interests on minorities, since both countries have the largest Hungarian minorities.

Antall explained the Czech Republic failing to support Hungary's attempt to fix preconditions to Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe, i.e., Slovakia should first guarantee minority rights by law, by the Czechs wanting to make a gesture towards Slovakia, since the two have several disputes. Also, he added, the Czechs and Slovaks have many common traditions.

Hungary's position in principle is Slovakia should also become a Council of Europe member, but that new members to be admitted to the Council of Europe must try to offer guarantees on minority issues before joining, Antall said.

Discussing home affairs, he said none of the parties had any interest in holding elections, due in 1994, earlier than scheduled. Hungary needs to show the world that its democratic parliament works and can fulfil its function, he said.

It might perhaps be in the interest of the recently reviving Hungarian Socialist Party to hold early elections, he admitted, but added it would be unfortunate for Hungary if the successor of the former Communist Party took on a governing role next year.

Interview With Prime Minister Antall

LD2606173893 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0905 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Interview with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall by correspondent Jozsef P. Szabo—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Szabo] I have been reading in the news that the German Government is encouraging German businessmen to take their money to Hungary, which is stable and capable of functioning.

[Antall] A lot of people have done everything they can to spoil Hungary's image abroad. They have successfully managed to do this on every side, even on the various sides of Hungarian politics, so that the image of Hungary might be spoiled. And of course it is always possible to find appropriate partners abroad as well, since the east-central European countries, the former communist countries, are in competition with one another abroad. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] In another respect, to be precise the military respect, I read in the news that according to Bonn Hungary can count on Germany taking into NATO the concept of Hungary's security; I imagine that here the South Slav crisis is in the forefront, first and foremost?

[Antall] The way I would put it is that in NATO there are serious internal debates about the direction in which NATO should develop. [passage omitted] The Germans,

on the one hand, have gone as far as they can, obviously always as far as possible, in supporting us in our forming relations with NATO. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] Did you come across any NATO or German concept, while you were in Germany, which could make us a little bit more optimistic perhaps in the issue of the Bosnian crisis, in the matter of the South Slav crisis?

[Antall] Well, I did not experience any great optimism in this regard anywhere. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] Did the people in Germany perceive what happened in recent weeks here in Budapest as a strengthening of stability or quite the opposite? [passage omitted]

[Antall] Those with whom I have contact in other terms as well as intergovernmental terms, for example, the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social Union, and those political forces which currently govern Germany, are obviously sympathetic to us and the government coalition on a party level, and those economic circles which are connected to these would like and expect that we will strengthen ourselves in order to be able to continue government in the next cycle too. However, even those who would support or sympathize with other [Hungarian] parties look at Hungary's stability in its totality. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] Staying with domestic policy in its narrow sense. [passage omitted] Why did you take a stand against Csurka and his associates? Can this step be interpreted as meaning that the election is approaching, the party must be given a clear ideology, a program for the election? Or did other things play a part, like the study "Thoughts" by Csurka, which rather firmly formulated the views of Csurka and his associates which are rather different, or in conflict with the government's ideas? [passage omitted]

[Antall] Within the coalition parties, and also within the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] which is the largest coalition party, the act of governing itself brought to the surface the differences, conflicts which may have existed already because the MDF deputies and grassroots members must accept a horrible burden when meeting their electorate every day, the people on the street who confront them with their opinions, unfulfilled wishes, grievances, disillusion. Everybody expected a speedier rise in living standards as a result of the transformation, a quicker change of the regime. [passage omitted]

Within a party, it is obvious that it is the weight of governing....[pauses] The entire political party or administration, lives in the last year of its term under such tensions. They feel that they have not managed to implement this or that part of their program, that people are dissatisfied. Well, all this contributes to the fact that within the party, the government, or the parliamentary group of deputies conflicts sharpen and the voice of opponents also becomes stronger.

I would like to stress the Csurka issue, which we have discussed so much and about which so much has been written both here and abroad. [passage omitted] The entire Csurka issue, both abroad and here, has been taken out of proportion and distorted in the past two-three years—I am not speaking about the past months. He has been criticized over issues—and not just he but others too, all of us if you will—which have been dwarfed by events taking place from the United States to France or from Britain to Germany or Rome, or what is happening in Yugoslavia, or in the area of the former Soviet Union. Thus certain charges are simply ridiculous. [passage omitted] It is ridiculous to speak about nationalism, racism, and others with regard to Hungary's Csurka affair when elsewhere tens of thousands are being shot, houses set on fire with people in them, windows broken. [passage omitted]

I can safely say that with regard to economic policies or in other issues, Istvan Csurka has not been following some kind of patriotic political viewpoint but he has simply a socialist viewpoint. He thinks in terms of socialism, state socialism. [passage omitted elaborating on this point]

[Szabo] Has the MDF become more united? There are views that the intelligentsia, or a proportion of it, supporting the MDF may withdraw or even turn against the party after the expulsion of Csurka. Obviously the situation is different in this respect in the provinces and the capital, but is there such a problem here?

[Antall] Obviously, some may possibly leave but others will join the MDF precisely in this situation. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] When I was preparing for this conversation, I found a statement by Viktor Orban [leader of the Young Democrats, Fidesz] in which he said, weeks or months ago, that Csurka's presence [in the MDF] obstructs the possibility of MDF-Fidesz cooperation. Can this be interpreted to mean that the removal of Csurka and his associates may create the conditions for such a cooperation?

[Antall] I would not say so. There is no question of Fidesz-MDF cooperation at present just because we were coupled so neatly in the affair of real estate sales. [passage omitted] It can, rather, be attributed to the Fidesz political philosophy or political program that they are expressing [Chairman] Viktor Orban's view on Istvan Csurka. I would welcome it if they would watch every political party, government party or opposition, so closely—and if they would do that in a fair manner.

[Szabo] The government may be discussing the supplementary budget right now, during our conversation. What do you hope for in parliament?

[Antall] I trust that in the whole of the budget issue, that is, both the supplementary budget and the 1994 budget, that the government coalition can reach a common stand. Of course, it is very difficult not only between the

parties—for we cannot speak about party political interests here, it is about conflict, difference between branches. [passage omitted]

There is also conflict in issues, such as to what extent should we develop the army, how much must be spent on the army in this region in the present circumstances, within international agreements, how much must be spent on the police in the interest of our public security, what sum is used by the administration—as opposed to common belief—in Hungary's central administration, the ministries? Not that I am overwhelmed with the activity of every one of them or with the central administration or self-governments in general, but in Hungary's administration bureaucracy is much smaller than even in the developed Western countries. [passage omitted]

I think that every coalition party will understand the supplementary budget, which means the adjustment of this budgetary year to the present conditions, and it will get the support with which it can be adopted. I can only say that it is also in the interest of the interest-safeguarding organizations, from the point of view of both the employers and the employees as well as the parties, to adopt the 1994 budget. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] Has the opinion changed that the elections will be held according to schedule, sometime next spring or early summer?

[Antall] I hope that early elections are not in the interest of any of the parliamentary parties, apart from perhaps the Socialist Party, which might be relatively interested in early elections compared with the other parties, because they might feel they have the background, the base, the financial or organizational possibilities, experience in power techniques. Therefore, they might perhaps consider early elections to be favorable to them. I am convinced that the other parties do not want early elections at all. However, I do not think that the majority [of the Socialist Party] would seriously want them. [passage omitted]

We must strive so that Hungary will operate with this parliament for four years—obviously with this government if possible. And then after four years the elections will come and then it will be decided which of the parties which governed so far, or the government coalition as a whole—or other political forces, too—will have the population's support. It will be a period of competition and weighing up. And I repeat that it is not the interest of the deputies or the government, nor it is a party political interest, but it is a fundamental issue from the point of view of the country's future, from the point of view of confidence in us and our self respect that we can complete this parliamentary cycle.

Minister Kadar Holds Talks in Washington

LD2906091693 Budapest MTI in English 0857 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Washington, June 29 (MTI)—Hungary's International Economic Relations Minister Bela Kadar stressed to U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown the need to keep Hungary under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

Brown noted that while the U.S. Administration supported this, a brief interruption might occur for procedural reasons. The United States has ensured Hungary GSP conditions since 1989, allowing 53 per cent of Hungarian goods to enter the American market duty-free. The law under which 138 countries enjoy the allowance, mainly developing states, expires on July 4.

Extension of GSP is part of the administration's budgetary reforms to be approved by congress—not sooner than late July. Meanwhile, GSP beneficiaries will have to pay duty of 8-12 per cent in line with the most favoured nations formula, but the sums will be repaid after GSP's extension.

The Monday talks with Brown also touched on intellectual property rights, which Kadar had earlier discussed with Mickey Kantor, the U.S. official in charge of international trade. Kadar hoped an agreement would

soon be reached and also sought U.S. support for Hungary's full membership in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), on the grounds that Mexico, which paralleled Hungary in level of development, had Washington's backing.

Brown saw a need to protect investments under an agreement, in view of continued U.S. interest in opportunities in Hungary.

Kubecka Signs Energy Agreement With Slovakia

AU2506161693 Budapest MTI in English 1214 GMT 24 Jun 93

[Text] Budapest, 24 Jun (MTI)—Hungary and Slovakia are to cooperate in building a 400-kilovolt electricity line, link their gas pipelines and coordinate issues of oil supply, under a memorandum signed by Hungarian Industry and Trade Minister Janos Latorcai and Slovak Economic Minister Jaroslav Kubecka on Wednesday.

At the talks, the Hungarian side expressed interest in building a side branch to the pipeline connecting Bratislava's Slovnaft Refinery and the Schwechat Refinery in Austria.

The memorandum also calls for the joint supervision by both sides of nuclear plants' safety systems. The sides agreed to set up a joint committee by August to work out the cooperation details.

Walesa Favors No Border With Belarus by Year 2000

LD2806164093 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1600 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] In the year 2000, there ought not to be any border between our states, said President Lech Walesa in Minsk after talking privately with [Belarus Supreme Soviet Chairman] Stanislav Shushkevich. The president added that for this to come about it is necessary for us to strengthen cooperation, especially in the economic sphere.

Asked whether he supported the Supreme Soviet chairman's stance on that state not joining the CIS military alliance, Lech Walesa replied that Stanislav Shushkevich is a refined politician and seeks to do everything that is best for his nation.

After the 40-minute talk with the Belarus Supreme Soviet chairman, President Walesa went to the residence reserved for him, in Zaslavl near Minsk, where he received Belarus Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich. In the prime minister's view, the talks related to the implementation of earlier signed agreements, especially those about border crossings and the free flow of people between the two countries.

To the question of why he feels that Belarus ought to be a member of the CIS collective security system, Vyacheslav Kebich said that he does not see other allies and other alliances for Belarus.

Walesa Refuses To Sign Bill Amending Cooperative Law

LD2506210193 Warsaw PAP in English 1636 GMT 25 Jun 93

[Text] Warsaw, June 25—President Lech Walesa on Friday refused to sign the bill amending the Cooperative Law.

Speaker of the Sejm (lower house) Wieslaw Chrzanowski received Walesa's letter to this effect, in which the president asked him to table a motion to a Sejm of the future term of office to re-examine the bill.

Substantiating his decision, the president proposed to reconsider particularly the sections that speak of depriving persons being cooperatives' employees of membership in cooperatives and depriving these persons of the right to be elected to cooperatives' boards of directors. He also asked to re-examine the sections concerning the way of setting up a cooperative council and provisional cooperative council.

Walesa pointed out that in a letter to him Chairman of the International Cooperative Union Lars Marcud and representatives of Polish organizations and unions of cooperative members stressed the need to differently solve questioned provisions of the bill.

Onyszkiewicz: Poland Closer to NATO Membership

LD2606214993 Warsaw PAP in English 1803 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Text] Warsaw, June 26—Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz on Saturday said that Poland is getting closer its NATO membership.

Speaking at the airport following his return from a three-day visit to the United States, Onyszkiewicz said that the U.S. governmental spheres had started a dispute on the future of NATO, especially on adding new members: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Onyszkiewicz links it with the NATO summit scheduled for December.

Onyszkiewicz also announced he would pay a visit to Moscow in a weeks' time where he expects to sign an agreement on military cooperation between Poland and Russia.

Referring to the elections, he said his constituency will decide whether he will run.

Solidarity Leader Not To Run in Elections

LD2806183793 Warsaw PAP in English 1809 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Zielona Gora, June 28—Leader of the Solidarity Trade Union Marian Krzaklewski told the union's national congress at Zielona Gora that he will not run in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. "I do not believe that one man can satisfactorily fulfill two functions as leader of the parliamentary floor group and leader of the (Solidarity) national commission," Krzaklewski told journalists.

If Solidarity in the forthcoming elections wins more than 7 percent of votes, it will be a great success, Krzaklewski stressed adding that the union will be also satisfied if it wins just 5 percent of votes.

Solidarity decided to run in the elections not to assume power but "to be present in parliament at the time when the rights of employees and trade unions are endangered," and when democratic reforms in Poland are not carried out "in the direction that Solidarity fought for in the eighties," Krzaklewski told newsmen.

PK Not To Join Walesa's Non-Party Bloc

LD2706192993 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 27 Jun 93

[Text] The Conservative Party [PK] announced that it is willing to contest the elections as part of the Polish Convention. PK leader Aleksander Hall told journalists about this. He said that at the same time talks are being conducted with the Christian-National Union aimed at creating an electoral bloc within the government right.

At today's PK programmatic conference its leadership ruled out the possibility of the conservatives' joining the election lists of the president's Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms.

BBWR Election Committees Established

AU2406173093 Warsaw PAP in English 2126 GMT 22 Jun 93

[Text] Krakow, June 22—Representatives of the non-party pro-reform forum "Siec" (Network) and local councils, businessmen, Christian and Solidarity activists set up a district election committee of the Non-Party Reform Bloc (BBWR) in Krakow, chairman of the committee Maciej Mach announced today.

One of the signatories of Krakow's BBWR, Wojciech Daniel, said that the activity of the BBWR will lead to the change of the current economic situation of the country in order to secure an economic growth which should bring about both an increase in real wages and an improvement of the social situation.

A BBWR provincial election committee was also established in Czesochowa today on the initiative of the Union of Catholic Laity.

In Warsaw, President Walesa received representatives of the Entrepreneurs Convention, the Lodz Capital Club, the Assembly of Warsaw Tradesmen and Entrepreneurs, the Polish Business Club, the Convention of Entrepreneurs of the Gdansk Region and the Chamber of Tradesmen and Small Business. The president acquainted them with the idea of the BBWR.

They expressed full support for the president's idea and said a statement supporting the bloc was already signed by 30 clubs, associations and organizations of businessmen.

The president also met with representatives of the management of the Polish Business Council.

Members of the Council, stressing its apolitical character, said that it will not offer support to any parties or political groupings, but backed up the charter of economic principles of the Republic of Poland prepared by the Council for Economic Development attached to the president. They stressed the charter should become an over-party platform of understanding and cooperation between all forces which care for Poland's well being.

In Gdansk, local employers and members of the "Solidarity of Labour" set up at the Gdansk Shipyard S.A. a regional organizational committee of the BBWR.

The Committee plans to open a BBWR regional electoral committee early next week.

Liberal Leader Interviewed on Trade Unions

AU2806202793 Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 25 Jun 93 p 3

[Interview with Donald Tusk, chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Congress, by Jerzy Klosinski; place and date not given: "Like a Responsible Patriot"]

[Excerpts] [Klosinski] Following your recent speech about the need to curb the role of the trade unions, a group of liberal deputies presented a bill on abolishing trade unions and replacing them with associations.

[Tusk] Your question contains many half-truths. The Korwin-Mikke initiative, which is what you are asking about, has nothing to do with my own initiative. I cannot take responsibility for various unfathomable ideas. There is a difference between restricting the role of trade unions, which I profess, and eliminating them altogether, which is what Mr. Korwin-Mikke wants. [passage omitted]

[Klosinski] Why do you want to curb the role of the unions?

[Tusk] The trade union law is bad because its origins are mixed. Parts of it stem from the era of real socialism, other parts from the martial law period, and other parts from the time when Solidarity reigned supreme as a national movement. At that time, the trade union law was very much necessary and it settled a lot of issues. Today, however, it is dangerous. As a responsible patriot, I believed at the time that the trade unions require a strong position because Solidarity was present in the government and in Parliament, and in addition was an independence movement. This is no longer applicable.

[Klosinski] You talk about changing—for example, restricting the role of the trade unions, but Solidarity has been calling for an amendment to the trade union law for a long time. The government has not responded.

[Tusk] The government has no possibility of limiting the power of the deputies' clubs to present legislative initiatives, and the Solidarity club has never proposed an amendment to this law.

[Klosinski] Could your idea of curbing the role of the trade unions lead to a departure from the pattern developed by Western countries, which has brought them prosperity? I mean the triple relationship of employers' unions, employees' unions, and the government.

[Tusk] There are only specific parts of the trade union law that I want to see changed, and these will not affect the triple relationship in any way. It is necessary to change relationships between the trade unions and individual enterprises. For example, the principle of a solidarity strike is often abused. The right of public service employees to strike should be restricted. It is unthinkable that an employer should finance trade unions. There are other features of the law that need to be changed, but

introducing these changes will not reduce the position of national trade unions in talks with the government. [passage omitted]

[Klosinski] Did you have Solidarity in mind when you presented your idea?

[Tusk] No. I was referring to those unions that abuse trade union principles for political gain, such as the Farmers' Self-Defense.

[Klosinski] But your idea concerns all trade unions. What right do you have to curb their roles, especially that of Solidarity, which is the mainstay of the reforms?

[Tusk] Until early 1991, Solidarity was the only force that guaranteed the success of the Polish reforms. Over the past few months, however, we have been witnessing Solidarity's demise as a homogeneous movement. Right now there are several Solidarities, diametrically different from each other. As for my right to present such an idea, my parliamentary mandate gives me this right. My idea is clearly a liberal one, and I expect some measure of support in the coming elections.

UP Claims BBWR Enjoys 'Special Privileges'

LD2506213693 Warsaw PAP in English 1826 GMT 25 Jun 93

[Text] Warsaw, June 25—The Union of Labour (UP) demanded on Friday equal access of all parties to the mass media during the parliamentary campaign.

In a statement released on Friday, the party demanded access to the media "also, or most of all, of those groupings that are not supported by the present power alignment. Otherwise, democracy will turn into manipulation."

The statement said that "special privileges are given" to the Non-Party Reform Bloc (BBWR), and expressed hope that the "Polish president will become an impartial arbiter and not a patron of one of the runners in the September elections."

The Polish handicraft will run in the elections within the federation of Polish business, the Council of the Union of Polish Handicraft resolved on Friday and stressed that the federation is a political party representing the interests of the emerging middle class in Poland.

The union of ex-Soldiers reminded its members that the organization, being not a party, will not contest in the parliamentary campaign. In a statement adopted on Friday, the main board of the union declared not to support any political party and not to have its own candidates for parliamentary seats.

Having studied a report by the Sejm (lower house) Presidium on parties and organizations forming parliamentary floor groups, the State Electoral Commission resolved on Friday that parties that had a 15-member floor group on the day of the parliament dissolution will

not have to collect signatures for district lists. Under earlier decisions, the rule referred only to electoral coalitions.

Meanwhile, according to a recent poll by the Public Opinion Polling Centre (CBOS), 40 per cent of the respondents are determined to go to the polls on September 19 while 24 per cent are "likely to go." The centre predicts that 52 per cent of Poles will go to the polling stations in September.

Christian National Union Leader Interviewed

PM2206084593 Opole TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 11-13 Jun 93 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Professor Wieslaw Chrzanowski, chairman of Christian National Union, by correspondent Tadeusz Kucharski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Kucharski] Professor, your party is now facing a new parliamentary election campaign—as are all other parties. We hear opinions that the Christian National Union [ZChN] will not enjoy the kind of success it experienced in the previous election.

[Chrzanowski] I am not personally anxious about the outcome of the new election. During the previous election campaign public opinion survey centers—echoed by the media—also predicted that we would secure at most 2 percent of votes. Well, they were wrong: We got more than four times that. Such a substantial difference between the prediction and the actual result could not be explained away as a statistical margin of error. Indeed, it suggested that the poll results were being manipulated. I believe that we should be able to command even better election results than the last time round, not least of all because our local structures have expanded.

[Kucharski] Some hold the view that the ZChN owed that success largely to the assistance extended to it by the clergy, and even by a proportion of the church hierarchy. By now it is doubtful whether you could receive such extensive help from them again.

[Chrzanowski] In answer to this diagnosis of our election success last time round, I always cite the fact that we won parliamentary seats also in constituencies where the local hierarchy was indifferent to or even critical of the ZChN. However, this is not the time nor the place to list specific cases.

[Kucharski] What about the view that the hierarchy is disappointed with the ZChN, or at least with certain ZChN deputies?

[Chrzanowski] I hope that for the most part such speculations represent wishful thinking. Real facts speak clearly in support of the truth that our parliamentary caucus took the most consistent stand in defending Christian values and their place in Polish legislation. And I am not talking here merely about the fact that we were instrumental in introducing a formula to such an

effect into the relevant legal documents. We also defended the church's legitimate rights. As for the views held by the church hierarchy, they are clearly diverse, but I believe that the hierarchy has a good idea of who within the ZChN holds views which are representative of our party, and who does not quite represent it. In any case, the hierarchy is certain to evaluate individual candidates for Sejm deputies from different constituencies, not particular parties.

[Kucharski] Does this offer us the hope that the next ZChN parliamentary caucus will have a more uniform character than the last one? Considering that your group is a party of declared Catholics, the differences between the positions, behaviors, and views demonstrated by ZChN deputies are quite startling.

[Chrzanowski] The differences which you mention are perfectly natural as long as they are confined to questions of tactics, or even strategy, and occur in a party which is by definition nonauthoritarian. This is particularly true in our complex domestic situation in Poland, especially on the political stage. On the other hand, I believe that the differences within the ZChN as regards ideological issues and principles are only a matter of intensity: They simply represent more or less radical shades of how these issues and principles are perceived by their proponents.

[Kucharski] Which areas of public activity are of particular interest to the ZChN?

[Chrzanowski] The principal tasks and problems which we have identified as our brief—apart from the protection of the unborn child, since that issue is already determined by the relevant legislation—are as follows: First, the issue of religious education in schools, which has been highlighted by the attention given to it by the civil rights spokesman and a whole range of various press campaigns. Second, the situation of Polish people in countries beyond our eastern borders. Admittedly, we do not hold a monopoly on speaking out on these matters, but our approach to the problem is somewhat unique. Further, there are a number of economic and social issues, including the problem of protection of the domestic industry. Here, we have popularized the slogan, "Buy Polish!" (as far as that is possible, of course). Then, there is the painful question of unemployment. Here, in our opinion, the main emphasis should be placed on developing forms of active reduction of unemployment, that is, on creating favorable conditions for the provision of new jobs and public works. Another problem of considerable importance to us is protection of the country against visitors from abroad who are not tourists and whose activities often pose a threat to the security of Polish citizens and the condition of Polish economy. These are matters of vital interest in our eastern territories today. Our position on immigration control and visas for our visitors from the east has been well highlighted. Alongside other interested bodies, we also pose questions about correct assessment of our historical past (concerning mainly the Stalinist era, but also later periods), which is a necessary prerequisite

whenever historical justice is sought; we also campaign for the adequate safeguarding of war veterans' interests, and so on. There are still many issues which generate doubts and grudges in this particular sphere.

[Kucharski] What about national issues?

[Chrzanowski] Issues concerning our national interests include—in addition to the aforementioned question of Polish nationals in territories beyond our eastern borders—the problem of proper treatment of national minorities, who must enjoy equal rights while at the same time demonstrating loyalty to the Polish state. We believe that the state authorities should respond firmly to improper attitudes demonstrated by members of national minorities. Such reaction would be in the best interest of both nations. The state policy on this issue should be clear-cut, stable, and never based on either wooing or threatening the minorities involved. At the same time, it should stress unequivocally that the rights of the majority are the same as those enjoyed by the minorities. In any case, this situation should obtain not only with regard to national issues but also to religious issues.

[Kucharski] How does the ZChN view the buildup of moves aimed at gaining autonomy for Silesia?

[Chrzanowski] We favor the idea of far-reaching self-government systems, territorial as well as industrial, economic, and cultural. On the other hand, we are against "autonomization," that is, creation of [federal] states or *laender*, such as exist in other countries. This is because we believe that here in Poland their existence would not be naturally justified. We do not deny that sentiments of local patriotism persist in certain places, or that vestiges of the borders mapped out by the old occupying powers are still traceable, but we must realize that some people attempt to magnify these sentiments and differences by artificial means. On the basis of their statutory rights, self-government structures may introduce certain specific legal regulations for the given area—for example, regulations concerning the financing of self-government structures could guarantee more extensive financial opportunities to those areas which are capable of producing more goods. All that is possible within the framework of a well-developed local self-government structure.

[Kucharski] In the Opole region, parishes inhabited predominantly by the German minority sometimes strive to change place and street names, introduce bilingual signs, use the German language in all official communication situations, and so on. What is your attitude toward these phenomena?

[Chrzanowski] Within the provisions of the state legislation the given parish may appoint self-government authorities according to the national structure of its inhabitants. However, we must not allow situations in which a national minority claims and obtains privileged rights in order to win favor with a foreign state. The nature of self-government structures is that, in contrast

to autonomous structures, they are obliged to comply with the laws in force in the given state. If it attempts to transcend these laws, then a relevant state body is obliged to take appropriate measures to ensure that the laws in force are kept and obeyed.

[Kucharski] Some describe the ZChN as the secular arm of the church hierarchy. How much truth is there in this assertion?

[Chrzanowski] In my opinion such views are broadcast in order to warn the hierarchy that it could be seen as failing to comply with the decisions of the Second Vatican Council and to persuade it to distance itself from our party. The truth is as follows: neither do we set out to treat the church in an instrumental manner nor does the church hierarchy make any political demands of us. From our position in parliament we defended some of the church's rights and its position—for example, we took a stand on the question of the tax levied on the church, because the provisions of the original bill submitted to parliament resembled the worst postwar regulations on the matter. Fortunately, the Senate amended the bill. Nevertheless, our action in that case was completely independent and had not been coordinated with the church in any way.

[Kucharski] Even so, your party is surely the single political group that is closest to the church hierarchy, is it not?

[Chrzanowski] We would like it to be so. In any case, it is stated in our program that we appreciate the church's role in the nation's life and that we are willing to listen to the church's moral teaching with regard to social issues, to take into account its opinions on questions concerning the education and instruction of the young generation, and to consider its position on the legislative regulations which affect its work and its task and to which, therefore, the church cannot remain indifferent. However, our action on all these points is not inspired by official contacts with the church authorities or any recommendations from the church itself. As regards its stand on all matters of a social or political nature, the church acts according to the recommendations issued by the Second Vatican Council.

[Kucharski] Which political parties are close enough to the ZChN's profile and character for you to consider entering into coalition with them?

[Chrzanowski] In our congress resolution we stated that we wanted to cooperate above all with political groups based on Christian, national, and peasant orientation—provided that the peasant-oriented parties at least refrain from questioning the traditional Christian values. In the last election it was not our party that was closed to the idea of joining with other parties in a coalition: It was other parties which cultivated vastly exaggerated ideas about their chances in the election.

[Kucharski] Is it not true that the Conservative Party's program is the closest in its ideas to your own? By the

same token, are the Conservatives not the best potential candidates for your partners in a future coalition?

[Chrzanowski] The Conservative Party's presence on the political map of our country is still too weak. Nor do the Conservatives display a readiness to enter into closer cooperation with us. Perhaps they would be more comfortable in alliance with other political groups. However, if they were to demonstrate a willingness to join forces with us, we would be open to the idea of talks on the subjects.

[Kucharski] Finally, I would like to ask you whether you would envisage a sphere in the life of our country and its people in which the ZChN and the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] could perhaps come close to meeting each other?

[Chrzanowski] I must admit that I do not see any possibility of a possible plane of cooperation between our two parties at the present stage. However, let me remind you that in his pastoral letter "Octogesimo adveniens" Pope Paul VI stated clearly that you could depart from completely contradictory philosophical premises and yet still be capable of joint action aimed at the realization of specific solutions if the latter are acceptable to both sides and, moreover, are compatible with sound common sense. In the past, there have been instances where certain draft parliamentary acts received joint support from in the parliamentary forum from the ZChN and Democratic Left Forum [SLD] caucuses. For example, one such case concerned the proposal to prevent foreign capital investment in Polish casinos. There were also cases in which both these parliamentary party groups voted in the same way for different reasons, although sometimes the motives were identical, too. We have never voted against an act just because the SLD favored it: That would be tantamount to basing your actions on doctrinaire grounds.

[Kucharski] All other considerations notwithstanding, today it is not the left-wing political orientation but the philosophy of libertinism that has become church's main adversary (and, by the same token, the ZChN's main adversary). After all, the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] was more puritan than libertine in its nature.

[Chrzanowski] Certain milieus which were more politically charged than others during the era of the Polish People's Republic [PRL], and in which the PZPR affiliation was more widespread than elsewhere, such as, for example, the teaching profession, still take the libertine attitude for the most part, although in the eighties teachers' chaplaincy groups were also quite widespread and influential. At the moment it is difficult to decide whether the church is more threatened by the libertines or the postcommunist left-wing political orientation, since there is a great deal of overlap between these milieus. The postcommunist Left houses many libertines—for instance, women deputies from the SLD as well as the Democratic Union were active in the Parliamentary Women's Group, which arguably takes the most

extreme libertine stance. After all, most of the editorial staff of the NIE [anticlerical, pro-Left] weekly were originally members of the former PZPR.

[Kucharski] It has been suggested that the ZChN intends to demand an introduction of a "morality censorship" scheme in the media. How much truth is there in this suggestion?

[Chrzanowski] No truth at all as regards traditional censorship practices. On the other hand, we must remember that statutory provisions in many countries, such as, for example, Germany, allow for the use of a variety of measures which offer their local authorities the chance to confiscate publications which, say, infringe the principles of public decency. Of course, such measures are used on the express authority of the local administration body, which can be held to account in case the courts decide that the confiscation was unlawful. Such regulations are grounded in the provisions of international human and civil rights conventions. These conventions always provide for the admissibility of certain legal restrictions designed to protect public decency. Protection of the latter is always mentioned alongside the human right to protection of life and health. In Poland, those who always readily invoke these conventions as a rule fail to notice the additional "public decency" provision. But it should be incorporated—as a matter of course—into the legislation of all democratic states.

Visa Requirements for FRY, B-H Citizens

LD2506202393 Warsaw PAP in English 1526 GMT 25
Jun 93

[Text] Warsaw, June 25—On the motion of Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski, the government on Friday decided to restore visas for citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The decision comes into effect as of July 1, deputy director of the government press office Dariusz Jadowski said.

In connection with the decision, the government said refugees from the above countries will be allowed to enter Poland and will be given shelter and provided care in specialized centres.

The interior minister said "the introduction of visas is only a certain necessary system of control." He added that visas will be granted to those citizens of the former Yugoslavia who would give convincing arguments.

The minister said also that about 50,000 citizens of the former Yugoslavia had come to Poland till last May. They viewed Poland as a transit country en route to Denmark or Sweden that had expelled about 400 travellers to Poland so far, he added.

The minister said that countries of the former Yugoslavia should be expected to introduce visas for Poles.

Drug Addiction Has 'Increased Significantly'

LD2506141593 Warsaw PAP in English 1107 GMT 25
Jun 93

[Text] Warsaw, June 25—The number of drug addicts in Poland has increased significantly since 1990, a phenomenon assisted by the greater accessibility of drugs on the Polish market due to the easing of border controls, and an increase in domestic production of amphetamines, Mateusz Liwski of the Association for Drug Addicts and Their Families has reported.

He noted that narcotics are still very cheap in Poland, with one dose of the so-called cannabis "soup," 1 cubic centimetre, still costing the same in zloty terms as two years ago, despite double-digit inflation.

Also, Polish law does not provide penalties for the possession of narcotics, which makes life easier for drug-traffickers, if the police are unable to seize the dealers at the moment of the actual sale.

According to the data for 1991 there are 10 drug-addicts per 100,000 poles, rising to 15 addicts per 100,000 in larger towns and cities, Liwski said.

PSM Says U.S. Attack Against Iraq 'Regrettable'*AU2806163893 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1549 GMT 28 Jun 93*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 28/6/1993—The Socialist Party of Labour (PSM) spokesman Tudor Mohora stated at a news conference on June 28 that the PSM asked the Vacaroiu government to clarify in front of the nation the situation of the Romanian fleet and especially the setting up of a joint company by the Romanian "Petromin" and the Greek "Forum Maritime," and conditioned on these clarifications further support to be granted to the current government by his party.

On another line of ideas, spokesman Tudor Mohora said that the talks which had taken place between the PSM, the Democratic Agrarian Party [PDAR], the Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN], the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] and the Greater Romania Party [PRM], represented an occasion for the leaderships of those parties to exchange views regarding present issues of the country and not to plan or to work out a concrete political alliance."

The past parliamentary week was appreciated by the PSM spokesman as "a victory of the rational forces" by rejecting Article 30 of Law 35, which in its initial phrasing provided the possibility that land be sold to joint companies. The PSM leader asked that the PSM stand be not misunderstood as the PSM did not disavow foreign investments.

The last issue approached by the spokesman was the United States attack against Iraq. Tudor Mohora said this attack "revealed a position of force of the united states." "This is regrettable because at the end of the 20th century the relations between states must be rational, political and diplomatic and by no means based on force," the PSM spokesman said.

Press Comments on U.S. Attack*AU2906101393 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0925 GMT 29 Jun 93*

[From the 29 June press review]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 29/6/1993—Extensive space is also given to the United States attack on Baghdad and the debates in the Security Council. TINERETUL LIBER comments on the implications and significance of the action decided by President Clinton and writes among other things: "Most commentators are tempted to believe that, above deep political motivations to preserve the United State's unflinching position as leader in the Middle East, an important factor in picking the moment of the American attack had been subjectivism. Bill Clinton, whose public image deteriorated until finally becoming blurred, was in need of a spectacular public action that would demonstrate the world and the Americans that he is not a wavering man and can bravely assume certain decisions."

Iliescu Receives Lithuanian Foreign Minister*AU2506172593 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1441 GMT 24 Jun 93*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 24/6/1993—Romanian President Ion Iliescu was officially invited to pay a visit to Lithuania this year. The master agreement between the two countries, initialed in Bucharest on June 23, will be signed on that occasion. The invitation was extended to the Romanian head of state by Povilas Gylys, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, who called on President Ion Iliescu at Cotroceni Palace, on June 24.

The dialogue between President Iliescu and the Lithuanian chief diplomat focussed on the future of the relations among the formerly communist countries that traverse similar difficulties in the period of transition to a market economy. In that context, the Romanian head of state showed that the cooperation between Europe's West and East was more important than the process of assisting the countries in the East, as such a cooperation would prefigure the way Europe as a whole would consider in future the poorly developed countries of the Third World. Another subject of the dialogue was the development of the bilateral relations.

The interview was attended by Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu.

Iliescu Assesses Merits of Crans Montana Forum*AU2706151093 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 23 Jun 93 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with President Ion Iliescu by Rodica Avram; place and date not given: "Particular Concern With Romanian Issues"]

[Text] [Avram] Mr. President, what did the Crans Montana Forum mean for us and Europe?

[Iliescu] The Crans Montana Forum, which was attended by numerous representatives, was an opportunity to hold a great number of meetings in a short time; the dialogues were an opportunity to become acquainted with a great number of figures. At the same time, it was an opportunity to discuss numerous subjects within the forum's special plenary sessions and within meetings devoted to certain countries. There was a lot to be said. For instance, the prevailing subject was developing cooperation on the European continent and the all-European integration process. Along with the disappearance of blocs, new and positive elements have emerged thus changing the atmosphere in Europe, but there are still numerous vestiges from the past in people's minds.

[Avram] An expression used by you in your speech to the forum was noted and taken over by other speakers, namely ideological intoxication...

[Iliescu] I spoke about "ideological intoxication," whose influence is still felt in our country; the same can be said

about other countries and this was, indeed, noted and emphasized by numerous participants. But the most dangerous thing in recent developments—which was stressed by the speakers—is the intensifying economic barrier between the West and East. This phenomenon risks generating a new economic “Iron Curtain.” The Eastern countries expressed their dissatisfaction with the reticence, reservations, and a certain perception by the West regarding relations with the Eastern countries, which are viewed only as potential markets by the Western states, which, in turn, are troubled by economic difficulties. There is no way to solve the problem of the chronic and hopeless unemployment that affects more than 23 million people. A country like Switzerland organized a national referendum, which rejected the idea of European integration in connection with the discussions which are under way about reuniting the two communities: the European Community and that of free trade—EFTA. The Swiss population’s reticence is justified by their concern that integration in this area could impair the current balance, because Switzerland, in turn, is confronted by sensitive problems, for instance 500,000 jobless. This figure was provided by the president of the Swiss Confederation, who assessed it as particularly serious and unprecedented.

[Avram] What concerns were expressed in particular?

[Iliescu] There is an unfavorable economic situation throughout Western Europe and that explains this reticence toward expanding relations with Eastern countries and toward potential competitors. On the other hand, there is the dissatisfaction of the Eastern countries with the way cooperation between the two areas on our continent is developing. In my view, European developments should be part and parcel of the general world economic processes. The solution to common interests and the harmonious integration of all states depends on the way in which we will solve conflicts on the European continent, remove the causes of existing discrepancies, and on the way in which we will seek answers to the integration of equal partners and not of areas that will enter this integration process from an unequal position, as well as on the way the West will view the East—not as a potential market, but as potential partners. Only in this way will we be able to solve the discrepancy between the North and South, between the developed and poorly developed countries; this discrepancy may become the source of very serious future conflicts. Someone already spoke about the danger of new massive migrations, maybe millions of people from Asia and Africa. Discussing all these problems, I think that the Crans Montana Forum offered the opportunity for fruitful and useful dialogues.

[Avram] What can you tell us about Romania’s presence at this important economic forum, because the news that has reached the country speaks about a real success of the Romanian delegation.

[Iliescu] Romania enjoyed attention at this meeting. The meeting in the plenary hall devoted to our country had a

great number of participants, we actually had a full house. I noted particular interest in Romanian issues, in the stage of the economic reform process and the changes that have taken place in the political activity, in the conditions necessary for foreign capital, and in the privatization process. Numerous questions were asked and we conducted numerous talks with businessmen on all these subjects.

Finance Minister Views Loans Granted by G-24

AU2706102693 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1159
GMT 26 Jun 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 26/6/1993—Financial assistance granted to Romania by the Group of 24 for building support in the process of reform is estimated at \$180 million.

“Up to now, the seven-year credit to be returned at convenient interests is as follows: the European Community—80 million ECU, Austria—\$4.2 million, Finland—\$2 million, and Sweden—\$5 million, with which we have already signed credit agreements. We are due to initial similar documents with Switzerland—\$7.2 million, and Norway—\$2.7 million, a country with which we are presently in negotiations,” told Ministry of Finance Florin Georgescu to a ROMPRES editor.

“The signing on 24 June 1993 of the agreement with Sweden is another important step in the process for supplying foreign finance to our country. We hope that the forthcoming visit to Romania by a IMF [International Monetary Fund] delegation early in July will have in this respect the expected results and to sign the stand-by agreement for the year on course and for 1994. The credit from Sweden is to improve Romania’s balance of payments and is directed to critical imports, especially of raw materials,” concluded Georgescu.

Minister Briefs Parliament on Deal With Greece

AU2906062093 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1805
GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 28/6/1993—The minister of Transport Paul Teodoru informed the Chamber of Deputies Monday, June 28, about the “Petromin”—“Forum Maritime” bargain that had hit the headlines for a few days running.

The minister of transport presented data in support of the contract between the Romanian firm “Petromin” and the Greek “Forum Maritime.” He spoke about the difficult financial situation of the Romanian fleet in the patrimony of “Petromin,” which can be considerably improved by foreign investments. Minister Teodoru showed that the two partners had conducted negotiations in compliance with the law. He added that the said contract was the biggest and most important foreign investment so far, for which the government was asked no guarantee. The contract will be examined once again

the coming days in order to clarify all suspicions and speculations, added the minister of transport.

Deputy Ioan Bivolaru took the floor on behalf of the commission formed to examine the situation of the fleet. He said that the commission did not agree with the way in which Romania's interests were represented in the said contract, that is detrimental to the major interests of Romania, specified the deputy. He asked that a team of specialists re-examine the contract, which "should be added clauses offering guarantees to the Romanian party."

Nastase Discusses Black Sea, Party Issues

AU2506194593 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 22 Jun 93 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Chamber of Deputies President Adrian Nastase, delegation leader to the Istanbul meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone, by Petru Ionescu; place and date not given: "Let Us Grant Ourselves Another Chance, Let Us Be Optimistic"]

[Text] [Ionescu] What are the results of this visit, what did you propose, what did you achieve, and how much does this Black Sea organization help us in "entering" the Council of Europe?

[Nastase] This Black Sea cooperation project is like a building with 11 prospective tenants, each of whom wants to choose the best rooms. This is what Istanbul was all about—a distribution of rooms! Hence some tension. I think that we have achieved our major strategy by obtaining one of the four positions of vice president out of 11 candidates; we have also obtained the position of executive general secretary, which ranks second in importance in the General Secretariat. At the same time, we have the right to organize the constituent meeting of the most important commission—the economic commission—in Bucharest in September.

[Ionescu] Is anyone from our parliament going to be appointed to the leadership of this economic commission?

[Nastase] Yes, this is our secret thought; there are several candidates from Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and so forth and that is why we thought that it would be easier to fight for it at home, in Bucharest! As far as the procedural rules are concerned, the amendments we proposed, that is our point of view, have been accepted, but the text has a snag, namely the one referring to the voting system. Concretely, I am talking of the fact that basic questions have been voted on, according to delegations, something which we did not like. And neither did the Turks! The remainder of the delegations like this procedure, especially the former soviet republics, which have problems in their parliaments at home and do not want these differences to come out—through their individual and nominal vote—abroad! But, as I said, we have achieved that this procedure be changed in two year's time.

[Ionescu] What influence has our participation in the Black Sea community on our integration with the Council of Europe?

[Nastase] I do not think that we should be embarrassed by the fact that we are looking after our interests where they may be fulfilled. The way the Americans are not embarrassed to go to Kazakhstan and the Germans to Uzbekistan! Actually, our priorities are clear-cut—Western Europe, but at the same time we have to seek places where we can sell our products so that the economy may progress and that we will not create uncontrollable problems! If we had guarantees on behalf of the West that markets would be ensured for us, we would no longer look for various alliances in all directions!

[Ionescu] As far as the domestic political activity is concerned, how can you explain the fact that laws are not observed or applied when bearing in mind that the parliament, as a democratic institution, exists in a society with a centralized economy where a state monopoly prevails?

[Nastase] Parliament, in a way, reflects the political activity in our country and the stage of this activity. It constitutes a united framework for political discussions. Since we have very many political problems awaiting answers, the pressure—from a political point of view—on parliament is very great! The moment a political issue emerges, it is taken to parliament! We are discussing anything: Former governments, corruption, the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI], disciplinary commissions, and so forth, and only a few laws. Since the legal framework is not yet in order compared with the other countries around us and since there is a great need for laws, the electorate and even some of the parliamentarians are somewhat frustrated. I think we have to take things as they are; there is nothing we can do; we have to seek more effective procedures and we have to seek outlets for local messages. We do not have such a thing, we lack certain knowledge about procedures!

There should be a limited and set time in the program when deputies and senators may bring up their regional problems, so that no one can stand up whenever he wishes to announce—so to say—something important. Otherwise, parliament is a fantastic institution everywhere in the world! All these shortfalls will disappear by and by...

[Ionescu] Together with parliament?

[Nastase] Let us grant ourselves another chance, let us be optimistic! As you have seen, the moment people drink a glass of beer or a cup of coffee, they begin to become familiar with each other, how shall I put it... the stiffness disappears even if they continue to hold different opinions; they will no longer turn their differences into something personal! As far as the relationship between political and economic activity is concerned, the problem is more or less a general one in all the former socialist states!

[Ionescu] Regarding what we call political structure of parliament, it is clear that the parties do not have a social basis, they do not represent certain common interests; this is why it is easy to move from one party to another—from the left to the right and vice versa. How does this reflect on the parliamentary activity?

[Nastase] The transition process in our country is not taking place only in the economy, but also at the political level. The parties have to clarify their electoral profile and are now looking for messages, structures; mergers and fusions are taking place... and I think that this is a positive development. In my view, we will have a more correct picture of the political spectrum during the next elections! By then the number of political parties will probably have decreased and everything will be based on the three great trends affirming themselves in our country: Social-democracy, liberalism, and Christian-democracy!

[Ionescu] Current Romanian liberalism does not even equal the dust on the drum of the economic area, for instance. Should the three great trends, doctrines, you have mentioned not be substantiated economically?

[Nastase] In the liberal area there are enough trends and factions. On the one hand there is the PNL [National Liberal Party], which claims to continue the interbellic tradition and which, without having its own electorate on an economic and social basis, nevertheless enjoys the support of the family electorate, so to say!

[Ionescu] This is it... there is nothing one can do about it!

[Nastase] Well, yes, there is a certain support by the electorate, while on the other hand there are new liberals, or parties of young liberals who have already begun to represent more dynamic and aggressive groups of interests in the area of private interests! This is where, I think, a certain concentration will take place in the future; now, however, there are strong differences in interests between them.

[Ionescu] What about the FDSN [Democratic National Salvation Front] and the open or closed letters exchanged between the so-called "reformers" and "hard-liners," what is your position now and how is the party you represent preparing, so that Romania comes closer to meeting European requirements in the fall?

[Nastase] Any careful analyst of the political activity in Romania will discover that there is a very broad electoral base for a powerful center-leftist party! The problem is that it should not be conservative, should have clearly marked border zones, and should be characterized by a centrifugal attraction toward other bigger parties than the central nucleus! In my view, this kind of party has to be linked with modern social-democracy. The FDSN has been characterized to a great extent by rejecting other options. Now it is very important for those within the FDSN to assume a certain message and this has to be done within a debate, through brain-storming, by

involving as many people as possible who will be motivated to support this party. Not strictly on the basis of personal interests. We have to see to it that the party does not become a lobby of interests. The party will be able to affirm itself in the medium-term only if it knows what it stands for! If it does not try to make this effort, then its situation will rapidly deteriorate in a short time!

[Ionescu] What about the alliances?

[Nastase] Maybe between the "moderates" and "hard-liners," as you term them! We shall see...

New Liberal Party President Interviewed

AU2806134193 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 23 Jun 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Viorel Catarama, president of the New Liberal Party, by Dinu Dumitrache; place and date not given: "The East Desires a Correct European Integration Process"]

[Text] [Dumitrache] Mr. Viorel Catarama, in your opinion, what was the meaning of the Crans Montana economic forum, which you attended as a member of the Romanian delegation and as a businessman? How was Romania's image perceived by West European political-economic circles?

[Catarama] I participated in this forum as businessman and as President Iliescu's guest. And I can tell you that the Romanian delegation made up of President Iliescu, Mr. Ciomara, the prominent member of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD], but who participated as the director of an economic research institute, Mr. Dochia, chief of the National Privatization Agency, Mr. Cojocaru representing the State Property Fund, and myself and another businessman, Mr. Stefan Vasile, represented Romania and its image correctly. I can tell you that the Romanian delegation made one of the strongest and most positive impressions on both business circles and politicians.

[Dumitrache] Very interesting. Can you give any details?

[Catarama] To my surprise, President Iliescu presented the situation in Romania, and especially in the private sector, absolutely correctly; this was the first time that the positive qualities of private businessmen were spelled out: pragmatism, competence, intelligence, and performance. Even if I, in my speech to the plenary session, contradicted some of President Iliescu's ideas, I think that to discuss our country's real problems within the framework of a dialogue is a positive thing and was perceived as such. Thus, there was no useless propaganda or talk without any substance; things were spelled out, both positive and negative ones. And this was perceived positively by the audience. What is more important than the positive perception of the Romanian delegation was the fact that this forum clearly demonstrated that quite a sharp dispute has begun between the eastern, former communist countries, and the West

European countries in the sense that the East European countries are no longer willing to accept advice, to be satisfied with just humanitarian aid, but want cooperation and a correct and solid integration into Europe. In this sense—should West European countries eschew or be unable to provide material or financial help—the East European countries vehemently rose against barriers in East-West economic relations and demanded that they be eliminated. The West responded to all these attacks with great difficulty and sometimes incoherently. On the last day, certain conclusions were drawn and a university professor from France outlined the reasons for this state of affairs. One of the conclusions was that, at this point, West Europe has no great politicians, its leaders are of medium caliber; great politicians able to make important decisions at a time of crisis no longer exist and the institutions called upon to promote dialogue and to seek solutions for viable cooperation between the East and West are entrenched in a bureaucratic system that stops any initiative. In my view, in the not too distant future, this situation will lead to sharper confrontations with the East that wishes to be integrated into Europe and has special needs; and since it has special needs it breeds competent politicians. As a matter of fact, there was a clear qualitative difference between Eastern politicians (represented by the top), who, sometimes, were really brilliant. I am referring to the Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and President Iliescu, whose speeches were appreciated for their high level, so that the partners in the discussions did not have any answers to the problems raised. Talking about businessmen, I hope that this is the beginning of a change in our mentality in the sense that businessmen and the private sector should no longer be viewed as a negative aspect of the transition process; they are actually Romania's only hope to relaunch the economy. They have to be assisted and supported and by no means discriminated against. And it is necessary to amend the law regarding giving an impetus to investments in Romania—both domestic and foreign. It is intolerable for Romanian businessmen to be discriminated against and to have fewer advantages than foreign businessmen.

PUNR, PRM, PSM, PDAR Support Government

AU2506195393 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1656 GMT 25 Jun 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 25/6/1993—A release sent to ROMPRES on June 25 by the National Council of the Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN]—the ruling party—shows that a meeting took place on June 24, 1993, of leaders of the parties that back the Vacaroiu Government, i.e. the Democratic National Salvation Front, the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], the Greater Romania Party [PRM], the Socialist Party of Labour [PSM] and the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania [PDAR].

The leaderships of the respective political formations agreed on the reiteration of their parties' full support to the Vacaroiu government committed to the process of

reform and the accomplishment of the social market economy, the speeding up of the application of the government program and of the socio-economic reform strategy, the executive's more firm commitment to the enforcement of the country's laws and of its own decisions.

They also decided on the steady implementation of the program of fighting crime and corruption, on the expression of the will of the respective parties' parliamentary groups to expedite the bills under an advanced stage of debate, on backing the passing in the parliament of the bill of empowering the government to issue ordinances, according to Romania's Constitution, in priority domains of socio-economic activity during the parliamentary vacation.

Control Panel Over SRI Discussed

AU2506172193 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 24 Jun 93

[Text] The first news conference of the parliamentary commission to control the activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] was held today at the Senate headquarters.

After the news briefing, Senator Vasile Vacaru, the chairman of the mentioned commission, told our correspondents that the first meeting of the new parliamentary panel, which was held previously today, offered the possibility of outlining the main directions along which the commission will perform its duties.

During the meeting, they agreed upon the commission's functioning statute, after which the commission members met with SRI director Virgil Magureanu, who presented them a report on the SRI activity.

After examining the report, the parliamentary commission to control the SRI activity will present a comprehensive report including its own conclusions to the competent parliamentary bodies and the plenary session of the law-making body, Vacaru said. Mentioning that this report might be perfected by next week, Senator Vacaru told our correspondents that in his opinion, cooperation among the commission members is functioning well and the panel will most probably fulfill its duties in a satisfactory way.

FDSN, Republican Party To Merge

AU2706102993 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1412 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 26/6/1993—The Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN] (ruling party) and the Republican Party [PR] concluded, on Saturday, 26 June, a protocol on the merging of the two parties, signed by the two parties' presidents, Oliviu Gherman and Ion Manzatu.

The protocol released for the press stipulates that the merging starts "with the date on which the FDSN

national conference will open" [9 July] that is likely to give birth to "a modern political center-left party open to all social, professional, and ethnic categories in Romania."

Also mentioned in the protocol is that for the two parties' merging "the need for dialogue and collaboration of all political democratic forces in which national interests are put before party interests" was taken into consideration, as well as "similarities of the political platforms of both parties and the community of ideas and of fundamental stands regarding the defense of national interests and international openness."

Trade Union Files Complaint Against Iliescu

AU2806120793 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Jun 93 p 9

[Alexandru Grigoriev article: "President Iliescu Is Accused of Influence Peddling"]

[Text] The Free Trade Union Organization of the Traffic Management and Commerce Branch of the Romanian Railroad Employees, represented by its leader, Stefan Siromascenco, has forwarded a formal complaint against President Ion Iliescu and Romania's Deputy Prosecutor General, Mihai Popa Cherecheanu. The documents contains charges against the mentioned two persons claiming they have "perpetrated" the crimes of corruption, namely "influence peddling, bribing and accepting bribes, and abusing their office to the detriment of the public interest." The main charges are: covering up, by vast maneuvers of corruption, the abuses and other actions to the detriment of the public interest in the domain of railroad transport; the hindering, by Romania's Prosecutor General, of inquiries trying to investigate the mentioned corruption phenomena; the president's refusal to personally involve himself in favor of the unearthing of the grave corruption cases with serious consequences on the national economy. President Iliescu is also accused of having promoted Interior Minister George Ioan Danescu to the rank of lieutenant general and of having appointed Mihai Popa Cherecheanu to the office he is currently holding. Both promotions are considered rewards for their having prevented investigations related to the grave abuses in the field of railroad transport indicated by the trade union federation.

Interview With Man Accused in Tiraspol Trial

AU2606061893 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Jun 93 p 1

[Interview with Tiraspol detainee Ilie Ilascu, by Mihai Vicol; in Tiraspol, date not given: "I Have Always Believed and Believe In the Reunification of Our Homeland, Romania"]

[Text] After a one-week delay (owing to the illness of Olga Ivanonva, the judge of the trial staged for the Ilascu group) the court continued to hear the testimonies of the culprits suspected of having murdered the leaders of the locality of

Slobozia, Nicolae Ostapenko and Alexandru Gusar. Ilie Ilascu, one of the accused, has turned into a prosecutor, incriminating the members of the court and the Tiraspol leaders who have staged this mock trial. Ilie Ilascu has repeatedly emphasized the fact that the mentioned assassinations were committed by the Tiraspol secret service to discredit the Slobozia branch of the Christian-Democratic Popular Front of Moldova and to intimidate the indigenous population, which has started off on the road to national renaissance.

[Vicol] Mr. Ilascu, do you believe this is a political trial, or rather a staged trial?

[Ilascu] The latter one, of course. It is being staged by Russian pro-imperialist forces that are nested here in Tiraspol. It is staged by the special bodies of this pseudo-republic [self-styled Dniester Republic].

[Vicol] What role is this trial supposed to play in their efforts to divide the territory of the Republic of Moldova?

[Ilascu] It is more than obvious that this trial will either make our national ideal of Romania's reunification further expand or be repressed altogether. The setting up of the two pseudo-republics within the Republic of Moldova—the Gagauz one and the Dniester one—has a single goal, namely that of preventing Romania's reunification. Another consideration of Moscow is to maintain and strengthen its bridgehead placed in the Dniester region to be able to reach the Balkans and, especially, Romania. I possess evidence, which I have not aired so far, certifying that Russia's secret bodies are making plans to implicate Romania in this dirty business. If Romania's secret service do not deal properly with the issues related to state security, the things that are currently happening in Yugoslavia may well happen to Romania, as well, in the future.

[Vicol] How would you comment on the accusations against you, according to which you are a Romanian secret agent?

[Ilascu] I would be pleased if that were true. Unfortunately, I am but an ordinary economist, who has always hated the secret bodies called KGB or the former Romanian Securitate. Perhaps in the homeland [in Romania] things have changed a little bit, but in our country it is still the same old KGB. They claimed that I had been trained to become a member of terrorist groups in Brasov [in Romania], but I have never been in Brasov in my life. I did not have any contacts with the Romanian secret service.

[Vicol] What are your current political beliefs?

[Ilascu] I have always believed and believe in the reunification of our homeland, Romania. Even if, today, reunification seems to have been postponed, it will still be done tomorrow.

[Vicol] Do you have any messages intended for the free world, which is supporting you?

[Ilascu] I am worried... I thank everyone who is supporting us in the homeland and the whole Romanian diplomatic corps for their attitude backing our cause.

[Vicol] Is there anything else you would like to tell me in the seconds we have left?

[Ilascu] I have heard that the daily ROMANIA LIBERA has organized the "march of the cage" in the streets of the Romanian capital city [protesting the Tiraspol mock trial and the cage in which the prisoners were kept in court]. Despite the news ban we have still received issues of TARA, SFATUL TARII [Moldovan dailies], and, of

course, ROMANIA LIBERA. I have always been a reader of the daily you represent. I travelled several times to Bucharest and I even joined the rally in University Square [in June 1990]. I went along with the people to [Romanian] government headquarters, protesting injustice. I would like to thank ROMANIA LIBERA for everything it is doing for us. I thank all the good-willed people in the homeland and in Bessarabia [Republic of Moldova] for the moral support they are granting us. I would like to thank, especially, the Lucaci's in [the Romanian town of] Deva, who have hosted my children for a whole summer.

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 29 June
WA2906164993

The following is an overview of current FBIS reporting on events in the Balkans. It supplements other FBIS reporting and consists primarily of selected summaries of longer reports. For reference purposes, serial numbers of the longer reports are provided.

SUMMARY

Bosnian Presidency holds meeting at Sarajevo Airport ... Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic threatens to ask for international recognition of Serbian and Croatian states in Bosnia ... Muslim-Croat fighting continues in Zepce ... British troops escape injury in ambush near Zepce, but observers still unable to reach central Bosnian towns ... Serbs reportedly attack Dubrovnik area.

POLITICAL

BOSNIAN PRESIDENCY HOLDS MEETING (TANJUG, Sarajevo Radio): All 10 members of the Bosnian Presidency—including President Izetbegovic, Vice President Ganic, and Bosnian Army head Delic—meet at Sarajevo Airport to discuss peace plan proposed by international mediator Owen. At a news conference prior to the meeting, Izetbegovic said that while a federation “like the one in Switzerland” would be “acceptable,” the type of confederation discussed at the talks is “probably not acceptable.” (LD2906104893, AU2806144493)

KARADZIC MAY ASK FOR RECOGNITION (TANJUG): Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic says that unless the Bosnian Government agrees to confederation plan, “Serbs and Croats” will withdraw the proposal and ask that “their respective states” in Bosnia “be internationally recognized.” Karadzic has offered to grant Muslims a state encompassing close to 30 percent of Bosnian territory divided into two units around Sarajevo and the western enclave of Bihac. (LD2906121593)

MILITARY

MUSLIM-CROAT FIGHTING CONTINUES (Mostar Radio, Sarajevo Radio): Mostar Radio reports that Muslim forces are “regrouping and preparing for fresh assaults” on Zepce and that there have been “several hundred” civilian casualties from Muslim-Croat clashes in the area. Sarajevo Radio says that the Bosnian Army has “entered Zepce” and lifted the Croatian siege on the town. (LD2806173093, AU2906100093)

BRITISH TROOPS AMBUSHED (London PRESS ASSOCIATION, Zagreb Radio): British UNPROFOR troops escaped injury when their convoy was ambushed near Zepce. After stopping on a blockaded road from Vitez, the troops came under small arms fire and one of the vehicles hit a mine that the commanding officer suspected “was left by” Bosnian Croats. UNPROFOR military observers remain blocked from entering Zepce and Maglaj to determine the extent of the fighting. (LD2806211093, LD2806115593)

SERBIAN ARTILLERY ATTACKS REPORTED: Zagreb Radio reports Serbian artillery attack on Dubrovnik caused “considerable material damage” in nearby village of Cavtat. (LD2806221493)

Izetbegovic, Ganic, Others To Meet at Sarajevo Airport

LD2906104893 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1025 GMT 29 Jun 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Sarajevo, June 29 (TANJUG)—The rump presidency of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including President Alija Izetbegovic and Vice President Ejup Ganic, is to meet at Sarajevo Airport on Tuesday [29 June].

This was decided at the insistence of the cochairmen of the international conference on former Yugoslavia, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg for the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be cooperative in negotiations with the Serb and Croatian sides.

The third round of talks on Bosnia-Herzegovina was concluded in Geneva on Monday. During the third round, Owen and Stoltenberg informed the seven Bosnia-Herzegovina presidency members of the contents of the Serb-Croatian proposals for ending the war and for the future political arrangement for this former Yugoslav Republic.

Izetbegovic and Ganic boycotted the latest Geneva meetings.

Fikret Abdic, presidency member and Izetbegovic's main rival, said Monday evening in Geneva that he will go to Sarajevo on Tuesday. Abdic took part in the consultations with the international mediators in Geneva. Previously Abdic refused to go to Sarajevo for reasons of personal security.

The leaders of Bosnian Serbs and Croats, Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban, agreed to continue next Monday further coordination of the principles included in the new initiative for resolving the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis. The cochairmen expressed satisfaction with the progress achieved at the talks.

The rump presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina is to examine certain proposals of Lord Owen regarding the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, said on Monday evening in Zagreb Tatjana Ljubic-Mijatovic, a rump presidency member, who took part in the Geneva negotiations, REUTERS reported from Zagreb.

There are no legitimate representatives of local Serbs in the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, torn by a 15-month old civil, ethnic and religious war.

Presidency Members Arrive

AU2906114893 Paris AFP in English 1119 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Sarajevo, June 29 (AFP)—A seven-strong delegation of Bosnia's collective presidency arrived at the airport here on Wednesday [as received] to join the

presidency's three other members to discuss peace strategies and resolve divisions over ethnic partition of the country.

The seven arrived from Split at around noon (1000 GMT) on a U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) plane following peace talks in Geneva Monday boycotted by President Alija Izetbegovic and two other presidency members, diplomatic sources said.

Heading the Sarajevo agenda was the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the future make-up of the country, Bosnian Prime Minister Mile Akmadzic told AFP Tuesday.

"We will be looking into the military situation and see if the collective presidency... can do something to bring an end to the fighting and make progress on negotiations over the make-up of the country," he said.

Izetbegovic, who called the meeting, would be chairing the heavily-policed talks at Sarajevo airport, Akmadzic added.

The seven members were due to return to Split at around 5:00 p.m., possibly accompanied by Izetbegovic, who is hostile to the Serbo-Croat plan for a Bosnian confederation comprising Serb, Croat and Moslem states which was on the agenda at the Geneva talks brokered by international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg.

Akmadzic predicted a second meeting of the full presidency attended by Owen and Stoltenberg would take place in about a week.

Franjo Boras, who headed the seven-member Bosnian delegation in Geneva, said Monday the second meeting would be held in an unidentified Bosnian town. Speculation so far has centred on the Moslem stronghold of Zenica.

Diplomats said the airport was chosen as a venue on Tuesday since the seven members who came to Geneva were unlikely to enter the capital for safety reasons.

The seven include three Serbs, three Croats and one Moslem, Fikret Abdic, a rival of Izetbegovic who said he feared assassination in Sarajevo.

"I was against the idea of holding this meeting but I decided to go give my support to the legitimacy of Bosnia-Herzegovina," Abdic said. He refused to elaborate.

The remaining members of the 10-member presidency are vice president Ejup Ganic and army chief Rasim Delic, who both support Izetbegovic.

Izetbegovic had called for Owen and Stoltenberg to attend the Sarajevo meeting. But conference spokesman John Mills mentioned "safety considerations," adding that the mediators "have no plans to be in Sarajevo this week."

There was no indication whether they would attend the second meeting.

Also due to meet Tuesday at Jojnica, near Sarejevo, were Bosnian Croat commander Milivoj Petkovic, his Moslem counterpart Rasim Delic and commander of U.N. forces in the former Yugoslavia General Philippe Morillon.

Karadzic: Serbs, Croats Might Seek Recognition
LD2906121593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1126 GMT 29 Jun 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Sofia, June 29 (TANJUG)—Unless there was progress in the Geneva talks, Serbs and Croats would withdraw their proposal on a confederation and would ask that their respective states in Bosnia-Herzegovina be internationally recognized, said President of the Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina (R.S.) Radovan Karadzic to the Sofia paper DEMOKRACIJA.

In an interview front-paged Tuesday, Karadzic said sufficient time would be left for the Moslems to make up their minds, but warned that Serbs had no reason to wait for too long for the Moslems to "comprehend reality."

"The seven-member Bosnian presidency is more realistic than Mr. Izetbegovic and understands full well that Moslems have at this time good reasons to conclude peace as by way of negotiations they stood to gain much more territory than after war, which they could lose," assessed Karadzic.

Referring to the words of the commander in chief of the R.S. Army, Gen. Ratko Mladic, that Serbs would not concede an inch of the territories they controlled, Karadzic specified that this meant rejecting those concessions which lacked political agreement. Serbs were prepared to give certain territories, and exchange others, so as to enable the Moslems to establish a "quality state", capable of functioning in a future confederation.

He set out that Moslems would have between 26 and 30 percent of the territory, that is, 50-60 percent of the overall natural resources of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 40 large towns and municipalities.

Izetbegovic Discusses Peace Talks, Confederation
AU2806144493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Report by Nada Rajkovic on the news conference by Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency's President Alija Izetbegovic given to Russian reporters in Sarajevo on 28 June—recorded]

[Text] [Rajkovic] The Russian reporters were particularly interested in what the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency's President Alija Izetbegovic saw as the possible solution to the Bosnian problem.

[Izetbegovic] As for the solution as I see it, there is a word that has been in use around here recently in the political language, so-called confederation. [words indistinct] federation [words indistinct] for example, like in Switzerland, would be acceptable. What is on offer here is probably not acceptable. I say probably because I just said a moment ago that this was my personal belief.

[Rajkovic] Asked by the reporters about the role of the Russian Federation in solving the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem, and its new initiative, Mr. Izetbegovic said:

[Izetbegovic] The role of Russia in solving the many problems that have come up here is very important, problems that emerged with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. I believe that so far Russia has had a constructive role in that respect, since it did join the efforts to find a solution rather late.

[Rajkovic] Even this meeting with the reporters could not pass without the question concerning news on the disagreement within the Presidency.

[Izetbegovic] This disagreement is no greater than it was before. On the contrary, at a joint session of the Presidency that (?has taken place so far) [words indistinct] in Europe. But when they return in a couple of days we will see [words indistinct] perhaps a collective (?meeting). It is important to realize that for months it was impossible to get all the Presidency members together. Still, at least six members of the Presidency have more or less the same ideas of what should be done about Bosnia-Herzegovina, yes, there are at least six members who do. So when it comes to this (?related) question about the confederation, or the even more concrete proposal put forward by Tudjman and Milosevic, then Mr. Boras perhaps, and Mr. Lasic, and Mr. Abdic possibly, seem to support the idea directly or indirectly. The other six or seven members—I could not swear to all of them—but six or seven members so far have refused to talk about that idea.

[Rajkovic] The next question concerned what the (?Bosnian) changes to the Geneva proposals were?

[Izetbegovic] I must say that (?the proposal concerning our attitude) [words indistinct] its realization [words indistinct] I said that we would first go for a wide discussion, a debate on [words indistinct] before we announce anything. (?I cannot talk about details).

[Rajkovic] At the news conference, it was stressed that the existence of Russian mercenaries on the aggressor's side was creating difficulties in political relations between the Russian Federation and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Morillon Discusses UNPROFOR Mission*AU2806202593 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 25 Jun 93 pp 1, 16*

[Interview with Phillippe Morillon, head of UN Protection Force for Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Marina Blazevicova and Igor Blazevic; place and date not given: "Fear Is the Sickness of This Country"]

[Text] According to a REUTER report, Phillippe Morillon, head of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] for Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be replaced in a few weeks. The general granted an interview to LIDOVE NOVINY special correspondents.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Since the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both a military intervention by international forces and lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina have been considered. What is your opinion on that?

[Morillon] A military intervention will never take place. There are no such political goals that could be achieved by a military intervention. Those who count on a military intervention or a lifting of the embargo on arms deliveries are not taking the lives of the civilian population into account. Regarding the embargo, even if it were lifted, the Bosnian Army would only receive submachine guns and light anti-tank weapons.

You must realize that the Serbian Army is well organized, armed, and disciplined. An anti-offensive of the Bosnian Army would only bring 100,000 unnecessary victims and, militarily, there would be no change.

In my opinion, there is no military solution to the conflict.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] What do you suggest then?

[Morillon] The pressure on Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo must be increased. It would be a travesty if the international community pushed for a solution that would be at odds with the will of the Bosnian population.

Violence is exploding every 50 years in this country. After that, the situation always calms down.

Ethnic cleansing is abhorred by 80 percent of the residents in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Fear is this country's sickness. Irrational behavior is increasing everywhere. We must disprove the propaganda of hatred and fear, which is being professed by all three parties at war. UNPROFOR can help with its presence in the region. We must reach a cease-fire at any price, even if it were to be understood as a conservation of the status quo. Stopping the killings is the first and most important step.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Several days ago, you called for peace in Bosnia and you threatened that UNPROFOR units would leave the region since the local commanders, in fact, do not want peace.

[Morillon] I hoped it would weaken the position of the extremists. I would be happy if people took to the streets like they did in Srebrenica and began crying: Peace, peace. This would give us the mandate to save Sarajevo, as we did in Srebrenica. Plans are drafted. UNPROFOR has at its own disposal the necessary means to destroy the blockade of Sarajevo.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] Why have you not done so?

[Morillon] We need support from the people. We have not done so because the Bosnian Government did not agree.

[LIDOVE NOVINY] I do not understand it.

[Morillon] In other words, the government is afraid that people would leave Sarajevo and the world would cease to be interested in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Pale Radio Reports Threats to Siljadic, Abdic*LD2806143693 Pale Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Studio-S Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 28 Jun 93*

[Text] An open struggle for power has broken out in the Muslim political leadership after the international public accepted the division of former Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic communities. SRNA learned from sources in the Muslim-held part of Sarajevo. Following his conflict with Alija Izetbegovic, president of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslim Foreign Minister Haris Siljadic's life has been threatened by Izetbegovic's deputy Ejup Ganic. This is thought to be the main reason for Siljadic's decision to restrict his movement. According to the same source, Fikret Abdic's house was blown up on Saturday [26 June] in Velika Kladusa. The perpetrators of this terrorist act have not been discovered, but in the Muslim part of Sarajevo it is believed that the extremist faction of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency issued the order to blow up the house and to eliminate Abdic because of his inclination to favor the peace process and his open conflict with Izetbegovic.

British Military Commander Escapes Injury in Mine Blast*LD2806211093 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 2026 GMT 28 Jun 93*

[By Tim Moynihan, Press Association]

[Text] The commanding officer of British troops in Bosnia escaped injury today when his Warrior armoured vehicle ran over a mine.

Lieutenant Colonel Alastair Duncan and his crew were unhurt but the vehicle was immobilised and had to be towed back to its base at Vitez. Reporters travelling behind the Warrior witnessed the explosion about three miles from the town of Zepce and it was shown on the BBC's Nine O'Clock News.

Captain Peter Bullock in Vitez said: "The Warrior hit an anti-tank mine which split the left hand track, but there were no casualties."

In the TV news report, BBC journalist Kate Adie explained that the Warrior came under small arms fire before it hit the mine, which was hidden in an apparent landslip on a road. The crew found more mines underneath the stricken vehicle and were shown gingerly trying to pick their way clear of the Warrior after they again came under fire.

Col Duncan told REUTERS: "I thought at first a shell had hit us. I think the mine was left by the HVO (The Bosnian Croat forces) [Croatian Defense Council] and buried."

In another incident today, another Warrior detonated an anti-personnel mine near Novi Travnik. There was slight damage to the vehicle's running gear, but nobody was injured and it was able to return unaided to base. Also, about 20 miles from Tuzla, a Scimitar armoured reconnaissance vehicle came under shell fire. There were no injuries and it returned to Tuzla.

Zagreb Radio Updates Muslim-Croat Fighting

LD2806214593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] According to military sources in the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], 20 HVO soldiers and at least 100 civilians have been killed in the battle for Zepce. There is no information about the Muslim army's losses but it has been announced that following a counterattack by HVO forces, about 1,000 Muslim soldiers have surrendered.

Despite the latest successes of the HVO on the battlefields around Zepce, the situation in this area is still grave. The Muslim army is incessantly firing with tanks and guns at Zepce and neighboring villages which are still under total siege, with no food, medicines, and electricity. The clashes seem to be spreading to the Vares municipality. Muslim Defense Forces have attacked Lijesnica, a village in this municipality, with infantry weapons and mortars.

In central Bosnia the fiercest battles have been waged around Kresivo and Kiseljak. The Muslim army's tanks and howitzers were today destroying houses in the village of Lepenica in the Kiseljak municipality. Muslim artillery and infantry also attacked the HVO lines of defense in the villages of Mirisice, Volujak, and Mali Grad. In Lepenica five civilians have been killed by the shelling. Seven people have been wounded in the villages of Rijeka and Krevina in the municipality of Vitez, which were again shelled today by Muslim artillery. Croatian homes again burned today in those villages in central Bosnia that have been seized by Muslim forces. They set fire to nine homes in the village of Brajkovici near Guca Gora.

At today's meeting at the UN Protection Force base in Nova Bila the Muslim negotiators were by and large blaming the HVO officers for the Muslim-Croat clashes. In the course of this they did not put forward any constructive suggestions, so no agreement has been reached, the HVO military sources report. [passage omitted]

Fierce Fighting Continuing in Zepce Area

LD2806173093 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Report by Antun Mrkonjic from Zepce for Radio Herceg-Bosna]

[Text] Fierce fighting continued this morning for Zepce in the operational zone of the Croatian Defense Council's [HVO] 111th Brigade. After suffering substantial losses and launching unsuccessful infantry attacks, Muslim forces are regrouping and preparing for fresh assaults. The heaviest fighting is still going on in Zepce, Novi Seher, Maglaj, and Croatian-populated settlements in the vicinity of Zavidovici. Thirty troops have been killed so far and there have been several hundred casualties among innocent civilians.

Muslim henchmen are resorting to the dirtiest tricks of war. They are murdering everybody and torching everything in their way.

We have received information on serious squabbles within the Muslim army. Namely, commanders in Maglaj and Tesanj are asking their superiors in the III Corps in Zenica to order an immediate end to hostilities, because, as they say, they cannot defend Maglaj, Tesanj, and Zavidovici from Serbian attacks without the help of the Croats. The criminal Enver Hadzi Hasanovic, commander of the notorious III Corps from Zenica, is disregarding this entirely. He is not at all concerned that these towns will fall, and that thousands of people will die. That is why some 1,000 Islamists have surrendered to HVO fighters, choosing life instead of death.

Morale among members of the 111th Brigade is exceptional. The Croatian people of Zepce, Maglaj, Zavidovici, and Novi Seher have decided to defend themselves, and they will certainly succeed.

Zepce Siege Reportedly Lifted, Other Fighting Continues

AU2906100093

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network, in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 29 June, carries within its regular 16-minute newscast several reports on the fighting in the Republic.

A report from Zepce, by Adnan Dzonlic and Viktor Boban, says that "the units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina have entered Zepce and completely deblocked it. The Croatian fighters of (?Lozancic's) 111th and [word indistinct] of the Croatian Defense

Council [HVO] have been forced to completely disperse and flee. A large number of them surrendered with all their weaponry. The only thing left to them before a complete breakdown was to burn and destroy everything. Thus they set on fire the Zepa town mosque. In the fierce battles, the units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina managed to break through the siege that the HVO had been laying for a year and to connect themselves with the units that were under siege. In an unstoppable assault, our forces are occupying, [word indistinct], and catching the dispersed units of the HVO. The town has been deblocked, but it has been horribly destroyed by the Croatian fighters who lived there. After the units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina entered the town, howitzer and mortar fire on the town has intensified. According to our sources, the Croatian fighters also used chemical agents.

"The united chetnik and Croatian fighters' artillery continued destroying the Zavidovici free territory. About 2,000 shells, grenades, and mortar bombs have fallen on the populated places throughout the commune, as well as on the defense lines. Almost one-half of those shells have fallen on the broader region of Hajdarovici, on which chetniks carried out strong infantry assaults on two occasions. Defenders have energetically rejected both chetnik attacks." The report says that the "[word indistinct] units of the HVO are being pushed further away from the town and young Croatian fighters continue to join the forces of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Hajrudin Sermic reports from Maglaj on "the attacks by chetniks and the extremists of the HVO on the defense lines of the Maglaj Commune free territory." Further on, Sermic says that "it is still dramatic in the commune of Novi (?Seher) where a massacre is threatening the people. Last night, chetniks were bringing in new tanks and [word indistinct] on the part of the town (?front), preparing themselves for even stronger attacks."

Borka Rudic reports that "yesterday, Konjic and its citizens were submitted to an unprecedented aggression and material destruction. Since the early morning hours, Serbian and Montenegrin aggressors and the terrorists of the Serbian Democratic Party, but also members of the HVO, pounded the town, civilian settlements in its neighborhood, as well as defense lines at almost all sections of the Konjic front from all available artillery and infantry weapons. More than 400 shells from howitzers, mortars, guns, and other heavy artillery weapons have been launched at the civilian targets in town and suburbs from Borci, Bijela, and Ljubina. Material damage to residential, economic, and social facilities is huge." Finally, Rudic says that the "early morning hours in Konjic are relatively calm, only a sniper from a position of the HVO above the town is active from time to time."

A report by Hamiz Deronjic and Nihad Salihovic says that "Brcko battlefield had a relatively calm night." Further on, the report says that "key roads on the free

Brcko territory are a constant enemy target. They were shelled from recoilless guns late yesterday afternoon and by chetnik Browning guns this morning. This morning, Serbian chetniks are attacking the central section of the Brcko defense lines."

A report from Kladanj, by an unnamed correspondent, says that "after Kladanj and its defense lines had been shelled the night before, there have been no major aggressor's activities on the Kladanj battlefield, apart from the shelling of Prijedor with several mountain gun shells about 1930 last night."

A studio announcer says that "this morning in Sarajevo is relatively calm. The only exception is an occasional fire from an antiartillery machine-gun at the [word indistinct] of Stari Grad, as well as fire from the death sower [M-84 machine gun] from Stitasta Stijena on (?Sedrenik)."

Fighting in Maglaj Reported; UN Convoy Delayed

LD2806115593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Name indistinct], a spokesman of the peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo, told journalists today that UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] observers have still not succeeded in entering Maglaj and Zepce because of barricades on the roads. They therefore managed to inform the headquarters in Sarajevo only that in Maglaj fierce street battles are in progress and that this town, like Zepce, is being subjected to heavy shelling.

UNPROFOR has over the past few days ensured the passage of 12 convoys with humanitarian aid through all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Gorazde-bound convoy, however, is still in Pale and is waiting for permission from Serb General Mladic to continue on its way. Mladic is making the granting of his permission conditional on the convoy continuing its journey without being accompanied by an armed escort, but Danish personnel are rejecting this. [passage omitted]

UNPROFOR Inspects Trebinje Suburb After Croatian Shelling

LD2806174393 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1641 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Trebinje, 28 Jun (TANJUG)—UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] representatives late this afternoon visited the Trebinje suburb of Mostaci, on which some dozen highly destructive missiles landed this morning after being fired from positions held by regular Croatian Army troops.

The UN officials had the opportunity to acquire a first-hand insight into the obliteration of civilian objects and the material damage inflicted on this occasion.

No casualties were reported after the shelling, although 62-year-old Darinka Basic and her two-year-old granddaughter Snezana were seriously wounded from a grenade that hit their home.

Red Cross Says 'Chaos' Worsening for Civilians

AU2906093293 Paris AFP in English 0006 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Geneva, June 29 (AFP)—Civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina are trapped in a "situation of ever worsening chaos," the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] said Monday [28 June] in a statement issued here. It said the chaos was at its worst in central Bosnia and in Herzegovina where fighting between Moslems and Croats has been going on without interruption since April.

Civilians were "terrorised" and "harassed" and driven at gunpoint from their homes onto roads where bandits and snipers "imposed a reign of terror," the communique said. The bandits "have no qualms about mounting sometimes ferocious attacks on humanitarian convoys," it added.

The ICRC regretted that its agents had been unable to reach the Jablanica, Konjic and Travnik regions and said getting to other parts of central Bosnia was "still extremely risky."

An aid convoy arrived in Zenica on Thursday from Split after several weeks during which it had been impossible to reach the town.

Around Travnik, the ICRC said thousands of Croats had fled to Serb lines to escape an offensive by mainly Moslem Bosnian Government forces.

For several days, the refugees were caught in a "no man's land" between the two fronts. A total of 5,150 children, women and old people were evacuated to safety by the Red Cross but all men able to fight were separated from their families and imprisoned by the Serbs, it said.

In Mostar, the ICRC said thousands of people were prisoners of Croat and Bosnian government forces on opposite banks of the River Neretva—where there was a "dire shortage" of water, food and medicines.

The ICRC insisted that the warring parties had no right to use water as a "weapon," adding that water supplies to Tuzla were a major problem for aid workers.

A water processing plant near the front lines has been destroyed and a sanitation engineer was striving to ensure an adequate supply of drinking water for the 20,000 inhabitants.

ICRC delegates reached Gorazde with 1.5 tonnes of emergency medical supplies on June 20 after being prevented for nearly a month from getting there.

Serbs Detail Horrors of Croatian Camps

LD2806120193 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1100 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Belgrade, June 28 (TANJUG)—After a one-year imprisonment in the camps for Serbs in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vujadin Cecavac (53) who was ransomed for a large sum of money paid by his family, says he has gone through hell and was released only after his torturers convinced themselves he was physically and psychologically a ruined man.

Vujadin's story about the torture he experienced in the camps at an elementary school in Odzak, in Novi Grad, Bosanski Brod and the death camp Donja Mahala on the Sava River, on the border of Croatia and Bosnia, all of which are under control of the Croatian paramilitary formations, is one of the testimonies entered in the memorandum of the Yugoslav state commission for war crimes and crimes of genocide over Bosnian Serbs. Vujadin was freed on May 10 this year.

In early May last year, at the orders of the Croatian authorities of the Odzak municipality, over 1,000 civilians from five Serb villages were arrested and detained in camps, and the villages were burnt. On May 8, 1992, alone, according to the seized records, a total of 728 Serbs were taken away. By May 10, 1993, as many as 758 imprisoned Serbs were freed, and 65 from the exchange list are still listed as missing.

Among the arrested was also Vujadin Cecavac from the village of Donja Dubica. A tall man weighing 110 kilos, who had hardly 70 kilos after leaving the death camp at Donja Mahala as a total invalid. He says there are "at the camp in Donja Mahala now 44 Serbs being treated as persons in isolation," and adds that he felt "sorry for those honorable men who remained in this hell and who are sure not to come out of it alive."

"The 15 of us were kept in a separate room. Whoever got into that room...was due to be liquidated—murder in the most horrible manner," explains Vujadin.

"During my stay, they slit the throat of Goranovic (Milutin) Branm after horrible torture, and Goranovic (Marko) Branko (52) from Donja Dubica succumbed from the consequences of torture," he says.

Some of the inmates died as a result of torture, only after they were exchanged. Although free, after tasting hell, they had no strength to go on living.

The tortures of Vujadin were carried out by Pero Vincetic, called Konj (horse), who was chief executioner at the camp, Damir, called Dama, who often tried hard to surpass his boss and the others, seemed to have been aimed at testing the limit of the victim's physical suffering and the limit of the torturer's bestiality.

"Pero Vincetic, called Konj would order me to lay my palms on a plank, and would then pierce both my hands

with screwdrivers to the plank. After that he would tug at them left and right," says Vujadin.

"He forbade me to shave my beard. When my beard grew long he came over and lit it. The beard went up in flames, scorching my face, and they wouldn't let me put it out." Another time, says Vujadin, Damir, called Dama, beat him with an oar made of hard wood until he broke his ribs.

"He ran a hot iron bar all over my naked body and my neck. This was not enough and they bore holes in my head with a boring machine.... No wonder I look like this after all that," says Vujadin.

"When it was Orthodox Christmas, there came from Osijek six or seven members of the Croatian National Guard. They called us to attention and all hell broke loose then. They beat us with everything they could lay their hands on, including their feet. Blood flowed all over the place. Then they dragged us down the stairs. The body and head hit against the steps. How many steps, so many blows...."

In the world of cruelty at the Donja Mahala Camp, gestures of mercy and humaneness were banned. When the doctor gave us medicine, only in the most serious cases, the torturers would take them away. When the cold Bosnian winter set in, the Red Cross, whose representatives visited the camp, sent blankets, but they were taken away from the prisoners. The prisoners whose appearance would make it easy to conclude torture was widely practiced were hidden from the Red Cross representatives.

By undergoing horrible torture, the prisoners were forced to confess to the murders they never committed. One, Cvijetin, was made to confess he murdered 83 persons, women and children, and Slobodan, that he raped 12 Moslem women, then, after the confession, torture continued.

"Then they brought journalists from Germany, and we had to confess we slit the throat of some old lady, killed or cut the throats of 83 persons, women and children, raped 12 Moslem women. The journalists were taking this down, while the cameras rolled....," Vujadin testifies.

All this was "just part of the story which cannot be told in the full," Vujadin concludes.

Creation of New States, Corridors Analyzed

93BA1107C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 28 May 93 pp 12-13

[Article by Dusko Topalovic: "Creation of a Corridor-State"]

[Text] The battles between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina have confirmed once again the fact that the struggle for territory as living space and the geopolitical basis for a state is at the heart of all the conflicts among Croats, Muslims, and Serbs to date. The

area of the former Yugoslavia in the sector that lies approximately between the Kupa and the Sutla on the northwest and the Danube and the Drina on the southeast is today undergoing the most drastic geopolitical transition, marked by political-geographic dynamics and war as an "experimental ground for geopolitics." Two new and internationally recognized states (Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and at least two, and at the most four, "cancer-states" which can exist only by relying on a neighboring power center—the Serbian republic, the Serbian republic Krajina [RSK], Herceg-Bosnia (?), and Muslim "Bosnia" (??). In this context, any appeal to ethnic criteria and historical-governmental continuity (wherever it exists) is quite in vain, because only the balance of power ultimately defines political-territorial forms. Each side strives to achieve an ideal geopolitical scheme by gaining the best geostrategic positions and the best positions from the standpoint of transportation geography, economic geography, and the politics of water. It has thus turned out that others also had to learn the spatial logic of the territorial conquests of the Serbian expansionists, because a poor knowledge of geopolitics in the neighborhood of expansive Serbia reduces one's chances of his own political survival.

Aware of these spatial relations and in connection with the numerical size of their enclaves (Bihac-Cazin and Drina), some Muslims tend toward domination in the heart of Bosnia-Herzegovina—approximately a rectangle bounded by Zenica, Donji Vakuf (Bugojno), Jablanica, and Sarajevo, with Fojnica as its geographic center. Whether Bosnia-Herzegovina survives or falls apart as a state, from the standpoint of transportation geography this rectangle retains its transit and linking function toward the surrounding space, by being involved in use of the corridors along the Vrbas, Lasva, Bosna, and Neretva Rivers. Regardless of the political entities on which it directly borders in the future, this "Muslim" heart of Bosnia has supraregional importance, and it is through it that Muslims have a political weight which they cannot gain through the surrounding enclaves. The Vance-Owen plan is not essential in these relations, because the possibility of its implementation is highly complicated and seriously problematical. That is why all sides to the Croatian-Muslim-Serb conflict want to gain the best possible territorial positions, because with or without Bosnia-Herzegovina, space is the key prerequisite for a political future and the future of a state.

At the same time, assessments in the realm of realpolitik (H. Kissinger) are being floated concerning the need for division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaving a "small Muslim state, perhaps with a corridor to the sea." It is obvious that such a new "Bosnia" in a Croatian-Serb (Serbian) encirclement could not be an independent state without its own front on the sea. What is more, the geo-economic survival of that state is problematical even if it has that front, but without it it would have ties to the world exclusively across the territory of Croatia or (a new) Serbia. The corridor to the Adriatic for Muslim

Bosnia would go down the valley of the Neretva and probably to what is now the coast of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the Neretva River is not a functional border between Herceg-Bosnia (pushed westward) and the Muslim corridor, because the railroad line to the Adriatic is on the right side of the river almost all the way to Mostar, that is, on the remaining Croatian ethnicum. What is more, the outlet port for Bosnia-Herzegovina is the Croatian port of Ploce, not Neum. Regardless of its functionality, the corridor would round out the geopolitical picture of a Muslim state with an outlet to the sea. With financial aid from outside, it is possible to develop port facilities and an industrial complex in the maritime sector around Neum, but even in that case Bosnia does not have full-fledged marine access. The Croatian peninsula of Peljesac is located in front of the "Muslim" coast as a geophysical barrier which prevents it from having its own territorial waters. Thus, Bosnian waters would be only about half a nautical mile wide, and in actuality they would be within Croatia's inner coastal waters. The maximum which Muslim Bosnia could gain would be the right of innocent passage through Croatian territorial waters. Thus, even with the Neretva corridor it remains a geographically handicapped state with its own coast, inadequate from the standpoint of transportation geography, locked in Croatian "geopolitical tongs." In that sense, the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina could result de jure in a Muslim state which de facto must be spatially integrated with the neighboring Croatian or Serbian side. The geopolitical interest of the ethnic assembly in one state could push the Muslims into some reformed Yugoslavia, which would eliminate the importance of the Bosnian-Neretva corridor as a transit area for the elongated branches of Croatia (eastern Slavonia and southern Dalmatia).

This is not an insurmountable problem for Croatia, but if Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided as Kissinger suggested, as a state that was irresponsibly given international recognition, that could easily be applied in the Croatian case as well. So, in exchange for Herzegovina and a quite small portion of the Sava Valley in Bosnia, Krajina is lost, and geopolitical pressure remains a permanent feature in the coastal area of Zadar, Sibenik, and Dubrovnik. The wedge of Serbian expansionism would be driven completely into the space of the Croatian state, and Croatia's longest border would be with a hostile neighbor, which is geostrategically problematical and signifies an immense and lasting financial burden. It follows that the survival of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders, regardless of its internal political system, is a vital interest of the Republic of Croatia. Because Bosnia-Herzegovina can survive anyway only on the basis of ethnic equality, the essential thing is to frustrate the idea of Serbian expansionism. Any division of spheres of interest of Zagreb and Belgrade on Bosnian soil could be disastrous, because in addition to Herceg-Bosnia, there could also be "Herceg-Croatia." Croatian military involvement in Herzegovina was geostrategically central, but actual

authority in the field should not be "revealed" by political institutionalization. But the facts are the facts, mistakes have to be taken note of, because they are terribly costly to us, and the principle of Croatian defense on the Drina is truly vital, and this has nothing to do with neo-Ustashim, but only with geopolitics.

Kissinger's proposal for division of Bosnia-Herzegovina essentially results in unification of the Serbian ethnicum in a state to which territorial acquisitions in the war would probably be annexed. This would draw new state boundaries within the geopolitical entity comprising Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, complicating still further the already complex spatial configuration of Croatia as a state.

1. Every "new" and spatially redefined state depends on a key corridor from the standpoint of transportation geography, whose purpose would be to provide geopolitical balance:

- A—northern Dalmatia,
- B—Sava Valley,
- C—Neretva Valley.

2. In this system of "balance," Croatia would actually fare badly, because it would achieve its territorial integrity through a number of geostrategically sensitive corridors. In addition to the northern Dalmatian corridor, there are also these:

- I—Southern Dalmatia,
- II—Pannonian-Adriatic,
- III—Drava Valley.

3. The Croatian geoeconomic entity would be broken up into several regions:

- 1—Herceg-Dalmatia,
- 2—Rijeka-Istria,
- 3—Zagreb,
- 4—Slavonia.

4. The Zadar-Sibenik region (a) and the Dubrovnik region (b), as parts of Croatia that would have new borders and would be under geopolitical pressure of a hostile hinterland, would be exposed to economic backwardness.

5. The Kissinger corridor (?) of Muslim Bosnia, after the model of the Caprivi Concession, i.e., the Namibian outlet to the Zambezi River, is utterly dysfunctional and detrimental to the Croatian ethnicum.

1. The coastline of Bosnia-Herzegovina is 21.2 km long, but because of the shape of peninsulas and bays its length as the crow flies is about 10 km.

2. The approximate border at sea of Bosnia-Herzegovina waters in Croatian inner coastal waters. Bounded by the line of the midpoint between the peninsulas of Klek (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Peljesac (Croatia), Bosnia-Herzegovina waters could not attain the width of even 1 km.

3. The route for maritime communications between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the open sea cuts cross

Croatian waters. From the geostrategic standpoint, it is easily blocked in Malo More (a), the Neretva Channel (b), and between Peljesac (Loviscad promontory) and Hvar (c).

4. By contrast with Ploce, Neum as the leading Bosnia-Herzegovina maritime center has no rail connection with the interior. What is more, it is connected to the hinterland by the road across Croatian territory to Metkovic, which is shorter and easier from the standpoint of transportation geography, running along the Neretva delta (1); while its own highway route across Bosnia-Herzegovina territory is longer and the terrain is more complicated (2).

5. The mountain region of the Neum hinterland (Zaba—954 meters) makes the highway connection between Neum and Tasovcici longer.

6. The Gradina saddle (428 meters) on the rim of Popovo Polje.

7. The approximate border of Neum Opcina, as a marked Croatian ethnicum: in 1981—88.7 percent Croats, in 1991—87.6 percent Croats.

8. The sector of the Ploce-Mostar railroad line which is on the left (Muslim ?) bank of the Neretva.

Serbian Economic, Demographic Data Detailed

93BA1115E Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 28 May 93 pp 30, 31

[Article by Rajko Dukic: "Land of Vipers and Sheep"]

[Text] *By accepting the plan, would the Bosnian Serbs become the poorest state community in Europe?*

No reasonable person can accept that what it took generations to create should be reduced to just a division of territory by percentages. Bosnia-Herzegovina's property is not in territory, nor did the war begin because of territory. If territory had been the sole cause and occasion for the war, I would immediately accept having us given that 44.2 percent, or 22,600 square kilometers, that the Vance-Owen plan imposes on us, instead of the 64 percent of the territory inhabited by a majority Serbian population.

In arguing for these positions, I will use the language of figures.

1. The value of Bosnia-Herzegovina's total property is estimated to be \$31.4 billion. More than 70 percent of that value is concentrated in 10 industrial centers. Only Banja Luka is ours. According to the Vance-Owen maps, the estimated property is distributed as follows:

- \$18.1 billion in the Muslim provinces;
- \$7.2 billion in the Croatian provinces;
- \$6.1 billion in the Serbian provinces.

If we express the value of the territory in terms of the value of the property in that territory, then the distribution is as follows:

- 30,300 sq km for the Muslims;
- 11,000 sq km for the Croats;
- 10,000 sq km for the Serbs.

2. The territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided into 109 municipalities. Because of the considerably different situation in the field, however, the municipality as an ethnic community should not be taken as the basis for territorial demarcation. The Serbian people live primarily in villages, whereas the Muslim population gravitated toward the cities, and so at the expense of villages and hilly-mountainous areas, urban agglomerations were created that resulted in this sort of ethnic picture in the municipalities. One should not forget the genocide committed, the political elimination of municipalities with a majority Serbian population (in the area of Birac alone, five municipalities with a majority Serbian population were eliminated), the emigration of Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina because of unequal economic development (only 10 percent of the defense industry is located in Serbian territories), etc., etc.

The failure to take all of the above into account in preparing the Vance-Owen plan yielded the following result:

a) the Muslims have an absolute majority in 37 municipalities, in which 1,250,000 Muslims live, on a territory with a total area of 14,750 square kilometers;

b) the Croats have an absolute majority in 14 municipalities, with a total area of 5,100 square kilometers;

c) the Serbs have a majority in 32 municipalities, where 608,000 Serbs live on 19,830 square kilometers;

d) in 26 municipalities, no one has an absolute majority. There are about 2,000,000 inhabitants in that area of 11,000 square kilometers. The problem lies precisely in this section—although the Serbian people is the majority one in more municipalities, and in many of them it also owns a majority share of the territory, we were only given on municipality out of all 26.

3. The vital interest of the majority part of the Serbian people in unhindered mutual communication was not preserved in the formation of the provinces. In contrast to the Serbs, the Croats and Muslims are gaining homogeneous provinces. They have unhindered access to the sea, and a link with their parent homeland. For example, without any problems Mujo from Dobojo can go through Tuzla, and cross 300 kilometers through the Drina basin to Gorazde, while crossing over 70 percent ethnic Serbian territories, which according to the maps belong to the Muslims. From Milic, in which only about 10 Muslim families lived before the war, however, I cannot cross through Serbian territories for even 15 kilometers on the way to the Drina and Serbia.

The data that follow indicate what the ratio of national populations in the provinces is.

a) There are 731,000 Serbs in our provinces, or 54 percent. There are 166,000 of them left in the Croatian provinces, and 463,000 in the Muslim provinces. There are a total of 629,000 Serbs, or 46 percent, outside our provinces.

b) There are 1,544,000 Muslims, or 81 percent, in their provinces. There are 208,000 in Serbian provinces and 153,000 in Croatian provinces, i.e., altogether only 19 percent are outside their parent provinces.

c) There are 538,000 Croats in their provinces, or 71 percent, 82,000 in the Serbian provinces, and 137,000 in the Muslim provinces. This means that a total of 29 percent of the Croats are living outside their own provinces.

The entire Serbian ethnic areas of Podgrmec, Potkozarje, Sarajevo, Ozren, Birac, Posavina, Gornje Podrinje, and Kupres, bloodily preserved and protected, should belong to the enemy, according to the decisions at the green table.

According to the Vance-Owen plan, we should withdraw from 26 municipalities in which 630,000 Serbs live, and where we have an ethnic majority on 62 percent of the territory.

The Muslim provinces [get] \$18 billion, or \$9,500 per capita.

The Serbian provinces [get] \$6.1 billion, or \$5,000 per capita.

The Croatian provinces [get] \$7.3 billion, or \$8,100 per capita.

The Muslim province of Sarajevo has as much property as all the Serbian provinces together.

What norms of international law, or what rights, except for the right of force, were applied in dividing up the property?

a) All the bauxite, tin and zinc, iron, and salt mines, and 90 percent of the coal mines, as well as facilities for processing these resources (Birac-Zvornik, Kombinat-Mostar, Zeljezara [Ironworks]-Zenica, Vares-Ilijas, Akumulatori-Potocari, Brcko-Chloralkaline Complex) went to the enemy territories.

b) The Bosanski Brod petrochemical complex, Modrica, and also the largest wood-processing installations—Sipad, Krivaja, Maglic—the highest-quality forest areas, and other things are also in the enemy provinces.

c) The electrical energy installations (hydro- and thermoelectric power stations with an installed capacity of about 3,900 MW) have been divided as follows:

- 905 MW, 24 percent, in the Serbian provinces;
- 1,765 MW, 45 percent, in the Muslim provinces;
- 1,220 MW, 31 percent, in the Croatian provinces.

Expressed in terms of value, it appears as follows—of the total assessed value of \$7 billion:

- the Serbian provinces received \$1,650,000,000, or 24 percent;
- the Muslim provinces received \$1,850,000,000, or 28 percent;
- the Croatian provinces received \$3,500,000,000, or 50 percent.

d) Of the 920 kilometers of railroad lines in the provinces:

- 161 km, or 17 percent, belong to the Serbian provinces;
- 500 km, or 55 percent, belong to the Muslim provinces;
- 260 km, or 28 percent, belong to the Croatian provinces.

e) Of the approximately 1,200 kilometers of international roads (high-quality highways), 200 kilometers are in our provinces.

f) Since almost all of the Drina basin is a Muslim province, they received seven of the eight bridges that link Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. There are 230,000 Serbs left in the Muslim province of Tuzla, which is more than in two of our provinces (Nevesinje and Bijeljina), and the value of the property that went into that Tuzla province is twice as large, and exports are four times as large as in the two above-mentioned Serbian provinces together.

5. In the Muslim and Croatian provinces, there are four times as many institutions of higher education as in ours (three universities and 10 centers with higher and high schools). In our two provinces, four and six, there are only two higher schools. In those two provinces there is not one health institution above the hospital level. The problem is not just training personnel, but the economy is without an adequate infrastructure, concentrated in several low-production sectors incapable of ensuring any sort of prospects, development, and employment. Consequently, migrations are necessary; and if one knows that in the past 20 years we had a negative population growth of -0.1 percent, then it is realistic to estimate that under the conditions being offered us for the next 10 years, the Serbian population would be reduced from the present 34 percent to 15 percent.

6. I will also cite some extremely indicative facts that are very important for our national and spiritual awareness. The following are left outside our provinces:

- three out of five eparchy headquarters;
- 10 out of 19 archpriest deputies' offices;
- 150 out of 300 churches.

7. The planned concept of transitional authorities concentrates power not in the hands of the tripartite presidency and government, but rather the provincial governor and his government. He has the judicial system, the police, education, information, culture, and municipal services. Then what are the measures and possibilities for protecting the Serbian population outside the

Serbian provinces? It sounds like not just an empty phrase, but rather slightly morbid, when someone tells us that we will be equal, free, and protected. The question is crucial: whether, for the sake of future generations, to endure stoically even greater sacrifices, or to disappear by installments? My option is a third one. If we no longer have any chance of being on our own, if we do not have any possibility of gradually, step by step, achieving our

ultimate goal—and I hope that we are all aware of it—then an exchange of territories and resettlement should be carried out.

(Editorial comment) The author is an expert on economic development issues in the Serbian republic. Statistical data from censuses before 1991 were used for the analysis.

Serb Artillery Attack Hits Dubrovnik, Konavli Regions

LD2806221493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in English 2100 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] The general warning was again sounded for the whole of the Dubrovnik and Konavli regions at 5 o'clock this afternoon. One person was wounded in Obod. There was considerable material damage, mainly in Cavtat, and traffic has been stopped on the Adriatic road.

This was all the result of this morning's surprise Serb artillery attack. The attack started just after 9 o'clock. Shells of all types landed between Slano and Konavli. As soon as the attack started, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] was sent complaints as artillery hit solely civilian targets. When this did not produce any results, the Croatian Army was forced to return fire, targeting military installations in order to protect the civilian population.

U.S. Envoy, Tudjman Hold Talks; Iraq Raid Supported

LD2806165293 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith today presented his credentials to Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, in the presidential palace. The U.S. ambassador stressed that he is honored to submit his credentials to the president of independent, democratic, and free Croatia, primarily because he is the first U.S. ambassador in Croatia.

The United States appreciates the relations it has developed with Croatia over the past year, Ambassador Galbraith said, emphasizing that he will do everything to improve the efficiency of these relations in joint efforts directed toward peace in the Balkans and toward progress in Croatia.

The United States deeply regrets that Croatia's independence is being harmed by the war. This tragic conflict has imposed huge burdens upon Croatia, and it jeopardizes the territorial integrity of your country. We will cooperate with you persistently, energetically, and patiently in order to place all parts of your country under Croatian authority. We encourage you to continue pursuing a peaceful path in achieving this goal.

Croatia has an important role in solving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We hope and expect that Croatia will do everything within its power to halt the insane violence and to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict, a solution which will take into consideration the interests of all sides, including those of the Bosnian Government. Croatia and its neighbors will one day live in peace, refugees will return home, and normal economic and political life will be restored. I hope and believe that all this will happen during my term here, Ambassador Galbraith said.

He voiced full support for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, expressing a wish that the [UN] protected areas be reintegrated into the legal and economic system of the Republic of Croatia as soon as possible.

President Tudjman said that it is with special pleasure that he has received the credentials whereby the U.S. President appointed Galbraith as the first ambassador to the independent, sovereign, and internationally recognized state. We attach the highest importance to this act for several reasons, primarily because the United States has such a large and important role in the modern world and in establishing a new international order, because American society and democracy have always been and still are our ideal of how to build a progressive democratic society, and last but not least, because about 2.5 million people of Croatian origin live in the United States. Those people have been leaving their Croatian homeland since the late 19th Century, and have contributed to the development of American society. They can be a bridge and a link in the development of relations between the two states, the Croatian president said.

Since the introduction of democratic authorities, democratic Croatia has been trying to establish the best possible and most versatile relations between our two countries. I highly appreciate your remarks today that the United States honors the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, and that it will do everything it can to place all areas under the full sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia, President Tudjman said.

You have probably been informed about the fact that Croatia has been advocating a political solution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia, as well as of the protected areas in Croatia, and especially of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Tudjman said stressing that he listened to Ambassador Galbraith with great pleasure when he said that he will help efforts to find a peaceful solution.

Will you please also show understanding for the feelings of the Croatian nation which, although committed to a peaceful solution, requires that this problem be solved as soon as possible, both in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Until peace is restored, we will not be able to concentrate our forces on building a democratic society, on economic transformation, and on establishing stability in this part of the world, the Croatian president said. Rest assured that you will enjoy the full support of Croatia's public, government, and my own personal support in fulfilling your important tasks. I wish you a pleasant stay in the capital of Croatia, and I hope that during your term you will achieve solutions important for peace in the world, which are therefore a (?contribution) not only to Croatia, but to the United States as well, and that friendly relations between the two countries—the United States and Croatia—will be established, Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, said.

During the talks with U.S. Ambassador Galbraith following the submission of credentials, the Croatian president expressed concern about the many crisis hotspots in the world, about the danger of further destabilization of the world order, and about terrorism. In this connection, he expressed support for the U.S. action against the center of Iraqi terrorism as a sign of determination to curb international terrorism.

Jure Radic, head of the president's office, and Zeljko Matic, the president's foreign policy advisor, attended the presentation of credentials ceremony.

Tudjman Extends UNPROFOR Mandate

LD2806191293 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has sent a letter to UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali on extending the mandate of the UN peace forces deployed in our country. The letter begins by stressing that the Republic of Croatia considers the limited extension of the current mandate only partially acceptable for a period of one month. This extension must be taken as a probation period, during which the Serbian side and their local leaders should start cooperating in a serious manner with the Croatian authorities in the implementation of the UN peace plan—the Vance plan—and relevant Security Council resolutions. If during that period the local Serbians sign a binding agreement for the implementation of the Vance plan, the Republic of Croatia would be willing to consider extending the mandate for a period of three-six months. Unless such a binding agreement is signed, and unless considerable progress is made in the implementation of the Vance plan, the extension of UNPROFOR's [UN Peacekeeping Force's] mandate will only serve the tactics of procrastinating, used by local Serbian leaders, and the strengthening of the status quo.

I am fully aware of the difficulties which you and the Security Council face in fulfilling the tasks bestowed upon UNPROFOR. However, the Republic of Croatia sees no reason for UNPROFOR's continued presence on its territory if UNPROFOR does not fulfil its tasks, as determined in resolutions already adopted by the Security Council. Our decision, which was conveyed to your special envoy yesterday, to give our consent to a one-month extension of UNPROFOR's mandate, was reached in the hope that it will help the peace process currently under way under the auspices of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, especially its endeavors to find a permanent and just political solution for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We believe that the one-month extension of UNPROFOR's mandate will be enough to provide space for uninterrupted efforts toward finding a peaceful solution, as you said in your report.

As you correctly noted in your latest reports, the local Serbian authorities in the UN protected areas do not

cooperate with the Croatian Government or the international community, and have mounted open resistance to the implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions. The Republic of Croatia will however try to continue negotiating with the local Serbian population in honest efforts in order to find a solution beneficial to all sides. Croatia, however, cannot allow an unlimited maintenance of the status quo which not only seriously undermines the relevancy of Security Council resolutions, but also puts in jeopardy the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia.

Having decided to prolong UNPROFOR's mandate by just one month, Croatia has taken account of the following important facts:

Croatia can no longer tolerate a de facto division of its territory into several parts which experience extreme difficulties in communications. Today it is difficult to travel from Croatia's eastern part to its Western parts because of the existence of UN Protected Area [UNPA] Sector West, while southern Croatia is for the time being separated from UNPA North by sectors south and north. The power network cannot supply southern Croatia with electricity from north Croatia, since high-voltage lines have been cut off. The oil pipeline between Rijeka and central Croatia, which is of vital importance not just to Croatia but also to a number of countries in central Europe, something that is borne out by a demand raised by the central European Initiative in the United Nations, is not operational. The railway links between Split and Zagreb, via Knin, and Europe have been severed for over two years.

This is why economic difficulties threaten to hamper Croatia's entire social life, bringing about unprecedented consequences. The heavy burden of the displaced and refugees—as Croatia is forced to care for them—seriously compounds an already grave economic situation. Given all this, our limited armed operation in the Maslenica area and the Peruca dam area can easily be explained and justified. All these facts may be followed by other facts of identical if not greater importance. Serbian attacks on Croatian towns, which continue on a daily basis despite the presence of UNPROFOR and the signed cease-fire agreement, are seriously undermining what remains of normal life.

The Serbian authorities abuse UNPROFOR's indecisiveness and its lack of readiness to impose UN Security Council resolutions, as they are attempting, by way of their self-declared and illegal referendum, to create a quasi Serbian state within the internationally recognized borders of the sovereign Republic of Croatia. All this makes the present situation intolerable for Croatia.

The Republic of Croatia will welcome UNPROFOR's active role in the implementation of Security Council resolutions, as was stated in a letter I sent to you on 4 June 1993. If, in accordance with our current proposal, progress is made during the one-month period, the Republic of Croatia would be willing to accept the

extension of UNPROFOR's role in Croatia under a new mandate. However, we again stress that any agreement on a new mandate can be reached only between the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations, as separate from the mandates of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Furthermore, the new mandate must grant the protection forces authority and instructions to impose and implement all relevant resolutions passed by the UN Security Council in accordance with scheduled deadlines.

I sincerely hope that the Security Council will accept our proposal, and I am assuring you that the Republic of Croatia will always be ready to cooperate with the United Nations fully and sincerely. We are ready to offer logistics support and make our facilities available to UNPROFOR if the mandates for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia are separated from the mandate for Croatia.

This is stated in the conclusion of the letter by President Tudjman to UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali.

Tudjman Receives Delegation of Croats From Bosnia

LD2806213293 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] President Franjo Tudjman received a Croat delegation from central Bosnia and the Bosnian Posavina area in the presidential palace today, the president's office has announced.

The delegation briefed the president about the suffering of the Croats. First there was Serb aggression, now there is Muslim aggression. They thanked the president and the Republic of Croatia for everything they have done for the survival of the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Tudjman informed them about the progress of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, about the changes to the Vance-Owen plan, and about Croatia's endeavors to establish lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and protect the Croatian people.

The meeting was also attended by President's Office Head Jure Radic, Defense Minister Gojko Susak, and Croatian Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina Zdravko Sancevic.

Granic Holds Talks With Kozyrev, Churkin in Moscow

LD2806213193 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Report by correspondent Bogoljub Lacmanovic from Moscow]

[Text] A friendly atmosphere and a high level of accord are the basic characteristics of today's working visit to Moscow and talks between Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, and the Kremlin's [as received] Foreign

Minister Andrey Kozyrev, and Vitaliy Churkin, President Yeltsin's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia. Four topics were the focus of the exchange of opinions that went on for several hours—two hours with Churkin and almost a whole hour with Kozyrev.

The first topic refers to issues concerning the extension of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate in the occupied Croatian areas. Both sides agreed that the mandate needs to be more effective now and enable Croatian authorities to be restored throughout Croatian territory. Furthermore, at the very beginning of the talks, Kozyrev categorically confirmed Russia's stand that the Serbs in Croatia must and can solve their problems exclusively within the internationally recognized Croatian state borders.

Full accord between Russia and Croatia was also reached in connection with the new plan to divide Bosnia into three ethnic territories, so that Bosnia-Herzegovina is set up as a federal or confederate state. Russia even earlier supported the division of Bosnia into three ethnic territories, and talking to Granic, Kozyrev reiterated Moscow's stand that this division cannot be made at the Muslims' expense, or at the expense of the Croats or Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina either.

Our stands on Bosnia are close to Russia's, and the main problem and task will be work on the maps of territorial division, Granic told journalists following the talks with Kozyrev, adding that the assistance and encouragement of the international community will be necessary for work on these maps.

The two ministers also exchanged opinions on global international issues, such as human rights, minorities rights, and terrorism. They also discussed further development of interstate relations between Croatia and Russia, that were deemed to be constantly improving.

Following the talks, Minister Granic and members of his delegation left Moscow for Zagreb this evening.

Granic Addresses Assembly on Foreign Policy

LD2506160593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0815 GMT 25 Jun 93

[Address by Foreign Minister Mate Granic to Croatian Assembly session in Zagreb—live]

[Text] Mr. Speaker, honorable house: It is a special honor for me to address you from this floor in my capacity as minister for foreign affairs and hear, at this decisive juncture, this honorable house's valuable opinion and advice so the legislative and executive authorities, along with the president, can face up to the challenge of this moment.

We live at a time when we, as a country and as a people, have reached a new stage in the development and evolution of our immediate, as well as global, foreign-policy environment. We act at a time when attitudes to

the crisis in this part of the world, as well as to some other crises in the world—for instance Somalia and Cyprus—and likewise the interstate articulation of future relations in southeastern Europe and its future, have reached an extremely sensitive stage. Under such circumstances, one misguided and hasty move can result in missing, temporarily or irreversibly, the most favorable option. Hence, responsibility and the mutual trust achieved in the dialogue conducted by all institutions within the system becomes crucial. Likewise, every institution of the entire system should strictly comply with its role and responsibility as stipulated by the Constitution of the Republic. So far we have worked together, and I believe that in the future we are going to work and advance even more effectively.

Ladies and gentlemen, the present foreign-policy context of the Republic of Croatia is marked by a number of key features. The first refers to the general state of affairs in global relations in the world, which indicates a certain retreat by the advocates of the so-called new world order and a deepening dispute between the United States and Europe, something that is most evident in Washington's very complex policy toward Moscow, including even a return to bipolarity through Russia's more prominent role in activities regarding the crisis in the Balkans. This is compounded by conceptual divisions, that is, disunity among the leading EC countries.

The current phase in the resolving of the crisis in the area of the former Yugoslavia affects Bosnia-Herzegovina most directly. In this context, there is an increasing certainty there will be no military intervention imposing a solution from the outside. At least, there will be no military intervention in the foreseeable future. This is why the Vance-Owen plan is being increasingly transformed into a Vance-Owen process in the course of which numerous adjustments to the real situation are possible within the framework of an independent, sovereign, and territorially compact state of Bosnia-Herzegovina; something that was also endorsed by the Council of Europe [as received] at its recent session in Copenhagen. The indecisive international community and [U.S. Secretary of State Warren] Christopher find their excuses in saying there is no clear political aim for intervention. They still count on either a possible agreement between the warring parties or Serbia's total economic collapse, social chaos, Montenegro's secession, and the formal demise of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which would create a new situation on the ground, that is new relations between Bosnia's Serbs and the Serbs within Croatia's UN Protected Areas [UNPA].

Some geostrategists judge on the basis of this that it would be much easier to roll back the Serbian territorial conquest in Bosnia-Herzegovina and reintegrate the UNPAs into Croatia.

At this moment a priority and a pressing task of the international community is to halt, that is prevent, the foreseeable spread of war to Kosovo, Macedonia, and

further afield to the rest of the Balkans. This is the so-called policy of prevention.

Although we cannot be completely satisfied with this priority policy of the international community, and although we must convey our dissatisfaction in contacts with the main players—that is, great powers—we must also act openly and force our country to be accepted as a factor of regional stability, a factor without which there can be no lasting security and no lasting solution to the overall Balkan crisis.

Likewise, we must demand their more direct and efficient support both for our legitimate interests—the reestablishment of Croatia's sovereignty over the UNPAs and pink zones—and for a lasting and just resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We must also demand their support for rebuilding and for removing the consequences of the aggression, which is preventing normal development and consolidation of the country's democratic system.

The United States, as the leading world power, the European Community, Russia, and China play a especially important role in this. Results of visits and contacts with these factors, as well as their public statements, confirm that there is a readiness, but that we must persevere in this and that we must pursue a policy that is as transparent as possible.

In this context, we deem especially important a recent visit paid by Republican President Dr. Franjo Tudjman to the People's Republic of China and its political and economic results, about which you have already been briefed.

Likewise, we expect significant results from the planned contacts with other world factors, such as my meeting with Kozyrev in Moscow on Monday. [28 June] We expect understanding and support from these meetings. We shall proceed from clear stands, especially in connection with the four most crucial tasks of our foreign policy: the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, neighbors, and the policy toward the United Nations and the European Community.

Esteemed House, the establishment of full sovereignty on the temporarily occupied territories is our basic task. Our firm orientation is to achieve this in a peaceful way, through negotiations, and with political means, above all through UNPROFOR and its role in the implementation of the Vance plan. But we cannot reconcile ourselves with, or agree to, an ad infinitum delay to an effective reintegration of these areas into Croatia.

Our demand is very clear: We do not ask anything more or less than what is stated in the Vance plan and in Security Council resolutions. The only thing we demand is that this be achieved within an appropriate timeframe and that the UNPROFOR receives the appropriate mandate, means, and powers so that it can be what it should have been from the very beginning.

At this moment, when the world is preoccupied with the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UNPROFOR and UNPA—without a doubt two problems of crucial importance for our foreign status and internal security—remain partly in the background. We shall do everything to make the international community, and specifically the Security Council, pay due attention and finally start creating conditions for the Croatian state to be established on all parts of the Croatian territory, which has been temporarily occupied in an act of aggression.

The latest UN documents and some statements made by the EC and other countries explicitly confirm—as far as the UNPROFOR mandate and the so-called Krajina referendum are concerned—the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia over the UNPAs, that is, over these temporarily occupied areas of Croatia.

Likewise, public and private contacts are confirming the insignificance of the referendum organized by the Krajina junta [preceding word in Spanish], as it is increasingly frequently being called even by Serbs themselves.

Still, no clear progress regarding the strengthening of the UNPROFOR mandate, and especially no progress that could satisfy the Croatian public, has been made. The definition of the UNPROFOR mandate is a very sensitive issue that must be approached tactfully both in terms of diplomatic activity and in terms of possible effects on the public mood.

Our fundamental orientation is well-known. We favor a peaceful solution, but there will be no trading of territory. Not just because we regard our territory as sacred, but also because we believe in the basic principle of the stability of the international community and a code of conduct between states. The borders must not be changed, and in particular, a forcible change of borders must not be accepted.

This orientation, which has been endorsed and confirmed by the community of all nations, differentiates us from our enemies. We shall preserve and develop this difference, this final proof that we belong to this civilization, as long as we can achieve our strategic goals in accordance with international codes of conduct. This is a difficult road but the only road open to us at the moment.

Ladies and gentlemen, the factors and processes I have mentioned are having a significant influence on the current international standing of the Republic of Croatia. As far as international bodies are concerned—for instance into the European Community—and as far as bilateral relations are concerned—for instance with Germany—and as far as various warnings and even threats of sanctions are concerned, it is obvious that these are mainly advance warnings. Specifically, if the Republic of Croatia is to interfere in the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if Croats—as it is usually said—without wearing clear insignia are to thwart humanitarian convoys and aid delivery, or if the Army of the Republic of Croatia is to liberate the UNPAs, then

sanctions will follow, or it will become difficult for us to forge economic ties with the European Community.

Croatia is not threatened for what she is doing, but she is warned to observe fully all legitimate interests of the Bosnian Muslims in future negotiations on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This is partly caused by the notion of the Muslims as the victims, the notion that was developed in the international community over a lengthy period of time and which was to be used as the main reason for a possible military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a rule, such notions are developed over a long period of time and only disappear slowly, and such views are also only slowly changed.

With a view to the far-reaching importance of these mentioned factors and processes, and with a view to the fact that they will shape a new and perhaps even a radical political configuration in southern Europe, if not further afield, the period has come when—allow me to stress this once more—we are at the crossroads of history regarding our most vital historical and current interests in securing and strengthening the national sovereignty and integrity of the Republic of Croatia within the European and regional space, the interests that must be secured to the optimum degree at any cost.

Hence, it has become especially important that all systemic institutions pay close attention to monitoring and responding to possible developments in the four mentioned processes.

More specifically, as far as the UNPROFOR is concerned, the Republic of Croatia regards the integration of the UNPAs and pink zones into the entire country's system as her main priority, as being of crucial significance for the normalization of the situation in the country and for the normalization of relations with Serbia. To this end, the Government of the Republic of Croatia demands the strengthening of the UNPROFOR mandate and the setting up of a timeframe within which the Vance plan will be implemented. The separation of the UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia from the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia should also serve this purpose.

A special UNPROFOR mandate for the Republic of Croatia would facilitate the creation of the following conditions: the placement of heavy weapons under efficient control; demilitarization of UNPAs; the beginning of the establishment of the local Croatian authorities in line with the 1991 census; and the reopening of roads, electricity lines, and oil-lines. All these are preconditions for an organized return of a large number of displaced people and for an economic reintegration of these areas, that is, a real revival of the UNPA areas, which would equal the revival of other areas in Croatia. We have always said that these are our territories, and we shall confirm this when they are being rebuilt.

A report by the United Nations secretary general, which will serve as the basis for the future resolution on the UNPROFOR mandate, is expected in next few days, or more precisely, today. We expect from both the report and the resolution a clearer and more explicit confirmation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. We shall do everything to secure the strengthening and broadening of the UNPROFOR mandate and role in the implementation of the Vance plan, and to ensure that there is a time-limit on the mandate.

The so-called technical extension of the mandate for a limited period of time is not excluded, but in this case, the Croatian state will make a stand on it.

As far as the Government of the Republic of Croatia is concerned, there is readiness. All assurances have been given and infrastructure has been created for a peaceful resolution of the problem: the laws on minorities, laws on human rights, local self-rule, abolition and amnesty, and negotiations with the local Serbs. Furthermore, the Government of the Republic of Croatia has always proceeded from two fundamental principles: The borders are inviolable—these are integral parts of the Republic of Croatia—and all solutions must be sought within the framework of the Croatian system of authority with maximum openness to and participation of legitimate representatives of the international community. In any case, the Republic of Croatia will decide about the new UNPROFOR mandate.

Esteemed House, you know well that the Government of the Republic of Croatia has been advocating the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina since the beginning. It viewed the Vance-Owen plan as an opportunity to have—to the optimum degree in the current situation and in the current constellation of international factors—assurances and permanent guarantees not just for the survival of that state, but also for the institutionalized legal equality and opportunity for all three constituent nations to satisfy their interests.

For this reason, we were the first to support the Vance-Owen plan, and that is why we have used our influence to encourage the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats to accept the plan as the optimum solution. But, with the continued Serb aggression, the absence of a resolute international military action, and with the outbreak of clashes between Bosnian Muslims and Croats caused by a large-scale movement of Muslims from eastern Bosnia, the Republic of Croatia—as the Republican president said—has agreed to take part in the second, Geneva, phase of talks and negotiations in the belief that this is the most realistic opportunity for ending the war and suffering and for satisfying the legitimate interests of all three nations.

In spite of some doubts, the Croatian side did not instigate the latest round of the Geneva talks, which was convened by Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. No

Croatian-Serbian agreement on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the expense of Muslims or mutual trade in various areas and accesses to the sea preceded these talks.

As far as the Government of the Republic of Croatia is concerned, a possible confederal or federal solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina does not mean that parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina will enter into federation or confederation with neighboring states, but it means only that the original Vance-Owen plan will be made operational through an agreement between all three constituent nations. The Republic of Croatia has urged this all along.

For the Republic of Croatia, an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina is of strategic importance, and any solution reached by the constituent nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina that proceeds mainly from the principle of legal equality and within the framework of a recently instigated Vance-Owen process will be acceptable to us. Our participation in the second Geneva round of talks confirms this.

Clearly, it is in the strategic interest of the Republic of Croatia to ensure a numerous and widespread presence of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats in central Bosnia, the century-long territory of the Bosnian Croats. We shall do everything within our power to preserve and strengthen Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state of Bosnian Croats too.

Lately, Croats from central Bosnia have been sending appeals for help because expulsions and destruction are on a massive scale, and this is happening at a time when we are providing help to hundreds of thousands of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and economic and diplomatic assistance to Bosnia.

The Republic of Croatia is interested in the long-term development of good-neighborly relations, not just with the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but with all countries in the neighborhood, both with former republics of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and other countries in this part of Europe.

Our interest is strengthened by calls for regional and global security and by a demand to establish transport and economic links in line with the strategic, political, and economic interests of the country and its role and place as a mediator between Europe and the Middle East, and the Mediterranean and the heart of Europe.

In pursuing this policy, we proceed only from the indisputable fact of sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia, and we shall never agree to an imposed institutionalized or functionalized so-called framework of Yugoslavia. [as heard]

Yugoslavia has moved the borders of southern Europe and no return to Yugo-frames will bring this part of the continent nearer to Europe. [as heard] Indeed, this orientation and our strategic interests presuppose definition of the broadest possible spectrum of relations and

a constant development of a constructive atmosphere, good-neighborliness, and cooperation.

But in practice we must adopt a selective approach to each country, bearing in mind strategic and national interests. In our relations with neighbors we must be very active, we must be aware that the establishment and development of relations with our neighbors will show us in the best possible light in the eyes of the world and Europe and, thus, we will create foundations for our permanent standing in the international community.

The Republic of Croatia is willing to have mutual relations established, but only after Belgrade has recognized the Republic of Croatia in its internationally defined borders, that is *conditio sine qua non* for any bilateral relations of a usual nature, and when Belgrade stops all military aid to Serb rebels and terrorists.

Relations with the Republic of Slovenia are affected by several border disputes, out of which only the issue of the Bay of Piran is a realistically contentious one, that should, as well as all the other open questions be gradually resolved, in order to create a more favorable general atmosphere and to develop economic links and relations. The open questions with neighboring Slovenia are a consequence of historic heritage, and we shall solve them all in the spirit of and in compliance with European standards.

We shall endeavor to find honorable temporary solutions for all those issues that cannot be finally agreed on at this moment. I do not think it is necessary to say that Croatia and Slovenia, as two neighboring countries that are naturally dependent on each other, do not have any mutual territorial aspirations. Finally, I would like to stress that some important state agreements are expected to be signed in the next few days.

Relations with Montenegro are significantly affected by the fact that Montenegro has remained a part of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and by its participation in the aggression against the Republic of Croatia.

Regarding the Republic of Macedonia, under which name we recognized it some time ago, we should as soon as possible, fully formalize our state relations with it.

Through developing an increasingly wide spectrum of relations with Austria, Hungary, and Italy, the Republic of Croatia is trying to get closer to the European Community and confirm its Central European identity, which we are also doing by promoting our relations with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland. Our activity within the Central European Initiative [CEI] has particular significance in this context.

In the wider region we have very good relations with Turkey, very correct relations with Albania and Romania, while relations with Greece are partly affected by the closeness of Athens and Belgrade. With all these

three countries diplomatic relations should be either established—Greece and Albania—or intensified—Romania.

Ladies and gentlemen, the United Nations is the most important world forum and an area of multilateral activities of Croatian diplomacy. The policy and relations of the Republic of Croatia toward the United Nations are currently particularly influenced by the Croatian interest in resolving the status of the UNPA [UN Protected Area] and pink zones within the Security Council and General Assembly activities, as well as by the implementation of the UN General Assembly resolution on the reconstruction of the war-devastated areas of Croatia.

In the Security Council, including the permanent members, and within the CSCE we have met with a high degree of understanding regarding the sovereignty of Croatia on its entire territory, but we have not met with the willingness to significantly strengthen the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate and define it in terms of time. This is understandable to a certain extent, in the light of the before mentioned disunity of the United States and Europe, and bearing in mind involvement of the member states in numerous peacekeeping operations around the world.

Regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Nonaligned Movement, that has been active in both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, has increasingly expressed mainly constructive views on the crisis, and many of the member states have a positive stance toward the problem of the UNPA's in the Republic of Croatia.

In the near future, after the UN secretary general's report, we shall be faced with a great task and effort—to define the role of the UNPROFOR on our territory objectively, in the background of the Bosnian crisis.

Getting closer to the European Community and each of its individual member states, politically as well as institutionally, but with clear Croatian starting points, remains one of the primary tasks of the foreign policy and diplomatic activity of the Republic of Croatia. During the whole period since the first multiparty elections, the Croatian policy that we have conducted has been based on our own judgement, and once we have formally joined the European integration we shall continue to conduct Croatian policy, since only in such a way—as many other nations—do we see the sense of such integration of our continent.

At this moment, the European community unfortunately still does not have clearly defined, integral, and long-term policy toward the whole of the area of the former Yugoslavia, and thus it does not have a clearly defined policy toward us. We sometimes feel hostages of the Bosnian crisis in the international environment, but we are doing our best to get rid of that burden. The European Community activities, however, confirm great interest in the Republic of Croatia in this phase of its rapprochement toward European integration.

The Republic of Croatia is being actively monitored by the IMF, in various ways and by various groups of EC experts, since it is being counted on in the long-term as a factor of stability, security, and cooperation in the area.

In that respect the Republic of Croatia welcomes steps such as the initiative for a separate European security and stability pact that will prevent conflicts breaking out caused by border or minority population problems.

Our experience in formulating and coordinating such an agreement will be valuable and we are prepared to offer it to the initiators of such agreements. We are aware of and we feel an aspiration within the European Community toward judgments on the Republic of Croatia being made on the basis of criteria that are not usually applied in such a strong form to other countries in the so-called transitional period. This can be a hindrance at times, but the contacts that usually start in this spirit usually have a positive ending. There are many such examples. For instance, the tours of experts for minority rights or for the media. For this reason, this primary and [word indistinct] of exceptional interest of the EC in the Republic of Croatia, as one of the models of a way out of the so-called transitional period, and the indisputable factor of peace and security in this part of the world.

The usual economic cooperation is developing normally and there have been no signs so far of introducing sanctions against the Republic of Croatia. However, we would like to see more evidence of progress as soon as possible as far as the general agreement on cooperation with the EC is concerned. We would also like to be involved in the [word indistinct] project, i.e. in the already agreed credit arrangements that had been postponed. Up until now such stagnation has been the consequence of the EC's temporary political decisions caused by the Community's hesitation concerning [word indistinct] policy, mainly vis-a-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia's UNPA's.

It is up to us to do everything we can in order to eliminate all doubts. An important step in this direction was the well-prepared and well-organized visit of Premier Nikica Valentic to Brussels. Given that such doubts—as far as our whole policy is concerned—are a serious burden, we must do all we can in the upcoming period in order to be able to conduct a much clearer, open, and far-sighted policy with our main political partners and have more frequent direct contacts to present our views.

The Assembly, together with the prime minister, and the government, plays a very significant role in this and it neither can nor, I believe, wishes to avoid it. In this connection I believe that this esteemed chamber will meet all the challenges of the present moment and contribute to the realization of the common goal with all its moves, all its documents, and all its contacts with its parliamentary colleagues, always bearing in mind that together we do things more easily and that everyone has his own specific duties, responsibilities, and tasks and

that our goal is one: A sovereign one and undivided, democratic, and European Croatia. We should all achieve full national unity on this issue. Thank you Mr. President.

SDA President on Survival of Bosnia

93BA1107A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 28 May 93 p 8

[Interview with Semso Tankovic, president of the Democratic Action Party (SDA) of Croatia, by unidentified reporter, place and date not given: "The Fear Is Groundless"]

[Text] [DANAS] Is it your position that there is a possibility for the first time in the history of the United Nations that a member of that organization could disappear?

[Tankovic] If you are thinking of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state threatened with the "possibility of being removed from the rolls of the United Nations," then be certain that the fear is groundless. There are countless reasons for that assertion. I will give just one.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are still a sufficient majority of its citizens of diverse nationalities and faiths who are giving witness in their words and deeds to Bosnia-Herzegovina as their homeland. At this point, it is true, members of the Muslim nation are dominant in that "critical mass," but, why not say it, there are also many Bosnian Serbs and Croats. The other day, I was with the Bosnia-Herzegovina national basketball team. I listened with particular attention to what they had to say about life together and cohabitation in Sarajevo. Serbs who love their Bosnia are fighting (and dying) on the Bosnian side. They have mentioned the number of 3,000 Serbs who have died in Sarajevo alone. Does anyone have the right to close his eyes to that fact? I am convinced that there are such tendencies throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and they need only to be appropriately identified and made known.

[DANAS] If Bosnia-Herzegovina disappears, who would bear the principal blame? Who would profit most in that case?

[Tankovic] Reflections about whether Bosnia might disappear did not arise yesterday, and they can be found in both the Serbian and Croatian press. This is no wonder, because the history of Bosnia has in fact been the history of its people's survival. Many conquerors have come to Bosnia. They have flown various flags. There have even been crusades against Bosnia. It has been and has remained a thorn in the eye of many. The fundamental problem of Bosnia and its people lies in the fact that this is the only people on the space of the former Yugoslavia which has European views, but Balkan neighbors. The other Balkan peoples, developing their ethnic exclusiveness, burdened with numerous myths and frustrations, simply do not have enough sensitivity to understand the broad Bosnian soul. And we, on the other hand, have not

imposed on them with sufficient strength that model of life's commitment. It should be no wonder then that the expression "good Bosnian" sprang up precisely in Bosnia. It is no wonder that it is the Bosnian church that for all of three centuries has been the strength that linked our area to northern Italy and southern France. Can anyone be surprised by the fact that the Sephardic Jews, driven out of Spain, found their new homeland precisely in the heart of Bosnia? The Sarajevo Haggada, a masterpiece of Jewish sacred wit, provides the best testimony to Bosnia as a "promised land."

Henry Kissinger's reflection about Bosnia as "Yugoslavia in the small" should be seen as the swan song of a politician who has become senile. I have not had occasion to see the entire text of what Alois Mock wrote. If that statement is accurate, then one can only express astonishment at the low level of historical memory of

friendly Austria's foreign minister. Austria, which, tacitly to be sure, is showing aspirations to the territory of Bosnia, is not a good neighbor.

[DANAS] Is the world interested in preserving or dismembering the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What are those interests?

[Tankovic] First of all, there are rules of the game which the international community has built up and adopted. One of the proclaimed principles is that it will not accept and condone aggression as a model for resolving conflict situations. In that context, Bosnia is a test of the truth of the international community. If the world allows an aggressor in Bosnia to go unpunished, then we all lose. Then new rules of behavior in mutual relations need to be built. In that case, the door is opened to gunboat politics. And then may the omnipotent Creator come to our aid.

Federal**Press Comments on U.S. Missile Attack on Baghdad***LD2906111793 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1038
GMT 29 Jun 93*

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, June 29 (TANJUG)—U.S. missile attack on Iraqi capital, Baghdad, was perhaps not such a big surprise in the context of Washington-Baghdad relations, but the explanation was intimidating and cautionary, assessed Belgrade press Tuesday [29 June].

U.S. President Bill Clinton set out this was, as he said, an act of legitimate defense, citing U.N. Charter Article 51, but Belgrade POLITIKA daily notes that "one cannot see from this article, just how a planned but not an attempted assassination on the former U.S. President—from the legal viewpoint a private citizen on the soil of Kuwait two months ago—could be interpreted as an armed attack on a U.N. member-country, in this case—the U.S."

"If the U.S. explanation is carefully looked into this would practically mean that the U.S. government could link any attempted attack on a U.S. citizen anywhere in the world to some government in the world and undertake a missile retaliation incomparably more severe than the committed (or only intended) act," writes POLITIKA.

"The U.S. act could therefore be one of the dangerous precedents of the new, unipolar world order, which international law would interpret as the law of the stronger," concludes POLITIKA.

VECERNJE NOVOSTI assesses that the explanation offered by the U.S. Administration was "cellophane transparent, and from which it may be inferred that if tomorrow, and not only in Iraq, the Americans may use their own criteria to target the aims they define as disobedient and dangerous to their interests and execute a missile attack on them, without as much as a pardon even to the U.N. Security Council."

"The target on Sunday was Iraq's intelligence center; tomorrow the target could be some other disobedient center, some other disobedient ministries, some other suspicious facilities," VECERNJE NOVOSTI says.

"It is astonishing that a superpower opted for a step not supported by any tangible reason and proof," writes Belgrade BORBA daily. "This is actually the application of the 'new world order' under which a superpower has the right to administer justice at its own discretion, disregarding whether there was proof for this or not."

"What is causing particular concern is the fact that the U.S. missiles were exploding increasingly closer to the Balkans. It is hard to escape the impression that this was in fact a testing of the world public opinion as to how it

is going to react. Signs are being sent in this way to all those significant politicians in the world who do not fit into the U.S.-conceived framework. And it would seem that such politicians are rife in the Balkans," BORBA concludes.

Official Says Sanctions Aimed at Destruction of FRY*LD2906103293 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1016
GMT 29 Jun 93*

[Text] Belgrade, June 29 (TANJUG)—Strong pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) by some forces of the international community is aimed at total destruction of the country, Vladimir Milacic of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe told TANJUG on Tuesday [29 June].

A long-term hermetic isolation would have destroyed even the industrially more developed countries, said Milacic who is a member of the commission's working group for mechanical engineering industry and automation.

In May last year, the U.N. Security Council imposed stringent economic and political sanctions on the F.R.Y. because of its alleged involvement in the war in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina. The sanctions were later tightened twice.

"Some consequences of the embargo are more disastrous than the material damage. Destruction of the people's mental health is tragic and this is worse than the nuclear explosion over Hiroshima," Milacic added.

He said no country could develop without links with the industrially rich world which would make losses of Yugoslavia's technological lagging immeasurable. But, he added, at the time that all efforts are invested in bare survival, it is difficult to think about a worked-out development programme.

Drought, Sanctions Endanger Harvest*LD2806150593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1436
GMT 28 Jun 93*

[Text] Belgrade, June 28 (TANJUG)—This year's wheat yield will be reduced by between 10 and 30 percent, an official in the Serbian Association of Cooperative Farms said on Monday [28 June].

The yield from the 900,000 hectares planted with wheat is estimated at three million tons, the official, Milan Pavlovic, explained.

The harvest in the Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro started in mid-June, he said and added that it proceeded with great difficulties because of the strict international embargo imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 13 months ago.

Experts say that the yield will be further slashed because of the lack of fertilizers and plant-protecting chemicals.

The biggest problem is the lack of fuel and spare parts for agricultural machinery, said Pavlovic.

The problem is especially pronounced in the Yugoslav granary Vojvodina, where one-fifth of the 7,400 combines are not in operation because of the lack of spare parts.

The state has done its part to secure enough fuel for a successful wheat harvest, Serbian Agriculture Minister Jan Kisgeci told TANJUG.

A total of 30 litres of diesel fuel have been allocated for the harvesting of each hectare planted with wheat, plus the additional five litres for transport, he added.

However, wheat-growing farmers in many parts of Serbia complain that they have received no fuel at all.

Around 10.5 million citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 700,000 refugees from the former Yugoslav Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina vitally depend on the results of this year's harvest.

Bank's Role in Capital Flight Examined

93BA1115B Belgrade NIN in *Srbija-Croatian* 28 May 93 pp 12, 13

[Article by Toma Dzadic: "Hole on the Border"]

[Text] *Individuals are taking hundreds of thousands and millions of marks out of the country through private couriers, but often with suspicious certificates from the National Bank of Yugoslavia.*

When a bus from Belgrade, on the evening of 9 May, got in line in front of the gate at the border with Hungary near Kelebija, close to Subotica, Aleksandar Bakocevic, a member of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia and chairman of the Yugoslav Olympic Committee, immediately got out of it. He asked the border policemen to let the bus through out of order because "they were rushing to the airport in Budapest." The police nevertheless looked at what the passengers were carrying. On 10 passengers they found about \$80,000. None of them had a mark, or a schilling, or a franc—only dollars. The bus was therefore detained for several hours, and Mr. Bakocevic sat in his seat the whole time and stayed silent. The police believe that all the money belonged to one person, and that the bearers were performing a "courier job." The police will not speculate on who the boss might be.

Large amounts of foreign exchange have been discovered in recent months on "convertible couriers." An informed individual from the Yugoslav-Hungarian border confided to this reporter that it is probably a continuation of the "ministerial scandal," but unfortunately, he did not have permission to talk about it officially.

"Contrary to all expectations," our source said, "individual passengers from whom border officials confiscate large amounts of concealed foreign exchange, as a rule,

do not despair at all. As if it were a routine matter, they immediately ask calmly to use the telephone. Usually an intervention follows during the same hour. The foreign exchange is returned to individual influential figures, even before the foreign exchange violation is officially recorded."

Thus, it is said, without any procedure at all \$79,000 found in the door of a certain Slovene's car was returned to one Subotica director. The Slovene also asked to make a telephone call when the foreign exchange was found in his possession.

Most of the "couriers" have official permits from the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ], which are issued when more than 1,000 marks is taken abroad. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that, for example, a sawmill worker has the resources to earn three to four million marks, which, according to NIN's source, is how much one passenger with that background was carrying with an NBJ certificate.

Why are there suspicions about the authenticity of NBJ certificates, which are issued by specially formed commissions? The least stigma is aroused by the fact that these documents have multiplied. Because of the economic blockade, all goods are paid for abroad in cash. Some of those certificates, however, are so sloppy that they are not worthy to be the handiwork of semiliterate people. One of those papers, obtained through the Novi Sad Bank in the amount of 1,530,000 marks, under the heading "type of currency," even had three types of currency marked (erased and written in again). The last time, the German mark was written in, but the traveler with that document was carrying Austrian schillings. Probably the "courier" got fed up with correcting the designation of the currency every time he crossed the border, perhaps with the same certificate?

All the suspicions would be eliminated if the certificates issued were returned from the border to the NBJ so that it could be verified whether they were legally issued. This customary banking method of verification would certainly anger many people who want to take "their foreign exchange wealth acquired by hard work" out of the country.

We called officials to check these stories. We were referred by the border police in Subotica to the Subotica customs house. A half-hour conversation with Milos Vujic, the administrator of that customs house, can be summed up with the explanation: "I am not authorized to issue such information. Ask the Federal Customs Administration in Belgrade!"

"When you come to Belgrade, we will see what interests you!" said Lazar Masanovic, deputy director of the Federal Customs Administration, in a telephone conversation.

In Belgrade, Mr. Masanovic left everything to Marko Rovcanin, chief of staff of the Federal Customs Administration's director, who ended everything, however, with the words:

"The Federal Foreign Exchange Inspectorate is responsible for what you are interested in, not us!"

The Federal Foreign Exchange Inspectorate did not have any notion of any kind of interventions. The deputy of the chief federal foreign exchange inspector, Dragan Lazovic, and the head of the department for foreign exchange violations, Lidija Smiljanic, informed us:

"Those cases of intervention do not even reach us."

Certain decisions by the Federal Foreign Exchange Inspectorate, however, have been changed at a higher level—at the Federal Council for Violations.

Mrs. Jelisaveta Mirkovic, acting president of the Council, thinks that one should not be hasty:

"It cannot be done immediately. It is necessary to analyze cases, to set aside time...."

On this occasion, Federal Customs Administration Director Radoslav Sekulic had time for NIN. In response to a question about whether the Subotica customs house had returned enormous amounts of foreign exchange to some people with his approval, without informing the Federal Foreign Exchange Inspectorate, which is otherwise the only one with jurisdiction for this action, Director Sekulic was categorical.

"Not a mark! Not a pfennig!"

"And do you know where the hundreds of thousands or millions of marks were obtained by those who are taking them out with a permit from the NBJ?"

"That is what we are wondering!"

"How do they obtain the permits?"

"Everything is possible if there is someone at the NBJ who permits it."

"Are you saying that on the basis of certain indications?"

"Naturally, otherwise I would not mention it!"

The director of the Federal Customs Administration believes that this problem could be solved easily if the financial police investigated the business dealings of all those who take large amounts of foreign exchange out of the country.

"I am not certain that it is being done," Director Sekulic said, "but in a year I have not succeeded even once in having NBJ Governor Vuk Ognjanovic receive me so that we could talk about similar problems. He never had time for it."

Finally, a question for Director Sekulic inevitably followed about whether he really did have a private firm of

his own in Budapest and two in Germany, as he allegedly boasted every time to his colleagues in Subotica, which he also passes through frequently while traveling abroad.

"For heaven's sake! That is all incorrect information... Totally incorrect!"

That concluded this telephone conversation. About a minute later, however, Director Sekulic called with an additional explanation.

"I very frequently travel through Subotica, because I travel abroad in order to help the Javora firms there from Ivanjica. I was the director of Javora for more than 30 years, and so I still help them and often travel abroad for that reason, and someone misinterpreted it...."

Restrictions on Interest Rates Lifted

93BA1124B Belgrade *POLITIKA* in Serbo-Croatian 5
Jun 93 p 9

[Article by B. Dunic: "After a Decision by the National Bank: New Interest Rates as of Monday"]

[Text] Bankers welcome the decision of the Central Bank but also warn of possible harmful consequences

As late as yesterday limited interest rates were in effect in all banks, but as of Monday every one of them, according to a decision by the Council of Governors of the National Bank of Yugoslavia which should go into effect today, will establish new, higher interest rates, based on its business interest.

The bankers are welcoming the latest decision for the most part, because the limited interest rates up to now have smothered them in their operations. Indeed, they add that the decision is another extreme and that the monetary authority should have changed the discount rate earlier, that is to say gradually, because it has jumped abruptly from 34 percent to 120 percent. About 3.8 times over.

Therefore, according to Dragoljub Vukosavljevic, president of Union Bank, bankers would now have to consider how much to raise the interest rate.

"In accordance with the discount rate, interest rates should now increase within real parameters in order for users of credit to be able to follow them. Interest rates should also be directed at deposits. And as far as the citizens are concerned, we still don't know what interest rates we will establish for them, but we have been moderate up to now, as far as they are concerned.

Mr. Vukosavljevic believes that the monetary authorities must stand in the way of those who are establishing extremely high interest rates. At the same time he expresses satisfaction that the National Bank of Yugoslavia is giving agriculture its rightful place in primary issuance for the first time. Namely, interest rates for credits from primary issuance for wheat, corn, oleaceous plants...will amount to 30 percent monthly.

The president of the Commercial Bank, Ljubomir Mihajlovic, says that he also insisted some time ago at meetings in the federal government that market interest rates be introduced, but that the Central Bank thought up something "new" and limited interest rates, so that along with the foreign embargo, it also set up an internal embargo on the operations of banks.

"I support market interest rates, as long as all banks that determine interest rates outside market rates are warned that taxes, and this progressively, will be greater than revenues. Naturally, the problem is that two states are still conducting a tax policy, and only the federal state should conduct it," says Mr. Mihajlovic.

Serbia

Milosevic Speaks on Sanctions During Festivities

AU2806201093 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Report by Sladjana Stamenkovic]

[Excerpt] The President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, attended the central festivities celebrating the nine centuries of the city of Vranje, which was held last night at the Yumco stadium.

[Begin Milosevic recording] Citizens of Vranje, allow me to first of all thank you for the hospitality you are extending to us tonight. Both Mira and I are very happy to be here tonight in Vranje with you. Allow me, first of all, to sincerely congratulate you on the 900 years of your city's existence and to tell you that I am firmly convinced that Vranje and its citizens, this city and this region, are celebrating this high jubilee in the best possible manner with their great work and with their conduct, at a time when our entire country and people are under the greatest pressure ever to befall a people in the 20th century.

You here in Vranje have demonstrated how these pressures should be dealt with and what the right answer to these sanctions is. The sanctions are aimed at achieving certain goals and certain results that in this Serbian land shall never be achieved by force. You have given this answer primarily by increasing production, increasing exports, increasing salaries, increasing even investments. Therefore, you have given the right response to all those who think that the sanctions will be lifted through concessions and begging.

The sanctions will disappear precisely through this behavior, and I am very glad that today we see that in this respect, Vranje can serve as an example of how one should work when the country is in difficulties, when it is under such pressure. It is my wish that in the future Vranje continue with these great results in the interest of the entire city and region, in the interest of Serbia's south, and in the interest of all of Serbia. Long live Serbia! Long live Vranje, and long live all the citizens of

Vranje! I congratulate you once more on your high jubilee. Thank you! [end recording] [passage omitted]

Deputies Elect Arandjelovic New Assembly Chairman

AU2906093493 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Report by Zoran Vaskovic from the Serbian Assembly]

[Excerpt] As was expected, the new chairman of the Serbian Assembly was elected during the first part of the session. Dr. Zoran Arandjelovic, former deputy prime minister of the republic government, was elected at the proposal of a group of 85 deputies, which was explained by Zoran Andjelkovic, president of the club of deputies of the Serbian Socialist Party.

In a public vote, 197 deputies voted for Zoran Arandjelovic as chairman of the Serbian Assembly, 5 were against, and 37 abstained. This part of the session was also attended by FRY President Zoran Lilic, who was until recently chairman of the republican parliament.

The Serbian Assembly has called for a recess. The session will continue in 15 minutes. Let me also add that the post of one vice chairman of the republic Assembly has also become vacant since the deputies accepted a request today by Zoran Cetkovic to be relieved of his post due to a new assignment. [passage omitted]

Results of Poll on Vance-Owen Plan Published

93BA1115A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 28 May 93 p 8

[Article by Darko Brocic: "How We Are Divided"]

[Text] Abrupt reversals in politics always lead to regroupings in the electorate. What is shown by the latest public opinion polls in Serbia?

Up until recently, on the Serbian political scene we had a fairly uniform position among all the largest political parties on the Vance-Owen plan—it was felt that in the version initially offered it was unacceptable for the Serbs and that it should not be signed. Public opinion in Serbia also reacted similarly. After the stormy session of the [Bosnian] Serb republic's Assembly in Bijeljina (on Sunday, 25 April), at which the deputies were unanimously against signing the Vance-Owen plan, and in spite of the letter from FRY President Cosic, Serbian President Milosevic, and Montenegrin President Bulatovic, in which they decisively advocated signing that plan, the situation began to change drastically. A whole series of very important events followed: Karadzic's conditional signing at the meeting in Athens after extraordinary pressure; the Serb republic Assembly's session in Jahorina on 6 May; the decision on denying aid to the Serb republic from Serbia and Yugoslavia; the closing of the borders to the Serb republic's leaders; the failure of Serb republic deputies to come to

the meeting of the five Serbian assemblies at the Sava Center; the referendum in the Serb republic in which the vast majority of citizens voted against the offered plan; etc.

Restructuring in Progress

The polls of public opinion in Serbia that were conducted at the time of the latest political events (the Partner Agency, and NIN's Forum) show that the voters, although with a certain delay, nevertheless followed the change in official policy. According to the latest public opinion poll (NIN's Forum, 8 May), 62.5 percent of Serbia's citizens felt that the Vance-Owen plan should be signed (29.5 percent were against it). A poll conducted two days earlier (the Partner Agency, 6 May) also yielded very similar results (61.7 percent in favor of signing, and 18.3 percent against it). About 10 days earlier, after the session in Bijeljina, public opinion was completely divided, however. Specifically, at that time 39.4 percent supported signing the plan, while 37.6 percent were against it (the Partner Agency, 27 April). Also, just a little over a month before that, a majority of voters in Serbia (72.5 percent) were against signing the Vance-Owen plan in the version of that time (9 April, the Partner Agency).

Immediately after the session in Bijeljina, almost a quarter of the electorate could not choose whether the offered plan should be signed. That can be explained as a reflection of the confusion caused by the abrupt change in the official policy (inaugurated in the three presidents' letter). Soon, however, the voters succeeded in more or less "catching up" with the current changes in the political behavior of leaders and the leadership. Of course, the extremely strong media support for the new policy of the leadership here also made a big contribution to this.

The most vivid example of the significant reversal that happened is the reaction of SPS [Serbian Socialist Party] sympathizers. After the Bijeljina session, the majority was still against signing (46.6 percent against, 42.7 percent in favor). Immediately before the Assembly session in Jahorina, i.e., just about 10 days later, the situation had changed considerably—65.5 percent were in favor of signing, and 17.9 percent were against it. After the initial shock, a majority of SPS sympathizers thus still continued to follow their leader. A new element, however, is that Milosevic did not win the support of a majority of Serbia's citizens, and he did not even succeed in winning over all of his party's sympathizers.

The Serbian Radical Party's sympathizers are mostly following their leader—the majority was and remained against signing, although there was an increase in the number of those in favor of signing. If it continues its radical policy, it may end up losing some of its more moderate sympathizers. The voters inclined toward the Democratic Party remained consistent in their belief that the plan should be signed, in spite of all its shortcomings. It is characteristic of DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] that the majority is in favor of

signing the plan, while the number of opponents of signing is not negligible either. To some extent, this is also expected, since it is a coalition of parties, and the most significant of them have not always had the same positions on the Vance-Owen plan.

New Shifts

Stormy events that follow each other with lightning speed, of course, will also cause new shifts in Serbia's electorate. It seems that it is already clear now that the more radical wing of the SPS will be more and more inclined toward [Serbian Radical Party leader] Seselj, and that it will be difficult for Milosevic to win them over for his new policy of compromise. Also, Milosevic's reversal in the policy toward Serbs in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina may cause the loss of a considerable number of votes, among both refugees and citizens of Serbia who are from that area, of whom there are a considerable number. Since the SPS has the largest electorate, these expected shifts will not be insignificant. The Serbian Radical Party will probably lose some of its more moderate supporters, but on the other hand, it will win over the more radical SPS supporters. No significant shifts should be expected among the opposition.

On the basis of the data presented and the sequence of events to date, we are justified in assuming that the confrontation between opponents and supporters of the Vance-Owen plan will also continue in Serbia. The positions displayed at the recent meeting at the Sava Center in Belgrade may serve as an example of the direction in which that confrontation will probably develop.

The question of how really firm is the belief of the majority of Serbia's citizens that the offered plan should be signed is also being raised. Let us look at what we are shown by some of the results of NIN's poll. Thus, 67 percent of the citizens think that control of the borders with the Serb republic should not be permitted, and more than half of those polled (57 percent) think that the Army of Yugoslavia will defend the Serbs if there is a military intervention against the Serb republic. The fact that a majority does not approve of the denial of aid to the Serbs in the Serb republic is also consistent with this. Particularly interesting is the fact that young people, in their statements, are harsher champions of all these positions than older people.

One is also justified in raising the question of whether some sudden turn will once again turn Serbia's unstable political body around. Experience to date tells us that drastic shifts in public opinion here are extremely possible. What has happened during the past month is the best confirmation of that.

Sanctions Impact on Political System

93BA1115C Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 28 May 93 pp 14, 15

[Article by Bogdan Ivanisevic: "Pol Potism in Sight"]

[Text] *Since the sanctions were imposed, the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] has been the biggest loser of supporters, which calls some prevalent views into question. The main loser, however, is the population, which will be cut in half during the next two decades if the sanctions remain.*

Several days after the sanctions were imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, one could read in THE WALL STREET JOURNAL that "In Havana, Fidel Castro is fatter and fatter, and his people are thinner and thinner." In the meantime, the world also learned about an unusual disease—the loss of sight because of malnutrition—from which tens of thousands of Cubans suffer. During 1992, on the coast of Florida, 2,500 Cubans were caught trying to enter the United States illegally. Nevertheless, even after 30 years of sanctions Castro is in power, and two months ago the inhabitants of this island country once again flocked to the (one-party) elections—according to the official data, the turnout was 99 percent of the registered voters.

Most of the world media and the entire opposition in Serbia have been warning about that phenomenon—that a people suffering from the international community's sanctions rallies around its government—from the start. The surprisingly large number of voters who participated in last year's ("rump") May elections, in response to Security Council Resolution 757, which had been passed a few days earlier, has already been interpreted as the people's response to the announced embargo.

The prevalent view that the sanctions strengthened the Belgrade regime during the past year was only called into question on the eve of the December elections, when some polls put Milan Panic ahead of Slobodan Milosevic. After those elections, the world disappointingly concluded that the sanctions were not yielding results: not only were they not stopping the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, but they were also not threatening the Serbian regime. It is only now, after Milosevic's concurrence with the Vance-Owen plan, that Western media are writing that "in contrast to the chaos that prevails in other sectors of the West's policy on Bosnia, it seems that only the punitive measures against Serbia and Montenegro have proved successful" (THE GUARDIAN).

Benefit From the Sanctions

Did those punitive measures really help the authorities domestically? Goran Percevic, vice president of the SPS, thinks that they have not: "The economic blockade is the main reason that explains the smaller number of votes for our party in the December 1992 elections, in comparison with December 1992 [as published]. The sanctions are causing big social problems and represent an unpleasant atmosphere for any ruling party, including the SPS. Unemployment and the deterioration in the standard of living and general living conditions are creating dissatisfaction among citizens, and that is allowing the opposition to blame the ruling party. On the other hand, great disgust has appeared among some

voters against those who imposed the sanctions, which has promoted radical attitudes. The gradual elimination of the sanctions will create the conditions for the SPS's influence to reach the 1990 level again."

Radoslav Stojanovic, vice president of the Democratic Party of Serbia and a professor of international law at the Belgrade Law School, also does not agree with the view that the sanctions strengthened the authorities in Serbia. He thinks that with respect to the citizens of Serbia, one can observe an "ambivalent state of awareness, which on the one hand undoubtedly rejects the sanctions as an injustice committed against our state, but on the other hand, it is quite logical that the broad masses cannot accept the fact that life is getting worse and worse in one state, regardless of the cause. That is why the authorities in Serbia are continually losing their standing, as the December elections confirmed."

An observation that could be made here, that the SPS's lost votes mostly went to those who are seeking "even more of the same" (the Serbian Radical Party), is losing significance after the latest reversals on the Serbian political scene. If the conflict between the Radicals and the Socialists continues, the fact will remain that the sanctions "robbed" the Socialists of several hundred thousand supporters. It is less important whether these defectors are criticizing the ruling party for being too conciliatory or for irrational intransigence.

The sanctions, especially during the first few months, had a key role in events on the Serbian political scene. Inclined toward apocalyptic conclusions and believing economists' predictions, priests and writers openly sided with Milosevic's opponents (the Serbian Orthodox Church's memorandum, and the founding of Depos [Democratic Movement of Serbia]). The always rebellious students gained a perfect excuse for one more expression of dissatisfaction. Milosevic expressed willingness to withdraw if that would lead to elimination of the sanctions. Obviously he decided that it would not. Furthermore, as early as the fifth day after the sanctions were imposed, in a NEW YORK TIMES interview the Serbian president said that there would be enough food, coal, and electricity in Serbia. He repeated that during the election campaign, casually revealing our republic's large oil resources (eight opposition deputies then proposed that Serbia submit a request for admission to OPEC). The television company, however, framed Milan Panic because the sanctions were expanded during the 100 days of his rule, and said that he was responsible for it.

Today it seems that in this political exploitation of the sanctions everyone told an untruth: the economists and the opposition-minded part of the public exaggerated a little—or were at least premature—in their catastrophic predictions, and the authorities went too far in their (in)sincere optimism. Seeing this, both sides "reduced their perception," although not completely (about 20 days before Serbia proper gave its support to the Vance-Owen plan, Zoran Lilic said that we had enough food

and that consequently the world could not seriously hurt us). Most citizens believed those who claimed that the embargo would not produce disastrous consequences, and that even if it did, the sacrifice had to be endured.

We Will Not Eat Roots

Svetislav Tabarosi, a professor of economic policy at the Law School, distinguishes three groups of societies in terms of the population's reaction to sanctions: in developed countries, with a democratic tradition, a blockade would cause great social upheavals, which would lead to the elimination of their causes; in undemocratic countries, with a lower level of development, with a small proportion of foreign trade or with a "regionally" oriented economy (Cuba and the USSR), sanctions can last indefinitely, because the people will not essentially regress from their previous situation. It is most complicated in the countries "in between."

"The degree of political democracy here is not such that one can expect neutralization (through elections, for example) of the conduct that led to the embargo. The sanctions are unequally 'distributed' among the population—citizens are suffering most, and peasants less, because farmers are not as technologically dependent upon the world. Over half the population here lives in cities, admittedly, but psychologically we are not urbanized enough. In that respect, we are closer to the second group of countries. It is not just that we think that we can hold out under the sanctions for a long time, but also that we really can. Even if the sanctions lasted 20 years, we would not be 'eating roots,' and we would not die of starvation or illness. The price would be a decline into Pol Potism: a return to a village way of life, the 'dispersion' of the cities and the market economy, a complete return to nature, and a 'besieged fortress' psychology," Prof. Tabarosi said.

He recalled that during the 1948-1951 period, Yugoslavia already passed through similar experiences. Tabarosi also emphasized that we would indirectly nevertheless pay the same price as dying from starvation or an epidemic—the death rate that corresponds to the current income of \$600 is 35 per thousand, and the average life span is 62-63 years. The death rate of 18 per thousand and the life span of 75 years correspond to the level of \$4,000 that we had in 1989. The population would thus be cut in half over the next two decades.

That kind of demographic catastrophe is not visible to the naked eye, and it would only start in a year or so. That is why the voters in Serbia—as was seen in the elections—showed that they were not shaken, and put their trust in the parties that are "not bowing down." There was never really a social rebellion in sight. The recent strike by the Independent Trade Union was barely noticed by anyone, and the Independent Trade Union sent letters to foreign embassies accusing the world because of the embargo. If the sanctions influenced

Milosevic's decision to support the Vance-Owen plan, it was not because of fear of "the dissatisfaction of the starving masses."

The issue of Milosevic's survival in power has been linked to the sanctions from the very start. There has been general agreement among analysts that one of the goals of the Security Council resolutions on the sanctions—although not directly mentioned—is a change of regime in Belgrade. This kind of conclusion is supported by occasional statements from Western officials (Willi Klaus, the Belgian foreign minister...). After the victory in the presidential elections and especially after the support given to the Vance-Owen plan, no one is thinking about Milosevic's departure any more. A few days ago one could even hear the idea that the West might moderate the sanctions if necessary to help Milosevic in the conflict with domestic extremists!

Tightening or Elimination?

Radoslav Stojanovic said that the authorities in Serbia had realized that they had to act in accordance with what the international community was seeking from them, i.e., become obedient: "I expect that the sanctions—at least the harshest ones—will be gradually eliminated by the end of the year. Otherwise, the country would experience a real catastrophe, along with the authorities that are responsible for it."

In addition to Milosevic's "cooperativeness," Stojanovic also sees a reason for eliminating the sanctions in the geopolitical and transit position of Serbia, whose isolation for a longer period would hurt a large number of countries.

"Because of other countries' enormous economic interest, the sanctions will actually be gradually eliminated," Goran Percevic said. "Furthermore, the Americans have so far treated the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina as aggression, but they have started to see it as a civil war, thanks to the skillful diplomatic maneuvers of Serbia and its president. This represents a very essential fact for the elimination of the sanctions."

Admittedly, there are also different views, according to which the Washington declaration by the group of five ministers demonstrates that the West will persist in the sanctions until Yugoslavia suffers a complete collapse, which would probably force the Bosnian Serbs to give up their policy. This sort of approach is risky—the threshold of endurance of the population here is unusually high....

The Security Council's resolutions mostly contain demands that have to do with the (Serbian) population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If Serbia convinces the world that it cannot influence the Bosnian Serbs, the sense in keeping the sanctions is lost. Admittedly, the refusal to accept observers on the border of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is not the best way of removing the world's lack of trust in the sincerity of the new Serbian policy.

Serbian Radical Party Deputy Interviewed

93BA1137C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 8
Jun 93 p 10

[Article by Ivana Anojcic: "Who Are the Deputies to the Serbian Assembly: Easier on the Battlefield Than in Parliament"]

[Text] *Dusica Nikolic, a deputy of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] in the republic Assembly, says that things were easier for her on the battlefield than now in parliament, because on the battlefield she knew who her enemy was.*

Our interview with Dusica Nikolic, a deputy of the Serbian Radical Party in the People's Assembly of Serbia, in one of the offices of parliament is interrupted several times by telephone calls from people interested in knowing whether and when they will receive humanitarian aid. "Right now I am involved in collecting humanitarian aid, organized by the Main Committee of the SRS for fighters of the Serb republic [of Bosnia-Herzegovina]. Around 300 metric tons of aid have been collected thus far, and it is going out in five directions: Banja Luka, Doboje, Ozren-Majevica, Trebinje, and Sarajevo."

These are the destinations for the humanitarian aid, and then the goods are reloaded and make the rounds along the entire front. "By touring the field, we realized that although civilians are getting aid, the fighters are in the most remote positions and it is hardest for them to get humanitarian aid. One portion is also distributed among the families of those who have died and hospitals."

Five Months in Captivity

Dusica Nikolic knows very well how things are for fighters on the battlefield, because she fought in western Slavonia and Masicka Sagovina; she also spent five months in captivity in Nova Gradiska and Kerestinec. A year has passed since she was exchanged. "I have put on weight, my wounds have healed, now things are great. In the end, I came home alive. Any prison is rough, but the enemy Ustashi ones...."

"I was not the only girl among the volunteers, there were others. I thought that I would cook and treat the wounded, because before that I knew nothing. But instead I took up a gun. When the Ustashi attacked us on 19 December 1991, and it was a strong attack, nearly all my friends were killed. Few of us returned then. Moreover, they beat us every day, and there were people dead and wounded. My story about the war is not pretty, we were continually going into action, on reconnaissance. The fact that I had been captured was concealed from my mother because she would not have survived that."

The deputy says that she felt that she had to go to the front, because she had been "raised from childhood to be a good Serb. I felt that I had to go, even without knowing what war was. Before that, I had lived as all Belgardians. I had friends, I went out, and I was active in sports.

When I decided to go to the front, I had my hair cut very short, let it return to its natural color, and trimmed my fingernails. If it were not for my party, I probably would have never come home. I am especially grateful to Vojislav Seselj and the dukes who also helped me, Ljubisa Petkovic and Zoran Drazilovic."

Nikolic says this about why she decided to join the Serbian Radical Party: "In the past, I had never been a member of any party. I first joined the Serbian Chetnik Movement in 1990, and when the SRS was registered, I was attracted by Vojislav Seselj, whom I liked as a person, and our political positions concurred as well. I have always been a good Serb, some say even a great one. At the time, Seselj was the only good Serb, with a good political and economic program."

Appeal to All Serbs

Concerning the Assembly, she thinks that it is harmful that the parliament and certain committees are dealing with issues that should not be on the agenda at this time of war. "For Serbia, Montenegro, the Serb republic, and Serbian Krajina, the most important problem is agriculture. The Serbian Radical Party has stood up for pensioners and other employees and sought to reduce the difference between earnings. The Assembly should devote more attention to ending the war and helping our Serbian brothers in the borderlands. I would give particular emphasis to the wounded, invalids, and the families of the dead, who have not been provided for. The majority of those who have been killed have left large families behind, and someone must care for them. I am a member of the Committee for Labor and Veterans Affairs, and we are in frequent contact with the competent ministry on that issue."

On relations in parliament, she says that she does not expect support from DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia], nor from the DS [Democratic Party] and DZVM [Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians], "because they will not support our proposals even when the national interest is at stake, neither on political nor on economic issues."

Dusica Nikolic was born in 1962 in Belgrade, where she completed secondary technical school and enrolled in the mechanics program at the College of Science and Math. She is unmarried, lives with her parents and brother, and says that she likes being with her mom. She says that now it will be hard for her to finish college because she is involved in politics and uses every free moment to visit the families of dead soldiers and fighters at the front. Comparing the battlefield and parliament, she says, "It was easier for me to shoot and be on the battlefield than to sit in the Assembly. Because on the battlefield I knew who the enemy was, while here it is hard for me, because these are my Serbs, it is hard for me to see that we are the same people, but whatever happens, happens." About herself she also says reluctantly that she has trained in karate, that she has a blue belt, but that she stopped training after an injury.

Finally, she issues an appeal to all Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro to help the Serb republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina as much as possible.

Belgrade Student Paper Ceases Publication

93BA1124A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jun 93 p 8

["Announcement from the Editorial Staff of the newspaper of Belgrade students: STUDENT Ceases Publication"]

[Text] The Belgrade student newspaper, STUDENT, will no longer be published, the editorial staff of the newspaper announced yesterday.

It is said that this is the epilogue of a two-month struggle for the survival of the newspaper, which was waged between STUDENT and the Union of Students of Belgrade.

The editorial staff's announcement recalled that the clash developed at that moment when the president of the Union of Students, Slavisa Orlovic, evicted STUDENT's editorial staff in order to rent their premises to a private firm.

"The Editorial Staff no longer wanted to be under the wing of an organization in which a group of permanent students, with Slavisa Orlovic at the head, lives at the expense of all others, spending tens of thousands of marks of state money, intended for all students."

The announcement claims that the Union of Students of Belgrade was assisted by the former president of the University Conference of the SSO [Socialist Youth League], Slavoljub Veselinovic, now employed in the Republic Ministry of Education, who believes that the editorial staff must leave, because the editor in chief is Slobodan Vuksanovic, a representative of the Democratic Party.

Foreign Passports Sold on Black Market

93BA1155A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 8 Jun 93 p 16

[Unattributed STA article: "A Thousand Marks for a Slovene Passport"]

[Text] Belgrade, 8 Jun—The most sought-after "commodity" on the Belgrade and Serbian black market is foreign passports and visas. Dealers even advertise their business on television, and there is also an agency in Belgrade that engages in this business quite legally and publicly. For 500 to 1,000 German marks, one can buy from it the passports of about 10 countries, including Botswana, Guinea, Mauritania, Cameroon, and Rhodesia [as published]. Recently a trade in passports from the former Yugoslav republics, which is still underground, has also been flourishing. A buyer from Serbia or Montenegro has to go to Budapest and pay 1,000 German marks there for a partially forged Slovene passport. Allegedly the expenditure is worth it in spite of

the risk, since with a Slovene passport it is possible to travel to most of the EC countries, and it is also easier for the owner to become employed. Allegedly many people bribe Slovene customs officials and other government representatives to allow them to enter and leave Slovenia freely, and also to engage in smuggling.

Vojvodina

Mayor Warned Not To Introduce Croatian Language

LD2806214993 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] The leader of the Serbian Radical Party has threatened Jozsef Kasza, the mayor of Subotica, not to attempt to introduce Croatian as an official language in the town. Vojislav Seselj has said that Croats have never lived in this town of Vojvodina, only Catholic Serbs loyal to Serbia, and Sokacs, a Slavonic ethnic group. Seselj, known for his extremist views, has called the town government, consisting of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina and the Democratic Association of Croats in Vojvodina, a traitor coalition.

Former Minister, Officials Involved in Oil Scandal

93BA1137E Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Jun 93 p 13

[Article by Rade Subotic: "Big Oil Scandal Looming in Vojvodina: Cooperative Members and Farmers Swindled"]

[Text] A cooperative association and bank, together with the private firm "Jusako," received 1.2 million German marks [DM] from cooperatives and farmers for the delivery of 1.7 million liters of petroleum, but only one million liters were delivered; where are the key people in this affair—Petar Ilic and Savo Pejovic?

Sombor, 8 Jun—The ministerial affair is still not over, but a new one is already looming, involving a former minister and former Vojvodina officials. This is a petroleum scandal in which the main protagonists are Petar Ilic, the president of the Cooperative Association of Vojvodina and the former provincial minister of agriculture, and Savo Pejovic, the former top man at "Jugent" in Novi Sad and currently the director of the firm "Jusako," also in Novi Sad.

Given the serious shortage of petroleum, worried members of cooperatives and farmers in Belgrade accepted an offer by Petar Ilic to provide them with corresponding quantities of oil through the Cooperative Association of Vojvodina. Thus, more than 50 cooperatives paid DM1.2 million for 1.7 million liters of petroleum, to cover the needs of a thousand farmers. Individual cooperatives got certain quantities, and then the deliveries stopped. This was last October. All efforts by the cooperatives to get the oil for which they had paid were in

vain. Petar Ilic, whose offer was the basis for the cooperatives entering into this transaction, promised to deliver the goods and placed all the blame on the private firm "Jusako" in Novi Sad, which is owned by Savo Pejovic. So this has been going on for eight months now.

Among those suffering the most harm from this is the "Zadugarka" Agricultural Cooperative in Sombor. Its director, Dr. Gojko Djurica, says that since they believed the Cooperative Association and its president, Petar Ilic, they paid for 300,000 liters of oil through the Cooperative Bank in Novi Sad. They received a little more than 80,000 liters.

"Zadugarka" has blamed Vojvodina cooperative agencies, which have claimed that the entire transaction concerning the delivery of oil came to a halt at the private firm "Jusako" in Novi Sad.

Middlemen and Swindlers

The Agricultural Cooperative in Bezdan is also on the list of those swindled in the oil scandal. According to attorney Milorad Veljovic, the head of legal services for that cooperative, they too trusted Petar Ilic and the Cooperative Association of Vojvodina. It is true that they paid a little less than the people in Sombor, a total of 60,000 liters of petroleum, he says in jest. Over the course of eight months, they received only 6,000 liters. We asked Veljovic what he expects from the complaint that they have filed with the Economic Court in Novi Sad.

"Obviously, this is a case of murky dealings by middlemen and swindlers. We are not familiar with 'Jusako' or any of the other firms that are being mentioned now. We made all our payments fair and square to the Cooperative Association of Vojvodina, having confidence in the association president, Petar Ilic. Time and the police investigation will determine whether the former minister of agriculture of Vojvodina, Pero Ilic, is also involved in the murky dealings," Veljovic stresses.

Everyone Took Commission

Nikola Repac, the director of the "Ravnica" Agricultural Cooperative in Ridjica, says that a contract was concluded with the Cooperative Association of Vojvodina and that money was paid to the Cooperative Bank in Novi Sad for 13 carloads of petroleum. They received eight and are still waiting for the other five, like all the other swindled cooperative members.

"Today, besides the complaint that I am going to file with the Economic Court in Novi Sad, I will also request the assistance of the SUP [Secretariat of Internal Affairs] and the financial police of Vojvodina," says Repac.

We tried to reach the top man and boss of the controversial firm "Jusako," Savo Pejovic, by telephone. After we failed to do so, his assistant, Bogdan Ostojic, told us briefly what had happened to the bank and the unused petroleum. According to his explanation, Petar Ilic retained their firm to provide 1.7 million [liters] for the needs of Vojvodina cooperatives and farmers. Money totalling DM1.2 million arrived in the account of "Jusako," but the petroleum was not delivered.

"We managed to deliver certain quantities to individuals. Thus far, we have delivered a total of approximately one million liters of petroleum. We have yet to send out the remaining 700,000 liters, and I believe that we will do so shortly," Ostojic emphasized.

He told us that everyone in this deal was paid in advance and drew a commission, even though not all the oil was delivered. The Cooperative Association of Vojvodina earned 15 dinars (at last October's value) for every liter of oil, while the Cooperative Bank took a 2 percent commission on the total amount of DM1.2 million. Ostojic says that the remaining quantity of oil would have been delivered if it were not for the embargo and blockade, and that this would have happened through the private firm "Krasko" in Belgrade, which they had also involved in this deal. He said that the director and boss of "Jusako," Savo Pejovic, had left for Bulgaria in order to supply the remaining quantities of petroleum to the cooperatives and farmers.

The people with whom we spoke, the directors of the agricultural cooperatives in Sombor, Bezdan, and Ridjica, hope that the SUP and financial police will determine who all is involved in the latest oil scandal in Vojvodina, and to what extent.

[Box, p 13]

Key Man "in Belgrade"

There is no doubt that Petar Ilic, the president of the Cooperative Association of Vojvodina and the former provincial minister of agriculture, is the key man in this oil scandal.

We tried to speak with him today by telephone, but were told that he is in Belgrade.